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“The ability to take in information and
make it one’s own by processing it,
restructuring it, and then presenting it in
a form so that it can be understood by
others (or by oneself at a later point) is
one of those ‘basic skills’ that is useful
throughout life” (Cohen, Kim, Tan, &
Winkelmes, 2013).

THE FACTS
Studies show 11% of a lecture is typically
captured in a first-year college student’s
notes.

Even the best students only capture 75%
of a lecture.
(Kiewra, 1985)

The quality of notes taken
during a lecture has a
direct relationship to
retention of the material
presented.

“Researchers have found that if
important information is contained
in notes, it has a 34% chance of
being remembered. Information
not found in notes only has a 5%
chance of being remembered”
(Howe, 1970 as cited in Longman
& Atkinson, 1999).

Myth: “I just have to copy what my
teacher writes on the board.”

Reality: Not everything written on
the board is important.

BEFORE CLASS…
- Review notes from other classes
and readings.
- Clarify unclear points.

Successful
Note-Taking
A GUIDE FOR STUDENTS

DURING CLASS…
- Make notes easy to read.
- Underline key words.
- Connect important thoughts.
- Listen for key words/cues.
“The most important point…”
“The three ideas…”
- Request handouts of complicated
diagrams.
- Leave a space if you miss something.

THE FINDINGS
The Good News

The Bad News

“Studies show that during a
20-minute lecture, you
retain approximately 70%
of what is presented in the
first 10 minutes.”

“You only retain 20% of
what is presented in the
last 10 minutes.”

(Kiewra, 1985)

CAN YOU RECALL?
After hearing a lecture, studies show the
average student is able to recall:
50% after 1 day
35% after 1 week
20% after 2 weeks

Taking notes is critical!

AFTER CLASS…
- Within 24 hours, review, clarify,
and elaborate.
- Do it again a week later, and then
a month later.

Having trouble taking
notes during class?

Talk to your instructor.

Socrates – Historical Background and Key Themes
Life as a Divine Mission

Image 1: Socrates ("Socrates" by Ian W Scott is licensed under CC BY-SA 2.0 )
Socrates (469 – 399 BCE) was the first philosopher in Ancient Greece to think critically about
how people should live. In other words, he was the first serious philosophical ethicist in the west
and the first to reflect seriously about the good life. His thought and his life are inspirational; as
the great Roman stateman and orator Cicero put it: “All philosophers think of themselves and
want others to think of them as followers of Socrates.”
Socrates wrote nothing. What we know of him is based on the writings of his great student and
lifelong admirer Plato and to a lesser extent a comedic play by Aristophanes and the work of a
historian named Xenophon. Evidence from all three sources suggests that Socrates was very
unusual. He was poor and spent most of his time in public places engaging people in
philosophical conversations. He was ugly, walked around barefoot with a swagger or waddle,
and he was not bothered by extremes of heat and cold. Apparently, he could drink a lot of
alcohol without getting drunk. He had three sons by his wife Xanthippe. Socrates also had
unusual religious beliefs. He claimed a childhood friend named Chaerephon had once asked the
priestess at Delphi if anyone was wiser than Socrates. (Delphi is the site of a shrine to Apollo,
Greek god of light, intelligence, and the arts.) The ambiguous reply Chaerephon received was
that “no one is wiser.” Socrates also thought he was guided by a daimonion, a sort of divine
“voice” or a “sign.”
Socrates was put to death for his philosophical views. The speech he gave in defense of himself
at his trial is reconstructed in The Apology, written by Plato. Evidence from a different Platonic
dialogue, Crito, suggests Socrates could have escaped from jail had he wanted, by allowing
wealthy friends to bribe the prison guard. Socrates refused the offer, arguing it would be wrong
for him to escape, and so he was executed. A different Platonic dialogue, Euthyphro, portrays
Socrates’ typical manner of philosophical conversation. By embarrassing Euthyphro, the
dialogue shows why Socrates may have become so despised by wealthy and powerful people in
Athens.
Some brief historical and political context is relevant. In Socrates’ youth, the city-state of
Athens was prosperous, democratic, and its culture was vibrant. This changed following the
long and difficult Peloponnesian War with rival Sparta. Socrates apparently served admirably in
the war and saved the life of Alcibiades, an Athenian general. Sparta finally conquered Athens
in 404 B.C., five years before Socrates was executed. After the war, Sparta demanded that
Athens’ democratic assembly be replaced by the so-called “Thirty Tyrants,” a council composed
of three members from each of Athens’ ten tribes. The council confiscated property from

wealthy Athenians and killed some 1,500 political opponents. They were replaced by of “Board
of Ten” which instituted a wave of democratic reforms, including amnesty for past crimes.
Despite the reforms, many jurors at Socrates’ trial may have been in a mood to find scapegoats
for Athens’ humiliating defeat by the Spartans and its subsequent turmoil.
Key Themes
1. Virtue is Knowledge
Socrates is well-known for various paradoxical sayings: one of Socrates’ more puzzling ideas is
his belief that virtue is knowledge. Most people nowadays think of ethical or moral virtues
(excellences) as character states, not a mere mental or cognitive state like knowledge. The
striking implication of Socrates’ identification of virtue with knowledge is that he thinks when
someone does ethical wrong, he or she must have been acting in ignorance. In other words, he
believes one cannot both really know that something is wrong and do it anyway.
Why would anyone think this? Socrates’ view makes more sense when we notice two additional
background assumptions he makes but does not mention specifically. The first assumption is
that everyone always does and desires what he or she thinks is overall best for him- or herself.
The second assumption is that what is virtuous, righteous and just is what is overall best for each
individual to do. (Notice how striking this idea is: most people typically think that the right thing
to do is often quite different from the thing that best serves their interests.) From these two
assumptions, it follows logically that any action that is not for the best must be the result of
ignorance. People do the wrong thing not because even though they may not think it’s the right
thing to do, it’s still not what they want to. (Put differently: They do what they want to do rather
than what they know to be the right thing.) Rather, Socrates’ view is that they fail to do the right
thing because they are ignorant about what is really best for them to do, or what it is genuinely in
their interest to do.
2. The Unexamined Life is Not Worth Living
Another famous Socratic claim is the idea that the unexamined life is not worth living. On the
face of it, this seems false – cannot a relatively simple life, full of enjoyment but little intellectual
activity or reflection, be worth living? After all, many higher animals seem incapable of
thinking about the meaning of life or anything like this, but as long as their lives are mostly free
from pain and suffering and include food and decent living conditions, are not these lives “worth
living”?
To make sense of Socrates’ thought, realize that as he’s thinking about it, a life of pleasure is not
a worthy life for a human being to live. To live a worthy life, one must do worthy and
worthwhile things, things befitting a rational being. One must live virtuously, and virtue,
remember, is possible only with knowledge. If we assume further, along with Socrates, that only
someone who subjects his or her beliefs to critical scrutiny – makes arguments for and against
them, tries to find their weak points, and allows them to be questioned by others – has genuine
knowledge, it follows that one can live a life worthy of a human only when one tests his or
beliefs by serious questioning and examination.

3. It is better to suffer injustice (or harm) than to do it.
Socrates seems to have cared very little about the things that most people care about and
structure their lives around. He cares little about pleasure, fame, or money. He does not care
about his reputation, status, or political power. For him, the only thing that really matters is the
“state of his soul,” that is, his moral character. Suffering injustice means a loss of pleasure, or
property, or even loss of one’s life. But none of these things are as important as virtue. Virtue
cannot be taken away by the wrongs others may inflict on us. Consequently, it is better to be the
victim of wrongdoing than to do wrong oneself. Rather than “stick and stones can break my
bones but words will never hurt me,” for Socrates it’s “wrongdoing and ignorance can harm my
soul, but being the victim of injustice can never hurt me!”
© S.Bruton, revised 4/16/2020
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APOLOGY of SOCRATES
By Plato
How you, O Athenians, have been affected by my accusers, I cannot tell; but I know that
they almost made me forget who I was, and yet they have hardly uttered a word of truth. But
of the many falsehoods told by them, the one which quite amazed me was when they said
that you should be upon your guard and not allow yourselves to be deceived by the force of
my eloquence… From me you shall hear the whole truth, but not delivered in their way with
a set oration duly ornamented with words and phrases. I will use the words and arguments
which occur to me at the moment, because I am confident in the justice of my cause… If I
defend myself in my accustomed manner, and you hear me using the words which I have
been in the habit of using in the agora1, at the tables of the money-changers, or anywhere
else, do not be surprised and do not interrupt me on this account. For I am more than seventy
years of age, and appearing now for the first time in a court of law, I am quite a stranger to
the language of the place… Never mind the manner, which may or may not be good; but think
only of the truth of my words, and let the speaker speak truly and the judge decide justly….
Well, then, I must make my defense, and endeavor to clear away in a short time, a slander
which has lasted a long time.….2
Someone among you will reply, 'Yes, Socrates, but what is the origin of these accusations
which are brought against you; there must have been something strange which you have
been doing? All these rumors and this talk about you would never have arisen if you had
been like other men.' Now I regard this as a fair challenge, and I will try to explain to you the
reason why I am called wise and have such an evil fame. My reputation comes from a certain
sort of wisdom which I possess. If you ask me what kind of wisdom, I reply, wisdom such as
may perhaps be attained by a human, for only to that extent am I inclined to believe that I
am wise; whereas the persons of whom I was speaking have a superhuman wisdom which I
1
2

The agora was the market in Athens. Socrates was said to spend a lot of his time there.
Socrates is accused of 1) corrupting the youth, 2) heresy, by not believing in the gods the city believed in.
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may fail to describe… I will refer you to a worthy witness, the God of Delphi—he will tell you
about my wisdom, if I have any, and of what sort it is. You must have known Chaerephon; he
was early a friend of mine. Well, Chaerephon, as you know, was very impetuous in all his
doings, and he went to Delphi and boldly asked the oracle to tell him whether anyone was
wiser than I was, and the Pythian prophetess answered, that there was no man wiser.
Chaerephon is dead himself; but his brother, who is in court, will confirm the truth of what I
am saying.

Image 1: Ruins at Delphi. ("P1040719" by sbamueller is licensed under CC BY-SA 2.0 )

When I heard the answer, I said to myself, What can the god mean? and what is the
interpretation of his riddle? for I know that I have no wisdom, small or great. What then can
he mean when he says that I am the wisest of men? And yet he is a god, and cannot lie; that
would be against his nature. After long consideration, I thought of a method of trying the
question. I reflected that if I could only find someone wiser than myself, then I might go to
the god with a refutation in my hand. I should say to him, 'Here is someone who is wiser than
I am; but you said that I was the wisest.' Accordingly I went a politician who had the
reputation of wisdom, the result was as follows: When I began to talk with him, I could not
help thinking that he was not really wise, although he was thought wise by many, and still
wiser by himself. I then tried to explain to him that he thought himself wise, but was not
really wise; and the consequence was that he hated me, and his animosity was shared by
several who were present and heard me. So I left, saying to myself: Well, although I do not
suppose that either of us knows anything really beautiful and good, I am better off than he
is,—for he knows nothing, and thinks that he knows; I neither know nor think that I know.
In this latter particular, then, I seem to have slightly the advantage of him. Then I went to
another who had still higher pretensions to wisdom, and my conclusion was exactly the
same. I had made another enemy of him, and of many others too.
And I said to myself, “Go I must to all who appear to know, and find out the meaning of the
oracle.” And I swear, the result of my mission was that the people most in repute were all but
the most foolish; and that others less esteemed were really wiser and better. After the
politicians, I went to all sorts of poets. There, I said to myself, you will be instantly detected.
I took them some of the most elaborate passages in their own writings, and asked what was
the meaning of them… But there is hardly a person present who would not have talked better
about their poetry than they did themselves. Then I knew that not by wisdom do poets write
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poetry, but by a sort of genius and inspiration; they are like diviners or soothsayers who also
say many fine things, but do not understand the meaning of them. I saw that based on the
strength of their poetry they believed themselves to be the wisest in other things in which
they were not wise. So I left, thinking myself to be superior to them for the same reason that
I was superior to the politicians.
At last I went to the artisans. I was conscious that I knew nothing at all, as I may say, and I
was sure that they knew many fine things; and here I was not mistaken, for they did know
many things of which I was ignorant, and in this they certainly were wiser than I was. But I
same that even the good artisans fell into the same error as the poets: because they were
good craftspeople they thought that they also knew all sorts of high matters, and this defect
in them overshadowed their wisdom. Therefore I asked myself on behalf of the oracle,
whether I would like to be as I was, neither having their knowledge nor their ignorance, or
like them in both; and I made answer to myself and to the oracle that I was better off as I was.
I am called wise, for my hearers always imagine that I myself possess the wisdom which I
find wanting in others: but the truth is that God only is wise; and by his answer he intends to
show that the wisdom of humans is worth little or nothing; he is not speaking of Socrates, he
is only using my name by way of illustration, as if he said, He is the wisest, who, like Socrates,
knows that his wisdom is in truth worth nothing. And so I go about the world, obedient to
the god, and search and make enquiry into the wisdom of any one, whether citizen or
stranger, who appears to be wise; and if he is not wise, then in vindication of the oracle I
show him that he is not wise; and my occupation quite absorbs me, and I have no time to give
either to any public matter of interest or to any concern of my own, but I am in utter poverty
by reason of my devotion to the god.
Young men of the richer classes, who have not much to do, come about me of their own
accord; they like to hear the pretenders examined, and they often imitate me, and proceed to
examine others; there are plenty of persons, as they quickly discover, who think that they
know something, but really know little or nothing; and then those who are examined by them
instead of being angry with themselves are angry with me. In order that they may not appear
to be at a loss, they repeat the ready-made charges which are used against all philosophers
about teaching things up in the clouds and under the earth, and having no gods, and making
the worse seem better. They do not like to confess that their pretense of knowledge has been
detected. This is the reason why my three accusers, Meletus and Anytus and Lycon, have set
upon me; Meletus, who has a quarrel with me on behalf of the poets; Anytus, on behalf of the
craftsmen and politicians; Lycon, on behalf of the rhetoricians. I know that my plainness of
speech makes them hate me, and what is their hatred but a proof that I am speaking the
truth?—Hence has arisen the prejudice against me …..
Socrates cross-examines Meletus, one of his three accusers:

Did ever man, Meletus, believe in the existence of human things, and not of human
beings?... Did ever any man believe in horsemanship, and not in horses? or in flute-playing,
and not in flute-players? No, my friend; I will answer to you and to the court, as you refuse
to answer for yourself. There is no one who ever did. But now please to answer the next
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question: Can someone believe in spiritual and divine agencies, and not in spirits or
demigods?
Meletus: He cannot.
But then you swear in the indictment that I teach and believe in divine or spiritual agencies
(new or old, no matter for that); at any rate, I believe in spiritual agencies,—so you say and
swear in the affidavit; and yet if I believe in divine beings, how can I help believing in spirits
or demigods;—must I not? Now what are spirits or demigods? Are they not either gods or
the sons of gods?
Meletus: Certainly they are.
But this is what I call the facetious riddle invented by you: the demigods or spirits are gods,
and you say first that I do not believe in gods, and then again that I do believe in gods; that
is, if I believe in demigods. For if the demigods are the illegitimate sons of gods, whether by
the nymphs or by any other mothers, of whom they are said to be the sons—what human
being will ever believe that there are no gods if they are the sons of gods? You might as well
affirm the existence of mules, and deny that of horses and asses. Such nonsense, Meletus,
could only have been intended by you to make trial of me. You have put this into the
indictment because you had nothing real of which to accuse me.
End of cross-examination.

I have said enough in answer to the charge of Meletus: any elaborate defense is
unnecessary, but I know only too well how many enemies I have acquired.
Someone will say: And are you not ashamed, Socrates, of a life which is likely to bring you
to an untimely end? To him I answer: You are mistaken: a man who is good for anything
ought not to calculate the chance of living or dying; he ought only to consider whether in
doing anything he is doing right or wrong—acting the part of a good person or of a bad
person. Were the heroes who fell at Troy were not good for much?… Had Achilles any
thought of death and danger? For wherever a man's place is, whether the place which he has
chosen or that in which he has been placed by a commander, there he ought to remain in the
hour of danger; he should not think of death or of anything but of disgrace.
When I was ordered by the generals whom you chose to command me at Potidaea and
Amphipolis and Delium, I remained where they placed me, like any other man, facing death.
Given this, it would be strange if now, when I believe God orders me to fulfil the philosopher's
mission of searching into myself and other men, I were to leave my post through fear of
death, or any other fear. That would be strange. and I might justly be arraigned in court for
denying the existence of the gods, if I disobeyed the oracle because I was afraid of death,
fancying that I was wise when I was not wise. For the fear of death is indeed the pretense of
wisdom, and not real wisdom, being a pretense of knowing the unknown; and no one knows
whether death, which men in their fear apprehend to be the greatest evil, may not be the
greatest good. Is not this ignorance of a disgraceful sort, the conceit that a man knows what
he does not know? And in this respect only I believe myself to differ from people in general,
and may perhaps claim to be wiser than they are:—that whereas I know but little of the
world below, I do not suppose that I know: but I do know that injustice and disobedience to
a better, whether God or human, is evil and dishonorable, and I will never fear or avoid a
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possible good rather than a certain evil. If you say to me, Socrates, this time we will not mind
Anytus, and you will be let off, but on the condition that you are not to inquire and speculate
in this way anymore, and that if you are caught doing so again you shall die, I should reply: I
shall obey God rather than you, and while I have life and strength I shall never cease from
the practice and teaching of philosophy, encouraging any one I meet and saying: “You, my
friend, are you not ashamed of heaping up the greatest amount of money and honor and
reputation, and caring so little about wisdom and truth and the greatest improvement of the
soul?” And if the person with whom I am arguing, says: Yes, but I do care; then I do not leave
him or let him go, but I interrogate and examine and cross-examine him. If I think this person
has no virtue, but only claims to be virtuous, I scold the person for undervaluing the greater,
and overvaluing the less. And I shall repeat the same words to everyone whom I meet, young
and old, citizen and alien, but especially to the citizens, inasmuch as they are my brethren.
For know that this is the command of God; and I believe that no greater good has ever
happened in the state than my service to the god. For I do nothing but go about persuading
you all, old and young alike, not to take thought for your persons or your properties, but first
and chiefly to care about the greatest improvement of the soul. I tell you that virtue is not
given by money, but that from virtue comes money and every other good of man, public as
well as private. This is my teaching, and if this is the doctrine which corrupts the youth, I am
a mischievous person. But if anyone says that this is not my teaching, that person is lying. I
shall never alter my ways, not even if I have to die many times.

Image 2: Parthenon in Athens. (untitled by Maggie Meng is licensed under CC BY-SA 2.0 )

…If you kill such a one as I am, you will injure yourselves more than you will injure me.
Nothing will injure me, not Meletus nor yet Anytus—they cannot, for a bad person is not
permitted to injure a better than himself… For the evil of doing as the bad person is doing—
the evil of unjustly taking away the life of another—is greater far.
If you kill me you will not easily find a successor to me, who is a sort of gadfly, given to the
state by God. The state is like a great and noble steed who is tardy in his motions owing to
his very size and requires to be stirred into life. I am that gadfly which God has attached to
the state, and all day long and in all places am always fastening upon you, arousing and
persuading and reproaching you… If I had gained anything, or if my exhortations had been
paid, that would have been one thing, but you see that not even my accusers dare to say that
I have ever demanded or asked for payment from any one. And I have a sufficient witness to
the truth of what I say—my poverty.
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Someone may wonder why I go about in private giving advice and busying myself with the
concerns of others, but do not venture to come forward in public and advise the state. I will
tell you why. You have heard me speak at sundry times and in diverse places of an oracle or
sign which comes to me, and is the divinity which Meletus ridicules in the indictment. This
sign, which is a kind of voice, first began to come to me when I was a child; it always forbids
but never commands me to do anything which I am going to do. This is what deters me from
being a politician. And rightly, as I think. For I am certain that if I had engaged in politics, I
should have perished long ago, and done no good either to you or to myself…
Let me relate to you a passage of my own life which will prove to you that I should never
have yielded to injustice from any fear of death, and that 'as I should have refused to yield' I
must have died at once. The only office of state which I ever held, was that of senator: the
tribe Antiochis, which is my tribe, had the presidency at the trial of the generals who had not
taken up the bodies of the slain after the battle of Arginusae; and you proposed to try them
in a body, contrary to law, as you all agreed afterwards. At the time I was the only one of the
Prytanes who was opposed to the illegality, and I gave my vote against you. When the orators
threatened to impeach and arrest me, and you called and shouted, I made up my mind that I
would run the risk, having law and justice with me, rather than take part in your injustice
because I feared imprisonment and death. This happened in the days of the democracy. But
when the oligarchy of the Thirty was in power, they sent for me and four others into the
rotunda, and bade us bring Leon the Salaminian from Salamis, as they wanted to put him to
death. This was a specimen of the sort of commands which they were always giving with the
view of implicating as many as possible in their crimes; and then I showed, not in word only
but in deed, that I did not care about death, and that my great and only care was that I not do
an unrighteous or unholy thing. The strong arm of that oppressive power did not frighten
me into doing wrong; and when we came out of the rotunda the other four went to Salamis
and fetched Leon, but I went quietly home. For which I might have lost my life, had not the
power of the Thirty shortly afterwards come to an end.
I have been always the same in all my actions, public as well as private, and never have I
yielded any base compliance to those who are slanderously termed my disciples, or to any
other. I have no regular disciples, if anyone likes to come and hear me while I am pursuing
my mission, whether he be young or old, he is not excluded. Nor do I converse only with
those who pay. Anyone, whether he be rich or poor, may ask and answer me and listen to
my words. Whether he turns out to be a bad man or a good one, neither result can be
attributed to me, because I never taught or professed to teach him anything…
This duty of cross-examining other men has been imposed upon me by God and has been
signified to me by oracles, visions, and in every way in which the will of divine power was
ever intimated to anyone. If I am or have been corrupting the youth, those of them who are
now grown up and have become sensible that I gave them bad advice in the days of their
youth should come forward as accusers, and take their revenge. If they do not like to come
themselves, some of their relatives, fathers, brothers, or other kinsmen, should say what evil
their families have suffered at my hands. Now is their time. Many of them I see in the court.
There is Crito, who is of the same age and of the same deme with myself, and there is
Critobulus his son, whom I also see. …Adeimantus the son of Ariston, whose brother Plato is
present; and Aeantodorus, who is the brother of Apollodorus, whom I also see. I might
mention a great many others, some of whom Meletus should have produced as witnesses in
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the course of his speech. For all these are ready to witness on behalf of the corrupter, of the
injurer of their kindred, as Meletus and Anytus call me…
Well, Athenians, this and the like of this is all the defense which I have to offer…. I have a
family, yes, and sons, three in number, one almost a man, and two others who are still young;
and yet I will not bring any of them hither in order to petition you for an acquittal. And why
not?... One who has reached my years, and who has a name for wisdom, ought not to demean
himself. Whether this opinion of me be deserved or not, at any rate the world has decided
that Socrates is in some way superior to other men….
But, setting aside the question of public opinion, there seems to be something wrong in
asking a favor of a judge, and thus procuring an acquittal, instead of informing and
convincing him. For his duty is, not to make a present of justice, but to give judgment; and he
has sworn that he will judge according to the laws, and not according to his own good
pleasure. Do not then require me to do what I consider dishonorable and impious and wrong,
especially now, when I am being tried for impiety on the indictment of Meletus…. For I do
believe that there are gods, and in a sense higher than that in which any of my accusers
believe in them. And to you and to God I commit my cause, to be determined by you as is best
for you and me.
Socrates is found guilty by 281 votes to 220.

There are many reasons why I am not grieved at the vote of condemnation. I expected it,
and am only surprised that the votes are so nearly equal; for I had thought that the majority
against me would have been far larger.
And so Meletus proposes death as the penalty. And what shall I propose on my part… What
would be a reward suitable to a poor man who is your benefactor, and who desires leisure
that he may instruct you? There can be no reward so fitting as maintenance in the
Prytaneum, a reward which he deserves far more than the citizen who has won the prize at
Olympia in the horse or chariot race, whether the chariots were drawn by two horses or by
many. For I am in want, and he has enough; and he only gives you the appearance of
happiness, and I give you the reality. And if I am to estimate the penalty fairly, I should say
that maintenance in the Prytaneum is the just return.3
When I do not know whether death is a good or an evil, why should I propose a penalty
which would certainly be an evil? Shall I say imprisonment? And why should I live in prison,
and be the slave of the magistrates of the year—of the Eleven? Or shall the penalty be a fine,
and imprisonment until the fine is paid? There is the same objection. I should have to lie in
prison, for money I have none, and cannot pay. And if I say exile (and this may possibly be
the penalty which you will affix), I must indeed be blinded by the love of life, if I am so
irrational as to expect that when you, who are my own citizens, cannot endure my discourses
and words, and have found them so objectionable and odious that you will have no more of
them, others are likely to endure me.

3

Socrates is proposing that he is punished by receiving free meals for life in the Prytaneum, which was a sort of
grand public cafeteria where Athens’ Olympic heroes were honored.
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...Well, perhaps I could afford a mina4, and therefore I propose that penalty: Plato, Crito,
Critobulus, and Apollodorus, my friends here, bid me say thirty minae, and they will be the
sureties. Let thirty minae be the penalty; for which sum they will be ample security to you.
He is condemned to death.

I would rather die having spoken after my manner, than speak in your manner and live.
For neither in war nor yet at law ought I or any man to use every way of escaping death.
Often in battle there can be no doubt that if a man will throw away his arms, and fall on his
knees before his pursuers, he may escape death. The difficulty, my friends, is not to avoid
death, but to avoid unrighteousness. And now I depart hence condemned by you to suffer the
penalty of death,—they too go their ways condemned by the truth to suffer the penalty of
villainy and wrong …

Image 3: Theater in Athens (untitled by Maggie Meng is licensed under CC BY-SA 2.0)

O my judges, I would like to tell you of a wonderful circumstance. Before now the divine
faculty of which the internal oracle is the source has constantly been in the habit of opposing
me even about little things if I was going to make a slip or error in any matter. Now as you
see there has come upon me that which may is generally believed to be the last and worst
evil. But the oracle made no sign of opposition, either when I was leaving my house in the
morning, or when I was on my way to the court, or while I was speaking, at anything which I
was going to say; and yet I have often been stopped in the middle of a speech, but now in
nothing I either said or did touching the matter in hand has the oracle opposed me. What do
I take to be the explanation of this silence? I will tell you. It is a sign that what has happened
to me is a good, and that those of us who think that death is an evil are in error. For it surely
would have opposed me had I been going to evil and not to good.
Let us reflect in another way, and we will see that there is great reason to hope that death
is a good; for one of two things—either death is a state of nothingness and utter
unconsciousness, or, as men say, there is a change and migration of the soul from this world
to another. Now if you suppose that there is no consciousness, but a sleep like the sleep of
him who is undisturbed even by dreams, death will be an unspeakable gain. For if a person
were to select the night in which his sleep was undisturbed even by dreams, and were to
4
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compare with this the other days and nights of his life, and then were to tell us how many
days and nights he had passed in the course of his life better and more pleasantly than this
one, I think that even the great king will not find many such days or nights compared with
the others. Now if death is like this, then to die is gain. Eternity is then only a single night.
But if death is the journey to another place where all the dead abide, what good can be
greater than this? Above all, I shall then be able to continue my search into true and false
knowledge in this world and also in the next. Then I may find out who is wise, and who
merely pretends to be wise, and who is not. What would not a man give to be able to examine
the leader of the great Trojan expedition, or Odysseus or Sisyphus, or countless others! What
infinite delight would there be in conversing with them and asking them questions! In
another world they do not put a man to death for asking questions.
Be of good cheer about death, and know of a certainty, that no evil can happen to a good
person, either in life or after death… I am not angry with my condemners, or with my
accusers; they have done me no harm, although they did not mean to do me any good; and
for this I may gently blame them.
Still I have a favor to ask of them. When my sons are grown up, I would ask you to punish
them, if they seem to care about riches, or anything, more than about virtue. If they pretend
to be something when they are really nothing, then correct them, as I have corrected you, for
not caring about that for which they ought to care, and thinking that they are something
when they are really nothing. And if you do this, both I and my sons will have received justice
at your hands.
The hour of departure has arrived, and we go our ways—I to die, and you to live. Which is
better God only knows.
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Study Guide: 1. Apology
What are the accusations (legal charges) brought against Socrates?
Socrates grudgingly admits that he has “a certain sort of wisdom.” What sort of wisdom is this,
exactly, and what kind of wisdom does Socrates contrast it with?
What does the oracle at Delphi say about Socrates? Why does this surprise him, and what does
he do to see whether or not the oracle is true? What does he end up concluding about his
wisdom?
What does Socrates take to be his divine mission, undertaken in “devotion to the god”? On a
day-to-day level, what kind of activities does Socrates engage in to fulfill it?
What are we supposed to make of Meletus’ testimony?
Socrates cites what to him is a core moral conviction: “wherever a man’s place is, whether the
place which he has chosen or that in which he has been placed by a commander, there he ought
to remain in the hour of danger; he should not think of death or of anything but of disgrace.”
What examples from his own life does he describe to show how he has followed the principle?
What is the relevance of this principle for his divine mission?
What does Socrates say he “scolds” people for caring about? What does he think they should
care about? How do you suppose people react to being scolded like this?
At one point, Socrates alludes to one of the famous yet paradoxical views he held: he says a bad
person cannot (by his bad deeds) hurt another. That is, one can be injured not by being the
victim of others’ wrongdoing, but only by doing bad deeds oneself. What does this view
presuppose about the nature of injury and well-being? Is this view at all plausible? It seems
quite contrary to most peoples’ ideas about injury and well-being.
Socrates says he is a gadfly God has attached to the state. What does he mean by this?
At one point Socrates says: “from virtue comes money and every good of man, public as well as
private. That is my teaching and if this is the doctrine which corrupts the youth, I am a
mischievous person.” But then on the next page he says: “Whether he runs out to be a bad man
or a good one, neither result can be attributed to me, because I never taught or pressed to teach
him anything….” These two claims seem to contradict each other. Is there any way to reconcile
them?

Socrates, upon being found guilty, is required to propose a fitting punishment. He proposes free
meals for life at the Prytaneum, which is the same as the reward given to Olympic heroes. What
should we make of this? Is he serious?
Socrates, upon contemplating his impending death, hypothesizes that death is one of two things.
What are these two things?
Nearing the end of the speech, he claims that no evil can happen to a good person, either in life
or after death. How is this to be reconciled with his views about what’s most important in life?
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Socrates (So): Why have you come at this hour, Crito? Or isn't it still

Crito (Cr): It certainly is.
So: About what time is it?
Cr: Just before dawn.
So: I'm surprised that the prison guard was willing to let you in.
Cr: He is used to me by now, Socrates, since I visit here so often.
And besides, I have done him a good turn.
So: Did you get here just now or a while ago?
Cr: Quite a while ago.
So: So how come you didn't you wake me up immediately, but sat
by in silence?
Cr: By Zeus, no, Socrates. I wish I myself were not so sleepless and
sorrowful, and so I have been marveling at you, when I see how peacefully
you've been sleeping. I deliberately didn't wake you so that you would
pass the time as peacefully as possible. Even before now I have often
thought you fortunate in your demeanor towards your entire life, and
even more so in your present misfortune, so easily and calmly do you bear
it.
So: It's because it would be out of tune, Crito, to be angry, at my
age, if I must finally die.
Cr: And yet others of your age, Socrates, have been caught up in
such misfortunes, but their age does not prevent them from being angry at
their fate.
So: That's true. But why did you come so early?
Cr: Carrying troubling news, Socrates—though not for you, as it
appears—but deeply troubling for me and all of your friends, and I, it
seems, am among the most heavily burdened.
So: What is it? Has the ship arrived from Delos,* upon whose arrival
I must die?
Cr: No, it hasn't arrived, but it looks like it will arrive today, based
on the report of some people who have come from Sounion* and who left
when it was there. It's clear from this that it will arrive today, and you will
have to end your life tomorrow, Socrates.
So: May it be for the best, Crito. If this pleases the gods, so be it.
However, I don't think it will come today.
Cr: Where do you get your evidence for this?
So: I will tell you. I must be put to death sometime the day after the
ship arrives?
Cr: That's what the authorities in these matters say, at least.
So: In that case, I don't think it will arrive this coming day, but the
next. My evidence is something I saw in a dream a little while ago during
the night. It's likely that you chose a very good time not to wake me.
Cr: Well, what was the dream?
So: A woman appeared, coming towards me, fine and goodlooking, wearing white clothing. She called to me and said, "Socrates, you
shall arrive in fertile Phthia on the third day."*
Cr: What a strange dream, Socrates.
So: But obvious, at least as it appears to me, Crito.
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Cr: Too obvious, perhaps. But, my supernatural Socrates, even now
listen to me and be saved. If you die, for me it won't be just one
misfortune: apart from being separated from the kind of friend the like of
which I will never find again, many people, moreover, who do not know
me and you well will think that I could have saved you if I were willing to
spend the money, but that I didn't care to. And wouldn't this indeed be the
most shameful reputation, that I would seem to value money above
friends? For the many will not believe that it was you yourself who
refused to leave here, even though we were urging you to.
So: But why, blessed Crito, should we care so much about the
opinion of the many? The best people, who are more deserving of our
attention, will believe that the matter was handled in just the way it was.
Cr: But surely you see, Socrates, that we must pay attention to the
opinion of the many, too. The present circumstances make it clear that the
many can inflict not just the least of evils but practically the greatest, when
one has been slandered amongst them.
So: If they were of any use, Crito, the many would be able to do the
greatest evils, and so they would also be able to do the greatest goods, and
that would be fine. But as it is they can do neither, since they cannot make
a man either wise or foolish, but they do just whatever occurs to them.
Cr: Well, let's leave that there. But tell me this, Socrates. You're not
worried, are you, about me and your other friends, how, if you were to
leave here, the informers would make trouble for us because we stole you
away from here, and we would be compelled either to give up all our
property or a good deal of money, or suffer some other punishment at
their hands? If you have any such fear, let it go, because it is our obligation
to run this risk in saving you and even greater ones if necessary. So trust
me and do not refuse.
So: I certainly am worried about these things, Crito, and lots of
others too.
Cr: Well don't fear them. Indeed, some people only need to be given
a little silver and they're willing to rescue you and get you out of here. And
on top of that, don't you see how cheap those informers are and that we
wouldn't need to spend a lot of money on them? My money is at your
disposal, and is, I think, sufficient. Furthermore, even if, because of some
concern for me, you think you shouldn't spend my money, there are these
visitors here who are prepared to spend theirs. One of them has brought
enough silver for this very purpose, Simmias of Thebes, and Kebes too is
willing, and very many others. So, as I say, don't give up on saving
yourself because you are uneasy about these things.
And don't let what you said in the court get to you, that you
wouldn't know what to do with yourself as an exile. Wherever you go,
there are places they would welcome you. And if you want to go to
Thessaly, I have some friends there who will think highly of you and
provide you with safety, so that no one in Thessaly will harass you.
What's more, Socrates, what you are doing doesn't seem right to me,
giving yourself up when you could be saved, ready to have happen to you
what your enemies would urge—and did urge—in their wish to destroy
you.
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seem correct to you? Because you, as far as any human can tell, are in no
danger of being executed tomorrow and the present misfortune should not
lead you astray. Have a look, then. Is it fair enough to say that one should
not value every human opinion but only some and not others? And not the
opinions of everyone but of some and not others? What do you say? Isn't
this right?
Cr: Yes, that's right.
So: Shouldn't we value the good opinions, and not the worthless
ones?
Cr: Yes.
So: Aren't the good ones the opinions of the wise, while the
worthless ones come from the ignorant?
Cr: Of course.
So: So then, what did we say, again, about cases such as this: should
a man in training, who takes it seriously, pay any heed to the praise and
blame and opinion of everyone, or only to one person, the one who is a
doctor or a trainer?
Cr: Only to the one.
So: So he should fear the criticisms and welcome the praises of that
one person, and not those of the many?
Cr: Clearly.
So: He must practice and exercise, and eat and drink, in the way
that seems best to that one person, the trainer and expert, more than to all
the others together.
Cr: That's right.
So: Well then. If he disobeys this one man and dishonors his
opinion and his praises and instead honors those of the many who know
nothing, won't he suffer harm?
Cr: How could he not?
So: What is this harm, and what does it tend to do, and in what part
of the disobedient person?
Cr: It's clear that it's in the body, since this is what it destroys.
So: Well said. Isn't it the same with the others—not to go over them
all, but in particular justice and injustice and shameful and fine things and
good and bad, which are what our current discussion is about—whether
we must follow the opinion of the many and fear it or instead the opinion
of the one person, if there is someone who has knowledge, whom we must
defer to and fear more than all the others together? If we do not heed his
opinion we will corrupt and harm that part of us which becomes better
with justice and is destroyed by injustice. Or don't you think so?
Cr: I do indeed, Socrates.
So: Tell me, if we do not follow the opinion of the person who
knows and so destroy that part of us which is improved by what is
wholesome and corrupted by what sickens, is life worth living when that
part is ruined? This is the body, I suppose, isn’t it?
Cr: Yes.
So: Then is life worth living with a wretched and corrupt body?
Cr: Not at all.
So: And is life worth living after the part of us which injustice
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injures and justice benefits has been corrupted? Or do you think this is
unimportant in comparison with the body, this part of us, whatever it is,
that injustice and justice affect?
Cr: Not at all.
So: But more valuable?
Cr: Much more.
So: So, best of men, we must not pay much heed to what the many
will say to us, but to what the one who knows about just and unjust things
will say—to that one person, and to the truth itself. So you were wrong, at
the beginning, to bring this up, that we must heed the opinion of the many
concerning just things and noble things and good things and their
opposites. "But in spite of that," someone might declare, "the many can put
us to death."
Cr: That too is obvious. For someone might say so, Socrates. You're
right.
So: But, you wonderful fellow, it seems to me that the following
statement, which we have been over before, remains just the same as
before. So examine again whether or not it still holds true for you, that it's
not living that should be our priority, but living well.
Cr: Why, of course it's still true.
So: And that this is living well and finely and justly, does that
remain true or not?
Cr: It remains true.
So: Therefore, based on what you've agreed, we must consider the
following: whether it is just or unjust for me to try to leave here, when I
was not acquitted by the Athenians. And if it seems just let's try it, and if
not, let's abandon it. As for the points you make about spending money
and reputation and the upbringing of children, Crito, I suspect that these
are really questions belonging to people who would casually put someone
to death and resurrect him, if they could, without any thought—to the
members of the multitude.
As for us, since the argument requires it, I suppose we should
examine precisely what we just mentioned: whether we will act justly by
giving money and thanks to those who will get me out of here—both you
in the lead and me being led—or whether we will in fact act unjustly by
doing all of this. If we think that we're acting unjustly by doing these
things, I don't think we should take into consideration whether we will die
if we hold our ground and keep our peace, or anything else we will
suffer—only whether we're acting unjustly.
Cr: I think you put that well, Socrates. See what we should do, then.
So: Let's look together, my good man, and if at any point you have
an objection to what I am saying, make it and I will persuade you; if not,
you blessed man, finally quit saying the same thing over and over, that I
have to get out of here against the will of the Athenians. I think it is most
important to act with your consent and not against your will. See, then,
that the starting point of the inquiry is laid down to your satisfaction and
try to answer the questions in the way you think best.
Cr: I shall certainly try.
So: Do we say that we should never willingly act unjustly, or that
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we should in some instances and not in others? Or is acting unjustly never
good or noble, as we often agreed on previous occasions? Or have all our
previous agreements been overturned in these last few days, and did we
fail to notice long ago, Crito, that when we have serious discussions with
one another, we ourselves, at our age, are no different from children? Or
more than anything isn't what we used to say still true? Whether the many
agree or not, and whether we must also suffer harsher things than these or
gentler, nevertheless acting unjustly is evil and shameful in every way for
the person who does it. Do we say this or not?
Cr: We do.
So: And so one must never act unjustly.
Cr: By no means.
So: And so one should not repay an injustice with an injustice, as
the many think, since one should never act unjustly.
Cr: It appears not.
So: What next? Should one cause harm, Crito, or not?
Cr: Presumably not, Socrates.
So: And then? Is returning a harm for a harm just, as the many say,
or not just?
Cr: Not at all.
So: Because harming a man in any way is no different from doing
an injustice.
Cr: That's true.
So: One must neither repay an injustice nor cause harm to any man,
no matter what one suffers because of him. And see to it, Crito, that in
agreeing with this you are not agreeing contrary to what you believe,
because I know that few people believe it or will believe it. And so there is
no common ground between those who hold this belief and those who
don't; when they see each other's positions they are bound to despise one
other. So think carefully about whether you yourself agree and believe it
and let us begin thinking from here: that it is never right to act unjustly, or
to return an injustice, or to retaliate when one has suffered some harm by
repaying the harm. Do you reject or accept this starting principle? For it
still seems good to me now, as it did long ago, but if it seemed some other
way to you, speak up and educate me. If you're sticking to what we said
before, listen to what comes next.
Cr: I do stick to it, and I accept it. Go ahead.
So: Here in turn is the next point. Or rather, I'll ask you: when
someone has made an agreement with someone else, and it is just, must he
keep to it or betray it?
Cr: He must keep to it.
So: Observe what follows from this. If we leave here without having
persuaded the city, are we doing someone a harm—and those whom we
should least of all harm—or not? And are we keeping to the just
agreements we made, or not?
Cr: I'm unable to respond to what you're asking, Socrates; for I do
not know.
So: Well, look at it this way. If the laws and the community of the
city came to us when we were about to sneak away from here—or
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whatever it should be called—and, standing over us, were to ask, "Tell me,
Socrates, what are you intending to do? By attempting this deed, aren't
you planning to do nothing other than destroy us, the laws, and the civic
community, as much as you can? Or does it seem possible to you that any
city where the verdicts reached have no force but are made powerless and
corrupted by private citizens could continue to exist and not be in ruins?"
What will we say, Crito, to these questions and others like them?
Because there's a lot more a person could say, especially an orator, on
behalf of this law we're destroying, which makes sovereign the verdicts
that have been decided. Or will we say to them "The city treated us
unjustly and did not decide the case properly"? Will we say this or
something like it?
Cr: By Zeus, that's what we'll say, Socrates.
So: What if the laws then said, "Socrates, did we agree on this, we
and you, to honor the decisions that the city makes?" And if we were
surprised to hear them say this, perhaps they would say, "Socrates, don't
be surprised at what we're saying, but answer, since you are accustomed
to using questions and answers. Come then, what reason can you give us
and the city for trying to destroy us? Did we not, to begin with, give birth
to you? And wasn't it through us that your father married your mother
and conceived you? So show those of us, the laws concerning marriages,
what fault you find that keeps them from being good?" "I find no fault
with them," I would say.
"What about the laws concerning the upbringing and education of
children, by which you too were raised? Or didn't those of us, the laws
established on this matter, give good instructions when they directed your
father to educate you in the arts and gymnastics?" "They did," I would say.
"Well, then. Since you have been born and brought up and
educated, could you say that you were not our offspring and slave from
the beginning, both you and your ancestors? And if this is so, do you
suppose that justice between you and us is based on equality, and do you
think that whatever we might try to do to you, it is just for you to do these
things to us in return? Justice between you and your father, or your master
if you happened to have one, was not based on equality, so that you could
not do whatever you had suffered in return, neither speak back when
crossed nor strike back when struck nor many other such things. Will you
be allowed to do this to your homeland and the laws, so that, if we try to
destroy you, thinking this to be just, you will in return try to destroy us the
laws and your homeland with as much power as you have and claim that
you're acting justly in doing so—the man who truly cares about virtue?
“Are you so wise that it has slipped your mind that the homeland
deserves more honor and reverence and worship than your mother and
father and all of your other ancestors? And that she is held in higher
esteem both by the gods and by men of good sense? And that when she is
angry you should show her more respect and compliance and obedience
than your father, and either convince her or do what she commands, and
suffer without complaining if she orders you to suffer something? And
that whether it is to be beaten or imprisoned, or to be wounded or killed if
she leads you into war, you must do it? And that this is just, and that you
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must not be daunted or withdraw or abandon your position, but at war
and in the courts and everywhere you must do what the city and the
homeland orders, or convince her by appealing to what is naturally just?
And that it is not holy to use force against one's mother or father, and it is
so much worse to do so against one's homeland?" What will we say to this,
Crito? That the laws speak the truth? Or not?
Cr: It looks so to me.
So: "Consider, then, Socrates," the laws might say, "if what we say is
true: that it is not just for you to try what you're now attempting to do to
us. For we gave birth to you, brought you up, educated you, and gave you
and all the other citizens every good thing we could, and yet even so we
pronounce that any Athenian who wishes, when he has been admitted as
an adult and sees the affairs of the city and us the laws, has the power, if
he is not pleased with us, to take his possessions and leave for wherever he
wants. And if any among you wants to live in a colony because we and the
city do not satisfy him, or if he wants to go somewhere else and live as a
foreigner, none of us laws stands in the way or forbids him from taking his
possessions with him and leaving for wherever he wants.
“But whoever remains with us, having observed how we decide
lawsuits and take care of other civic matters, we claim that this man by his
action has now made an agreement with us to do what we command him
to do, and we claim that anyone who does not obey is guilty three times
over: he disobeys us who gave birth to him, and who raised him; and
because, despite agreeing to be subject to us, he does not obey us or
persuade us that we are doing something improper. And we give him an
alternative and don't angrily press him to do what we order; and although
we allow either of two possibilities—either to persuade us or to comply—
he does neither of these.
“We say that you especially will be liable to these charges, Socrates,
if indeed you carry out your plans, and you not least of the Athenians but
most of all." If, then, I would say, "How do you mean?", perhaps they
would scold me justly, saying that I most of all among the Athenians have
made this agreement. They might say, "Socrates, we have great evidence
for this, that we and the city satisfy you. For you would never have spent
more of your life here than all of the other Athenians unless it seemed
particularly good to you. You never left the city for a festival, except once
to Isthmos, but never went anywhere else except on military duty, nor did
you ever make another trip like other Athenians do, nor did any urge seize
you to get to know a different city or other laws, but we and our city were
sufficient for you. So decidely did you choose us and agree to be governed
by us that, among other things, you had children in it, because the city was
satisfactory to you.
“Moreover, at your trial you could have proposed exile, if you had
wished, and what you're now trying to do to the city without her consent,
you could have done then with her consent. At the time, you prided
yourself on not being angry if you had to die, and you chose death, you
said, in preference to exile. But now you neither feel shame in the face of
those words nor have you any respect for us the laws. By trying to destroy
us you are doing what the most despicable slave would do, trying to run
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I also think you are betraying your sons, whom you could raise and
educate, by going away and abandoning them, and, as far as you are
concerned, they can experience whatever happens to come their way,
when it's likely that as orphans they'll get the usual orphans’ treatment.
One should either not have children or endure the hardship of raising and
educating them. But it looks to me as though you are taking the laziest
path, whereas you must choose the path a good and brave man would
choose, especially when you keep saying that you care about virtue your
whole life long.
So I am ashamed both on your behalf and on behalf of us your
friends, that this whole affair surrounding you will be thought to have
happened due to some cowardice on our part: the hearing of the charge in
court, that it came to trial when it need not have, and the legal contest
itself, how it was carried on, and, as the absurd part of the affair, that by
some badness and cowardice on our part we will be thought to have let
this final act get away from us, since we did not save you, nor you save
yourself, when it was possible and we could have done so if we were of
the slightest use. So see, Socrates, whether this is both evil and shameful,
for you and for us as well. Think over—or rather, there's no longer time for
thinking but only for deciding—this one consideration, because everything
must be done this coming night; if we hang around any longer it will be
impossible and we'll no longer be able to. So in every way, Socrates,
believe me and do not refuse.
So: My dear Crito, your eagerness would be worth a lot if it were in
pursuit of something righteous, but the more it is not, the more difficult it
is to deal with. We must therefore examine whether we should do this or
not, because as always, and not just now for the first time, I am the sort of
person who is persuaded in my soul by nothing other than the argument
which seems best to me upon reflection. At present I am not able to
abandon the arguments I previously made, now that this misfortune has
befallen me, but they appear about the same to me, and I defer to and
honor the ones I did before. If we have nothing better than them to offer
under the present circumstances, rest assured that I will not agree with
you, not if, even more so than at present, the power of the multitude were
to spook us as though we were children, imposing chains and deaths and
monetary fines upon us.
What's the most reasonable way we can examine this matter? By
first resuming this argument that you give about reputations. Was it
correct on each occasion when we said that one must pay attention to the
opinions of some people and not to others'? Was this the correct thing to
say before I had to die, whereas now it has become obvious that it was said
only for the sake of argument and was actually just playing around and
hot air?
I am determined to examine this together with you, Crito, whether
it appears different when I consider it in this condition, or the same, and
whether we should ignore it or be persuaded by it. It is always put like
this, I think, by people who think there is something in it, the way I put it
just now: that it is necessary to pay serious attention to some of the
opinions that men hold and not to others. By the gods, Crito, doesn't this
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away contrary to the contract and the agreement by which you agreed to
be governed by us. So answer us first on this particular point: do we speak
the truth when we say that you agreed to be governed by us in deed and
not merely in words?" What can we say to this, Crito? Mustn't we agree?
Cr: We must, Socrates.
So: "Aren't you", they might say, "going against your contracts and
agreements with us, which you were not forced to agree to, nor deceived
about, nor compelled to decide upon in a short time, but over seventy
years, in which time you could have gone away if we did not satisfy you
and these agreements did not appear just to you. You did not prefer
Lakedaimonia* or Crete, each of which you claim is well-governed, or any
of the other Hellenic cities or the foreign ones, but you left her less often
than the lame and the blind and the other disabled people. Evidently the
city and also we the laws were so much more pleasing to you than to other
Athenians, for is a city pleasing to anyone without its laws? Now then,
won't you keep to what you agreed? You will, if you are convinced by us,
at any rate, Socrates; and at least you won't make yourself ridiculous by
leaving the city.
"Just think about what good will it do you and your friends if you
break them and do wrong in one of these ways. It's pretty clear that your
friends will risk exile along with you and disenfranchisement from the city
and confiscation of their property. And if you first go to one of the closest
cities, to Thebes or to Megara—since both are well-governed—you will
come as an enemy, Socrates, of those governments, and everyone who
cares about their cities will regard you suspiciously, thinking that you are
a destroyer of the laws. And you will confirm the opinion of the judges, so
that they will think they judged the case correctly, since whoever is a
destroyer of the laws would certainly be considered in some way a
destroyer of young and foolish men.
"Will you flee, then, from well-governed cities and from the most
civilized people? Is it worth it to you to live like this? Will you associate
with them, Socrates, and feel no shame when talking with them? What will
you say, Socrates? What you said here, that virtue and justice are of the
greatest value to humans, along with lawfulness and the laws? And you
don't think the conduct of such a Socrates will appear shameful? One
should think so.
"But will you leave these places and go to Crito's friends in
Thessaly? There is plenty of disorder and disobedience there and they
might listen with pleasure to you, about how you amusingly ran away
from prison wearing some costume or a peasant's vest or something else of
the sort that runaways typically dress themselves in, altering your
appearance. But still, will no one say that an old man, who probably only
has a short time left in his life, was so greedy in his desire to live that he
dared to violated the greatest laws? Perhaps not, if you do not annoy
anyone. But if you do, Socrates, you will hear many dishonorable things
about yourself. You will surely spend your life sucking up to everyone and
living like a slave. What else will you do in Thessaly but feast, as though
you had traveled to Thessaly for dinner? And those speeches, the ones
about justice and the other virtues, where will they be?
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"Is it for the sake of your children that you want to live, so that you
can raise and educate them? What are you going do, in that case? You'll
raise and educate them by bringing them to Thessaly and making them
outsiders, so that they will enjoy that benefit too? Or if not that, will they
grow up better if they are raised and educated with you away from them
but alive, because your friends will take care of them? But is it that if you
go to Thessaly, they'll look after them, whereas if you go to Hades, they
won't? If those who claim to be your friends are any good, you must
believe they will.
"So be convinced by us who brought you up, Socrates, and do not
put children or life or anything else ahead of justice, so that when you go
to Hades you will be able to provide all this as your defense to those who
rule there. Since neither in this world, nor in the next when you arrive, will
this action be thought better or more just or more pious for you and your
friends to do. But as it is you leave us, if indeed you depart, having been
done an injustice not by us, the laws, but by men. If you return the
injustice, however, and repay the harm and flee in shame, having violated
your agreement and contract with us and harmed those who least of all
should be harmed—yourself, your friends, your homeland, and us—we
will make life hard for you while you're alive, and then our brothers, the
laws in Hades, will not receive you favorably, knowing that you tried to
destroy us too, as far as you were able. So do not be persuaded by Crito to
do what he says instead of what we say."
Rest assured, my dear friend Crito, that this is what I seem to hear,
just as the Korubantes* seem to hear the pipes, and the echo from these
words resonates within me and makes me unable to hear anything else. So
know that, based on my current beliefs, at least, if you speak against them
you will speak in vain. Nevertheless, if you honestly think you can achieve
anything more, speak.
Cr: No, Socrates. I am unable to speak.
So: Then let it be, Crito, and let us act in this way, since this is where
the god leads us.
NOTES
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ship arrived from Delos. Socrates has spent a month in prison since the trial
because he could not be executed until a religious mission returned from
the island of Delos, the mythical birth-place of Artemis and Apollo and
where Theseus slayed the minotaur, before returning to Athens.
Sounion. The tip of Attica; a headland 200 feet above sea-level, bearing a
temple to Poseidon.
you shall arrive in fertile Phthia on the third day. Iliad 9.363. Achilles is
threatening to leave Troy and return home.
Lakedaimonia. Sparta.
Korubantes. In the cult of Kubele, worshippers danced as though possessed.
The image on the first page shows Odysseus being tempted by the Sirens.
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Odysseus-Sirens.jpg
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Study Guide: 2. Crito
What is the setting for conversation?
When is Socrates to be executed? Why then, and why the delay?
Crito gives several reasons why he thinks Socrates should escape and avoid his punishment.
What are they?
What’s Socrates’ response to Crito’s concern about his reputation?
Socrates claims that “one should not repay an injustice with an injustice,” similar to our saying
that “two wrongs don’t make a right”. What are the two injustices Socrates has in mind?
Socrates refers to the notion that “when someone has made an agreement with someone else, and
it is just, he must keep to it.” What agreement is he thinking of, here?
Socrates says a citizen who does not obey the city’s laws is guilty “three times over”. What does
he mean?
What do you think Crito’s thoughts are at the end? Do you think he’s convinced by Socrates’
argument? Are you convinced by Socrates’ argument? – Why or why not?

Stoicism – Historical Background and Key Themes
Focus Exclusively on What You Can Control

Image 1: “Epictetus.” Frontispiece drawn by “Sonnem.” or “Sonnern.” (?, left bottom corner) and engraved by
“MB” (bottom right corner). The engraver is Michael Burghers ([1]). Image scanned by the John Adams Library at
the Boston Public Library. Image cropped and greyscaled by Pasicles. Public domain, downloaded from:
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Epicteti_Enchiridion_Latinis_versibus_adumbratum_(Oxford_1715)_fron
tispiece_-_greyscale.jpg

Epictetus (approx. 55 CE – 135 CE) was a Greek philosopher, one of a number of philosophers
from antiquity whose thought is considered “Stoic.” He was born a slave in what is now a part of
Turkey. Early in his life, Epictetus’ passion for philosophy was obvious, and his master
permitted him to study Stoicism with Musonius Rufus. At some point he became crippled; one
account has it that his leg was broken deliberately by his wealthy owner, although another
ancient source reports that he was lame from childhood. Soon after the death of the Roman
Emperor Nero in 68 CE, Epictetus was freed and began to teach philosophy in Rome. When
Domitian banished philosophers from Rome in around 93 CE, Epictetus fled to Greece and
founded a philosophical school of his own. Reportedly, he lived a life of simplicity with few
possessions. None of Epictetus’ writings have survived. What we know of his thought comes
from two writings compiled by his student Arrian: his main work, The Discourses, and a popular,
shorter work called the Enchiridion (the “Handbook”).
The Stoic school of thought was originally started in Athens by Zeno of Citium in Athens. The
term derives from the term for “Painted Porch,” which was a decorated colonnade on the north
side of the Agora in Athens where Zeno and his followers used to gather. Besides Epictetus,
other Stoics still studied today include Seneca, Nero’s tutor, and two politically prominent
Romans: the great orator and statesman Cicero and the emperor and military leader Marcus
Aurelius. Thus, Stoicism appealed to people from various strata of society, from lowly slaves to
even emperors. Stoicism was very practical in its teaching, stressing ways to remain calm and
brave in the face of dangerous and painful circumstances.

Key Themes
1. What is and is not in one’s control.
A central theme in Stoicism involves the distinction between what is and is not within our power
or control. The things that are within our power are “prohairetic” things (prohairesis =
“choice”). They include our opinions, desires, likings and dislikings. Aprohairectic things not
within our power include the “externals” like glory, power, possessions, and our bodies.
The “externals” are in themselves neither good nor bad. All we control and all we should care
about are the opinions we form of them.
Thus, a key part of Stoic advice is strict indifference and absence of opinion regarding external
things over which we have no control. If someone loses a possession, Epictetus advises the
person to say to himself, “I have lost nothing that belongs to me; something that was not in my
power has left me.” Desires degrade us and make us slaves of what we desire, because external
things we may want are not solely within our control. Whether we get the externals we desire
always depends on forces outside of ourselves. Glory and popularity, for example, depend on
other people even more than they depend on oneself. True freedom and true happiness involves
wishing for nothing except what fate or God has in store, and striving to perfect and focus on the
few things that can be achieved solely by our own choices. Marcus Aurelius writes that rather
than asking God to give us what we want or save us from what we fear, we should ask God to rid
us of the desires and the fears. That’s a characteristically Stoic attitude to fear and desire: not to
focus on attaining or avoiding the external thing one desires or fears, but to change one’s desires
and fears and other internal states that may perturb us.
2. Virtue is the only Good
Like Socrates, the Stoics stress the importance of virtue. Because of their emphasis on the few
things within our control, many Stoics maintained that the only good was that which is most
firmly within our choice or control: virtue itself. Also like Socrates, Epictetus’ view is that all
philosophy is founded on self-knowledge and that ridding oneself of ignorance, false
preconception, and gullibility is of central importance in life.
Another Socratic theme prominent in Stoic thought is the idea that the harms other people may
do to us are really nothing. The only genuine harms are those we do to ourselves through our
own bad choices. Rather than despise or hate other people, we ought to focus on our own faults
and shortcomings. As Marcus Aurelius wrote in his journal, “it is silly to try to escape other
people’s faults. They are inescapable. Just try to escape your own.’
There is also an optimistic side to this point of view. Because all that really matters is what is
within our choice, through exercise of control over our thoughts and actions, we have the power
to determine the goodness and badness of our own lives, rather than having our well-being rest

on forces beyond our control. Though this perspective on oneself and the world is not easy to
achieve, it is a tremendously liberating viewpoint on life.
© S.Bruton, drafted 1/31/2020

The text below is derived from a public domain translation of The Enchiridion by Epictetus, downloaded
from: https://standardebooks.org/ebooks/epictetus/the-enchiridion/elizabeth-carter

The Enchiridion
By Epictetus
Written 135 A.C.E.
Translated by Elizabeth Carter
1. Some things are in our control and others not. Things in our control are opinion,
pursuit, desire, aversion, and, in a word, whatever are our own actions. Things not in our
control are body, property, reputation, command, and, in one word, whatever are not our
own actions.
The things in our control are by nature free, unrestrained, unhindered; but those not in our
control are weak, slavish, restrained, belonging to others. Remember, then, that if you
suppose that things which are slavish by nature are also free, and that what belongs to
others is your own, then you will be hindered. You will lament, you will be disturbed,
and you will find fault both with gods and men. But if you suppose that only to be your
own which is your own, and what belongs to others such as it really is, then no one will
ever compel you or restrain you. Further, you will find fault with no one or accuse no one.
You will do nothing against your will. No one will hurt you, you will have no enemies,
and you not be harmed.
Aiming therefore at such great things, remember that you must not allow yourself to be
carried, even with a slight tendency, towards the attainment of lesser things. Instead, you
must entirely quit some things and for the present postpone the rest. But if you would
both have these great things, along with power and riches, then you will not gain even the
latter, because you aim at the former too: but you will absolutely fail of the former, by
which alone happiness and freedom are achieved.
Work, therefore to be able to say to every harsh appearance, "You are but an appearance,
and not absolutely the thing you appear to be." And then examine it by those rules which
you have, and first, and chiefly, by this: whether it concerns the things which are in our
own control, or those which are not; and, if it concerns anything not in our control, be
prepared to say that it is nothing to you.
2. Remember that following desire promises the attainment of that of which you are
desirous; and aversion promises the avoiding that to which you are averse. However, he
who fails to obtain the object of his desire is disappointed, and he who incurs the object
of his aversion wretched. If, then, you confine your aversion to those objects only which
are contrary to the natural use of your faculties, which you have in your own control, you
will never incur anything to which you are averse. But if you are averse to sickness, or
death, or poverty, you will be wretched. Remove aversion, then, from all things that are

not in our control, and transfer it to things contrary to the nature of what is in our control.
But, for the present, totally suppress desire: for, if you desire any of the things which are
not in your own control, you must necessarily be disappointed; and of those which are,
and which it would be laudable to desire, nothing is yet in your possession. Use only the
appropriate actions of pursuit and avoidance; and even these lightly, and with gentleness
and reservation.
3. With regard to whatever objects give you delight, are useful, or are deeply loved,
remember to tell yourself of what general nature they are, beginning from the most
insignificant things. If, for example, you are fond of a specific ceramic cup, remind
yourself that it is only ceramic cups in general of which you are fond. Then, if it breaks,
you will not be disturbed. If you kiss your child, or your wife, say that you only kiss
things which are human, and thus you will not be disturbed if either of them dies.
4. When you are going about any action, remind yourself what nature the action is. If you
are going to bathe, picture to yourself the things which usually happen in the bath: some
people splash the water, some push, some use abusive language, and others steal. Thus
you will more safely go about this action if you say to yourself, "I will now go bathe, and
keep my own mind in a state conformable to nature." And in the same manner with
regard to every other action. For thus, if any hindrance arises in bathing, you will have it
ready to say, "It was not only to bathe that I desired, but to keep my mind in a state
conformable to nature; and I will not keep it if I am bothered at things that happen.
5. Men are disturbed, not by things, but by the principles and notions which they form
concerning things. Death, for instance, is not terrible, else it would have appeared so to
Socrates. But the terror consists in our notion of death that it is terrible. When therefore
we are hindered, or disturbed, or grieved, let us never attribute it to others, but to
ourselves; that is, to our own principles. An uninstructed person will lay the fault of his
own bad condition upon others. Someone just starting instruction will lay the fault on
himself. Some who is perfectly instructed will place blame neither on others nor on
himself.
6. Don't be prideful with any excellence that is not your own. If a horse should be
prideful and say, " I am handsome," it would be supportable. But when you are prideful,
and say, " I have a handsome horse," know that you are proud of what is, in fact, only the
good of the horse. What, then, is your own? Only your reaction to the appearances of
things. Thus, when you behave conformably to nature in reaction to how things appear,
you will be proud with reason; for you will take pride in some good of your own.
7. Consider when, on a voyage, your ship is anchored; if you go on shore to get water you
may along the way amuse yourself with picking up a shellish, or an onion. However, your
thoughts and continual attention ought to be bent towards the ship, waiting for the captain
to call on board; you must then immediately leave all these things, otherwise you will be
thrown into the ship, bound neck and feet like a sheep. So it is with life. If, instead of an
onion or a shellfish, you are given a wife or child, that is fine. But if the captain calls, you
must run to the ship, leaving them, and regarding none of them. But if you are old, never

go far from the ship: lest, when you are called, you should be unable to come in time.
8. Don't demand that things happen as you wish, but wish that they happen as they do
happen, and you will go on well.
9. Sickness is a hindrance to the body, but not to your ability to choose, unless that is
your choice. Lameness is a hindrance to the leg, but not to your ability to choose. Say this
to yourself with regard to everything that happens, then you will see such obstacles as
hindrances to something else, but not to yourself.
10. With every accident, ask yourself what abilities you have for making a proper use of
it. If you see an attractive person, you will find that self-restraint is the ability you have
against your desire. If you are in pain, you will find fortitude. If you hear unpleasant
language, you will find patience. And thus habituated, the appearances of things will not
hurry you away along with them.
11. Never say of anything, "I have lost it"; but, "I have returned it." Is your child dead? It
is returned. Is your wife dead? She is returned. Is your estate taken away? Well, and is
not that likewise returned? "But he who took it away is a bad man." What difference is it
to you who the giver assigns to take it back? While he gives it to you to possess, take care
of it; but don't view it as your own, just as travelers view a hotel.
12. If you want to improve, reject such reasonings as these: "If I neglect my affairs, I'll
have no income; if I don't correct my servant, he will be bad." For it is better to die with
hunger, exempt from grief and fear, than to live in affluence with perturbation; and it is
better your servant should be bad, than you unhappy.
Begin therefore from little things. Is a little oil spilt? A little wine stolen? Say to yourself,
"This is the price paid for apathy, for tranquillity, and nothing is to be had for nothing."
When you call your servant, it is possible that he may not come; or, if he does, he may
not do what you want. But he is by no means of such importance that it should be in his
power to give you any disturbance.
13. If you want to improve, be content to be thought foolish and stupid with regard to
external things. Don't wish to be thought to know anything; and even if you appear to be
somebody important to others, distrust yourself. For, it is difficult to both keep your
faculty of choice in a state conformable to nature, and at the same time acquire external
things. But while you are careful about the one, you must of necessity neglect the other.
14. If you wish your children, and your wife, and your friends to live for ever, you are
stupid; for you wish to be in control of things which you cannot, you wish for things that
belong to others to be your own. So likewise, if you wish your servant to be without fault,
you are a fool; for you wish vice not to be vice," but something else. But, if you wish to
have your desires undisappointed, this is in your own control. Exercise, therefore, what is
in your control. He is the master of every other person who is able to confer or remove
whatever that person wishes either to have or to avoid. Whoever, then, would be free, let

him wish nothing, let him decline nothing, which depends on others else he must
necessarily be a slave.
15. Remember that you must behave in life as at a dinner party. Is anything brought
around to you? Put out your hand and take your share with moderation. Does it pass by
you? Don't stop it. Is it not yet come? Don't stretch your desire towards it, but wait till it
reaches you. Do this with regard to children, to a wife, to public posts, to riches, and you
will eventually be a worthy partner of the feasts of the gods. And if you don't even take
the things which are set before you, but are able even to reject them, then you will not
only be a partner at the feasts of the gods, but also of their empire. For, by doing this,
Diogenes, Heraclitus and others like them, deservedly became, and were called, divine.
16. When you see anyone weeping in grief because his son has gone abroad, or is dead,
or because he has suffered in his affairs, be careful that the appearance may not misdirect
you. Instead, distinguish within your own mind, and be prepared to say, "It's not the
accident that distresses this person., because it doesn't distress another person; it is the
judgment which he makes about it." As far as words go, however, don't reduce yourself
to his level, and certainly do not moan with him. Do not moan inwardly either.
17. Remember that you are an actor in a drama, of such a kind as the author pleases to
make it. If short, of a short one; if long, of a long one. If it is his pleasure you should act a
poor man, a cripple, a governor, or a private person, see that you act it naturally. For this
is your business, to act well the character assigned you; to choose it is another's.
18. When a raven happens to croak unluckily, don't allow the appearance hurry you away
with it, but immediately make the distinction to yourself, and say, "None of these things
are foretold to me; but either to my paltry body, or property, or reputation, or children, or
wife. But to me all omens are lucky, if I will. For whichever of these things happens, it is
in my control to derive advantage from it."
19. You may be unconquerable, if you enter into no combat in which it is not in your own
control to conquer. When, therefore, you see anyone eminent in honors, or power, or in
high esteem on any other account, take heed not to be hurried away with the appearance,
and to pronounce him happy; for, if the essence of good consists in things in our own
control, there will be no room for envy or emulation. But, for your part, don't wish to be a
general, or a senator, or a consul, but to be free; and the only way to this is a contempt of
things not in our own control.
20. Remember, that not he who gives ill language or a blow insults, but the principle
which represents these things as insulting. When, therefore, anyone provokes you, be
assured that it is your own opinion which provokes you. Try, therefore, in the first place,
not to be hurried away with the appearance. For if you once gain time and respite, you
will more easily command yourself.
21. Let death and exile, and all other things which appear terrible be daily before your

eyes, but chiefly death, and you win never entertain any abject thought, nor too eagerly
covet anything.
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22. If you have an earnest desire of attaining to philosophy, prepare yourself from the
very first to be laughed at, to be sneered by the multitude, to hear them say,." He is
returned to us a philosopher all at once," and " Whence this supercilious look?" Now, for
your part, don't have a supercilious look indeed; but keep steadily to those things which
appear best to you as one appointed by God to this station. For remember that, if you
adhere to the same point, those very persons who at first ridiculed will afterwards admire
you. But if you are conquered by them, you will incur a double ridicule.
23. If you ever happen to turn your attention to externals, so as to wish to please anyone,
be assured that you have ruined your scheme of life. Be contented, then, in everything
with being a philosopher; and, if you wish to be thought so likewise by anyone, appear so
to yourself, and it will suffice you.
24. Don't allow such considerations as these distress you. "I will live in dishonor, and be
nobody anywhere." For, if dishonor is an evil, you can no more be involved in any evil
by the means of another, than be engaged in anything base. Is it any business of yours,
then, to get power, or to be admitted to an entertainment? By no means. How, then, after
all, is this a dishonor? And how is it true that you will be nobody anywhere, when you
ought to be somebody in those things only which are in your own control, in which you
may be of the greatest consequence? "But my friends will be unassisted." -- What do you
mean by unassisted? They will not have money from you, nor will you make them
Roman citizens. Who told you, then, that these are among the things in our own control,
and not the affair of others? And who can give to another the things which he has not
himself? "Well, but get them, then, that we too may have a share." If I can get them with
the preservation of my own honor and fidelity and greatness of mind, show me the way
and I will get them; but if you require me to lose my own proper good that you may gain
what is not good, consider how inequitable and foolish you are. Besides, which would
you rather have, a sum of money, or a friend of fidelity and honor? Rather assist me, then,
to gain this character than require me to do those things by which I may lose it. Well, but
my country, say you, as far as depends on me, will be unassisted. Here again, what
assistance is this you mean? "It will not have porticoes nor baths of your providing." And
what signifies that? Why, neither does a smith provide it with shoes, or a shoemaker with
arms. It is enough if everyone fully performs his own proper business. And were you to
supply it with another citizen of honor and fidelity, would not he be of use to it? Yes.
Therefore neither are you yourself useless to it. "What place, then, say you, will I hold in
the state?" Whatever you can hold with the preservation of your fidelity and honor. But if,

by desiring to be useful to that, you lose these, of what use can you be to your country
when you are become faithless and void of shame.
25. Is anyone preferred before you at an entertainment, or in a compliment, or in being
admitted to a consultation? If these things are good, you ought to be glad that he has
gotten them; and if they are evil, don't be grieved that you have not gotten them. And
remember that you cannot, without using the same means [which others do] to acquire
things not in our own control, expect to be thought worthy of an equal share of them. For
how can he who does not frequent the door of any [great] man, does not attend him, does
not praise him, have an equal share with him who does? You are unjust, then, and
insatiable, if you are unwilling to pay the price for which these things are sold, and would
have them for nothing. For how much is lettuce sold? Fifty cents, for instance. If another,
then, paying fifty cents, takes the lettuce, and you, not paying it, go without them, don't
imagine that he has gained any advantage over you. For as he has the lettuce, so you have
the fifty cents which you did not give. So, in the present case, you have not been invited
to such a person's entertainment, because you have not paid him the price for which a
supper is sold. It is sold for praise; it is sold for attendance. Give him then the value, if it
is for your advantage. But if you would, at the same time, not pay the one and yet receive
the other, you are insatiable, and a blockhead. Have you nothing, then, instead of the
supper? Yes, indeed, you have: the not praising him, whom you don't like to praise; the
not bearing with his behavior at coming in.
26. The will of nature may be learned from those things in which we don't distinguish
from each other. For example, when our neighbor's boy breaks a cup, or the like, we are
presently ready to say, "These things will happen." Be assured, then, that when your own
cup likewise is broken, you ought to be affected just as when another's cup was broken.
Apply this in like manner to greater things. Is the child or wife of another dead? There is
no one who would not say, "This is a human accident." but if anyone's own child happens
to die, it is presently, "Alas I how wretched am I!" But it should be remembered how we
are affected in hearing the same thing concerning others.
27. As a mark is not set up for the sake of missing the aim, so neither does the nature of
evil exist in the world.
28. If a person gave your body to any stranger he met on his way, you would certainly be
angry. And do you feel no shame in handing over your own mind to be confused and
mystified by anyone who happens to verbally attack you?
29. In every affair consider what precedes and follows, and then undertake it. Otherwise
you will begin with spirit; but not having thought of the consequences, when some of
them appear you will shamefully desist. "I would conquer at the Olympic games." But
consider what precedes and follows, and then, if it is for your advantage, engage in the
affair. You must conform to rules, submit to a diet, refrain from dainties; exercise your
body, whether you choose it or not, at a stated hour, in heat and cold; you must drink no
cold water, nor sometimes even wine. In a word, you must give yourself up to your
master, as to a physician. Then, in the combat, you may be thrown into a ditch, dislocate

your arm, turn your ankle, swallow dust, be whipped, and, after all, lose the victory.
When you have evaluated all this, if your inclination still holds, then go to war.
Otherwise, take notice, you will behave like children who sometimes play like wrestlers,
sometimes gladiators, sometimes blow a trumpet, and sometimes act a tragedy when they
have seen and admired these shows. Thus you too will be at one time a wrestler, at
another a gladiator, now a philosopher, then an orator; but with your whole soul, nothing
at all. Like an ape, you mimic all you see, and one thing after another is sure to please
you, but is out of favor as soon as it becomes familiar. For you have never entered upon
anything considerately, nor after having viewed the whole matter on all sides, or made
any scrutiny into it, but rashly, and with a cold inclination. Thus some, when they have
seen a philosopher and heard a man speaking like Euphrates (though, indeed, who can
speak like him?), have a mind to be philosophers too. Consider first, man, what the
matter is, and what your own nature is able to bear. If you would be a wrestler, consider
your shoulders, your back, your thighs; for different persons are made for different things.
Do you think that you can act as you do, and be a philosopher? That you can eat and
drink, and be angry and discontented as you are now? You must watch, you must labor,
you must get the better of certain appetites, must quit your acquaintance, be despised by
your servant, be laughed at by those you meet; come off worse than others in everything,
in magistracies, in honors, in courts of judicature. When you have considered all these
things round, approach, if you please; if, by parting with them, you have a mind to
purchase apathy, freedom, and tranquillity. If not, don't come here; don't, like children, be
one while a philosopher, then a publican, then an orator, and then one of Caesar's officers.
These things are not consistent. You must be one man, either good or bad. You must
cultivate either your own ruling faculty or externals, and apply yourself either to things
within or without you; that is, be either a philosopher, or one of the vulgar.
30. Duties are universally measured by relations. Is anyone a father? If so, it is implied
that the children should take care of him, submit to him in everything, patiently listen to
his reproaches, his correction. But he is a bad father. Is you naturally entitled, then, to a
good father? No, only to a father. Is a brother unjust? Well, keep your own situation
towards him. Consider not what he does, but what you are to do to keep your own faculty
of choice in a state conformable to nature. For another will not hurt you unless you please.
You will then be hurt when you think you are hurt. In this manner, therefore, you will
find, from the idea of a neighbor, a citizen, a general, the corresponding duties if you
accustom yourself to contemplate the several relations.
31. Be assured that the essential property of piety towards the gods is to form right
opinions concerning them, as existing "I and as governing the universe with goodness
and justice. And fix yourself in this resolution, to obey them, and yield to them, and
willingly follow them in all events, as produced by the most perfect understanding. For
thus you will never find fault with the gods, nor accuse them as neglecting you. And it is
not possible for this to be effected any other way than by withdrawing yourself from
things not in our own control, and placing good or evil in those only which are. For if you
suppose any of the things not in our own control to be either good or evil, when you are
disappointed of what you wish, or incur what you would avoid, you must necessarily find
fault with and blame the authors. For every animal is naturally formed to fly and abhor

things that appear hurtful, and the causes of them; and to pursue and admire those which
appear beneficial, and the causes of them. It is impractical, then, that one who supposes
himself to be hurt should be happy about the person who, he thinks, hurts him, just as it is
impossible to be happy about the hurt itself. Hence, also, a father is reviled by a son,
when he does not impart to him the things which he takes to be good; and the supposing
empire to be a good made Polynices and Eteocles mutually enemies. On this account the
husbandman, the sailor, the merchant, on this account those who lose wives and children,
revile the gods. For where interest is, there too is piety placed. So that, whoever is careful
to regulate his desires and aversions as he ought, is, by the very same means, careful of
piety likewise. But it is also incumbent on everyone to offer libations and sacrifices and
first fruits, conformably to the customs of his country, with purity, and not in a slovenly
manner, nor negligently, nor sparingly, nor beyond his ability.
32. When you have recourse to divination, remember that you know not what the event
will be, and you come to learn it of the diviner; but of what nature it is you know before
you come, at least if you are a philosopher. For if it is among the things not in our own
control, it can by no means be either good or evil. Don't, therefore, bring either desire or
aversion with you to the diviner (else you will approach him trembling), but first acquire
a distinct knowledge that every event is indifferent and nothing to you., of whatever sort
it may be, for it will be in your power to make a right use of it, and this no one can hinder;
then come with confidence to the gods, as your counselors, and afterwards, when any
counsel is given you, remember what counselors you have assumed, and whose advice
you will neglect if you disobey. Come to divination, as Socrates prescribed, in cases of
which the whole consideration relates to the event, and in which no opportunities are
afforded by reason, or any other art, to discover the thing proposed to be learned. When,
therefore, it is our duty to share the danger of a friend or of our country, we ought not to
consult the oracle whether we will share it with them or not. For, though the diviner
should forewarn you that the victims are unfavorable, this means no more than that either
death or mutilation or exile is portended. But we have reason within us, and it directs,
even with these hazards, to the greater diviner, the Pythian god, who cast out of the
temple the person who gave no assistance to his friend while another was murdering him.
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33. Immediately prescribe some character and form of conduce to yourself, which you
may keep both alone and in company.
Be for the most part silent, or speak merely what is necessary, and in few words. We may,
however, enter, though sparingly, into discourse sometimes when occasion calls for it,
but not on any of the common subjects, of gladiators, or horse races, or athletic
champions, or feasts, the vulgar topics of conversation; but principally not of men, so as
either to blame, or praise, or make comparisons. If you are able, then, by your own
conversation bring over that of your company to proper subjects; but, if you happen to be
taken among strangers, be silent.
Don't allow your laughter be much, nor on many occasions, nor profuse.
Avoid swearing, if possible, altogether; if not, as far as you are able.
Avoid public and vulgar entertainments; but, if ever an occasion calls you to them, keep
your attention upon the stretch, that you may not imperceptibly slide into vulgar manners.
For be assured that if a person be ever so sound himself, yet, if his companion be infected,
he who converses with him will be infected likewise.
Provide things relating to the body no further than mere use; as meat, drink, clothing,
house, family. But strike off and reject everything relating to show and delicacy.
As far as possible, before marriage, keep yourself pure from familiarities with women,
and, if you indulge them, let it be lawfully." But don't therefore be troublesome and full
of reproofs to those who use these liberties, nor frequently boast that you yourself don't.
If anyone tells you that such a person speaks ill of you, don't make excuses about what is
said of you, but answer: " He does not know my other faults, else he would not have
mentioned only these."
It is not necessary for you to appear often at public spectacles; but if ever there is a proper
occasion for you to be there, don't appear more solicitous for anyone than for yourself;
that is, wish things to be only just as they are, and him only to conquer who is the
conqueror, for thus you will meet with no hindrance. But abstain entirely from
declamations and derision and violent emotions. And when you come away, don't

discourse a great deal on what has passed, and what does not contribute to your own
amendment. For it would appear by such discourse that you were immoderately struck
with the show.
Go not [of your own accord] to the rehearsals of any
authors , nor appear [at them] readily. But, if you do appear, keep your gravity and
sedateness, and at the same time avoid being morose.
When you are going to confer with anyone, and particularly of those in a superior station,
represent to yourself how Socrates or Zeno would behave in such a case, and you will not
be at a loss to make a proper use of whatever may occur.
When you are going to any of the people in power, represent to yourself that you will not
find him at home; that you will not be admitted; that the doors will not be opened to you;
that he will take no notice of you. If, with all this, it is your duty to go, bear what happens,
and never say [to yourself], " It was not worth so much." For this is vulgar, and like a
man dazed by external things.
In parties of conversation, avoid a frequent and excessive mention of your own actions
and dangers. For, however agreeable it may be to yourself to mention the risks you have
run, it is not equally agreeable to others to hear your adventures. Avoid, likewise, an
endeavor to excite laughter. For this is a slippery point, which may throw you into vulgar
manners, and, besides, may be apt to lessen you in the esteem of your acquaintance.
Approaches to indecent discourse are likewise dangerous. Whenever, therefore, anything
of this sort happens, if there be a proper opportunity, rebuke him who makes advances
that way; or, at least, by silence and blushing and a forbidding look, show yourself to be
displeased by such talk.
34. If you are struck by the appearance of any promised pleasure, guard yourself against
being hurried away by it; but let the affair wait your leisure, and procure yourself some
delay. Then bring to your mind both points of time: that in which you will enjoy the
pleasure, and that in which you will repent and reproach yourself after you have enjoyed
it; and set before you, in opposition to these, how you will be glad and applaud yourself if
you abstain. And even though it should appear to you a seasonable gratification, take
heed that its enticing, and agreeable and attractive force may not subdue you; but set in
opposition to this how much better it is to be conscious of having gained so great a
victory.
35. When you do anything from a clear judgment that it ought to be done, never shun the
being seen to do it, even though the world should make a wrong supposition about it; for,
if you don't act right, shun the action itself; but, if you do, why are you afraid of those
who censure you wrongly?
36. As the proposition, "Either it is day or it is night," is extremely proper for a
disjunctive argument, but quite improper in a conjunctive one, so, at a feast, to choose the
largest share is very suitable to the bodily appetite, but utterly inconsistent with the social

spirit of an entertainment. When you eat with another, then, remember not only the value
of those things which are set before you to the body, but the value of that behavior which
ought to be observed towards the person who gives the entertainment.
37. If you have assumed any character above your strength, you have both made an ill
figure in that and quitted one which you might have supported.
38. When walking, you are careful not to step on a nail or turn your foot; so likewise be
careful not to hurt the ruling faculty of your mind. And, if we were to guard against this
in every action, we should undertake the action with the greater safety.
39. The body is to everyone the measure of the possessions proper for it, just as the foot
is of the shoe. If, therefore, you stop at this, you will keep the measure; but if you move
beyond it, you must necessarily be carried forward, as down a cliff; as in the case of a
shoe, if you go beyond its fitness to the foot, it comes first to be gilded, then purple, and
then studded with jewels. For to that which once exceeds a due measure, there is no
bound.
40. Women from fourteen years old are flattered with the title of "mistresses" by the men.
Therefore, perceiving that they are regarded only as qualified to give the men pleasure,
they begin to adorn themselves, and in that to place ill their hopes. We should, therefore,
fix our attention on making them sensible that they are valued for the appearance of
decent, modest and discreet behavior.
41. It is a mark of want of genius to spend much time in things relating to the body, as to
be long in our exercises, in eating and drinking, and in the discharge of other animal
functions. These should be done incidentally and slightly, and our whole attention be
engaged in the care of the understanding.
42. When any person harms you, or speaks badly of you, remember that he acts or speaks
from a supposition of its being his duty. Now, it is not possible that he should follow
what appears right to you, but what appears so to himself. Therefore, if he judges from a
wrong appearance, he is the person hurt, since he too is the person deceived. For if
anyone should suppose a true proposition to be false, the proposition is not hurt, but he
who is deceived about it. Setting out, then, from these principles, you will meekly bear a
person who reviles you, for you will say upon every occasion, "It seemed so to him."
43. Everything has two handles, the one by which it may be carried, the other by which it
cannot. If your brother acts unjustly, don't lay hold on the action by the handle of his
injustice, for by that it cannot be carried; but by the opposite, that he is your brother, that
he was brought up with you; and thus you will lay hold on it, as it is to be carried.
44. These reasonings are unconnected: "I am richer than you, therefore I am better"; "I
am more eloquent than you, therefore I am better." The connection is rather this: "I am
richer than you, therefore my property is greater than yours;" "I am more eloquent than
you, therefore my style is better than yours." But you, after all, are neither property nor

style.
45. Does anyone bathe in a mighty little time? Don't say that he does it ill, but in a mighty
little time. Does anyone drink a great quantity of wine? Don't say that he does ill, but that
he drinks a great quantity. For, unless you perfectly understand the principle from which
anyone acts, how should you know if he acts ill? Thus you will not run the hazard of
assenting to any appearances but such as you fully comprehend.
46. Never call yourself a philosopher, nor talk a great deal among the unlearned about
theorems, but act conformably to them. Thus, at an entertainment, don't talk how persons
ought to eat, but eat as you ought. For remember that in this manner Socrates also
universally avoided all ostentation. And when persons came to him and desired to be
recommended by him to philosophers, he took and- recommended them, so well did he
bear being overlooked. So that if ever any talk should happen among the unlearned
concerning philosophic theorems, be you, for the most part, silent. For there is great
danger in immediately throwing out what you have not digested. And, if anyone tells you
that you know nothing, and you are not nettled at it, then you may be sure that you have
begun your business. For sheep don't throw up the grass to show the shepherds how much
they have eaten; but, inwardly digesting their food, they outwardly produce wool and
milk. Thus, therefore, do you likewise not show theorems to the unlearned, but the
actions produced by them after they have been digested.
47. When you have brought yourself to supply the necessities of your body at a small
price, don't pique yourself upon it; nor, if you drink water, be saying upon every occasion,
"I drink water." But first consider how much more sparing and patient of hardship the
poor are than we. But if at any time you would inure yourself by exercise to labor, and
bearing hard trials, do it for your own sake, and not for the world; don't grasp statues, but,
when you are violently thirsty, take a little cold water in your mouth, and spurt it out and
tell nobody.
48. The condition and characteristic of a vulgar person, is, that he never expects either
benefit or hurt from himself, but from externals. The condition and characteristic of a
philosopher is, that he expects all hurt and benefit from himself. The marks of a
proficient are, that he censures no one, praises no one, blames no one, accuses no one,
says nothing concerning himself as being anybody, or knowing anything: when he is, in
any instance, hindered or restrained, he accuses himself; and, if he is praised, he secretly
laughs at the person who praises him; and, if he is censured, he makes no defense. But he
goes about with the caution of sick or injured people, dreading to move anything that is
set right, before it is perfectly fixed. He suppresses all desire in himself; he transfers his
aversion to those things only which thwart the proper use of our own faculty of choice;
the exertion of his active powers towards anything is very gentle; if he appears stupid or
ignorant, he does not care, and, in a word, he watches himself as an enemy, and one in
ambush.
49. When anyone shows himself overly confident in ability to understand and interpret
the works of Chrysippus, say to yourself, " Unless Chrysippus had written obscurely, this

person would have had no subject for his vanity. But what do I desire? To understand
nature and follow her. I ask, then, who interprets her, and, finding Chrysippus does, I
have recourse to him. I don't understand his writings. I seek, therefore, one to interpret
them." So far there is nothing to value myself upon. And when I find an interpreter, what
remains is to make use of his instructions. This alone is the valuable thing. But, if I
admire nothing but merely the interpretation, what do I become more than a grammarian
instead of a philosopher? Except, indeed, that instead of Homer I interpret Chrysippus.
When anyone, therefore, desires me to read Chrysippus to him, I rather blush when I
cannot show my actions agreeable and consonant to his discourse.
50. Whatever moral rules you have deliberately proposed to yourself. abide by them as
they were laws, and as if you would be guilty of impiety by violating any of them. Don't
regard what anyone says of you, for this, after all, is no concern of yours. How long, then,
will you put off thinking yourself worthy of the highest improvements and follow the
distinctions of reason? You have received the philosophical theorems, with which you
ought to be familiar, and you have been familiar with them. What other master, then, do
you wait for, to throw upon that the delay of reforming yourself? You are no longer a boy,
but a grown man. If, therefore, you will be negligent and slothful, and always add
procrastination to procrastination, purpose to purpose, and fix day after day in which you
will attend to yourself, you will insensibly continue without proficiency, and, living and
dying, persevere in being one of the vulgar. This instant, then, think yourself worthy of
living as a man grown up, and a proficient. Let whatever appears to be the best be to you
an inviolable law. And if any instance of pain or pleasure, or glory or disgrace, is set
before you, remember that now is the combat, now the Olympiad comes on, nor can it be
put off. By once being defeated and giving way, proficiency is lost, or by the contrary
preserved. Thus Socrates became perfect, improving himself by everything. attending to
nothing but reason. And though you are not yet a Socrates, you ought, however, to live as
one desirous of becoming a Socrates.
51. The first and most necessary topic in philosophy is that of the use of moral theorems,
such as, "We ought not to lie;" the second is that of demonstrations, such as, "What is the
origin of our obligation not to lie;" the third gives strength and articulation to the other
two, such as, "What is the origin of this is a demonstration." For what is demonstration?
What is consequence? What contradiction? What truth? What falsehood? The third topic,
then, is necessary on the account of the second, and the second on the account of the first.
But the most necessary, and that whereon we ought to rest, is the first. But we act just on
the contrary. For we spend all our time on the third topic, and employ all our diligence
about that, and entirely neglect the first. Therefore, at the same time that we lie, we are
immediately prepared to show how it is demonstrated that lying is not right.
52. Upon all occasions we ought to have these maxims ready at hand:
"Conduct me, Jove, and you, 0 Destiny,
Wherever your decrees have fixed my station."
Cleanthes

"I follow cheerfully; and, did I not,
Wicked and wretched, I must follow still
Whoever yields properly to Fate, is deemed
Wise among men, and knows the laws of heaven."
Euripides, Frag. 965
And this third:
"0 Crito, if it thus pleases the gods, thus let it be. Anytus and Melitus may kill me indeed,
but hurt me they cannot."
Plato's Crito and Apology
THE END
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Study Guide: 3. Epictetus
The distinction between what is in our control and what is not in our control is a lynchpin of
Epictetus’ thought and Stoicism more generally. In addition to giving examples of things that
fall under each of these headings, he also characterizes the general differences between things
in/not in our control. In general, what is true of things in our control? In general, what is true of
things not in our control?
What sorts of things are in our control, and what sorts of things are not, according to Epictetus?
Do you agree with his categorizations? If not, why not?
In the third paragraph, Epictetus says “if you would both have these great things, along with
power and riches, then you will not gain even the latter, because you aim at the former too: but
you will absolutely fail of the former, by which alone happiness and freedom are achieved.”
What does this suggest about Epictetus’ intended audience? For example, is he aiming this for
the Marcus Aurelius-es of the world (emperor of Rome), or someone who’s a slave (or former
slave, like himself)?
Why does he think that if we confine our aversion (dislike) to things which are both in our
control and contrary to the natural use of our faculties, we will never encounter things we
dislike? What does this even mean?
Why should we not desire things not in our control? Is it really possible not desire things that are
not in our control?
In section 4, Epictetus offers some odd advice. He recommends, before engaging in the action,
to remind ourselves what the nature of the action is. Why? Does this work? Try it sometime –
see what you think.
Section 5, famously, asserts that people are disturbed, “not by things, but by the principles and
notions which they form concerning things.” Explain what he means – illustrate with an
example of you own what you think Epictetus has mind here.
“If a captain calls, you must run the ship…” In his analogy of the captain and the ship, what is
Epictetus claiming? Again, think of what seems to be his intended audience. Would this
recommendation be more helpful and relevant to some people rather than others?

How do we become free, according to Epictetus? Is he right about this? Make his case for him
using an example from your own life and experience.
When Epictetus says we are to “act well the character assigned to us,” who does this sound like?
(Someone else we’ve studied?)
Suppose someone says to Epictetus: my life goal is to “achieve the American dream”? How do
you suppose he might respond?
What does Epictetus mean by “being a philosopher?” Is there any particular philosopher he
might have in mind in such references?
Passage 26 recommends having the same kind of detached attitude regarding bad things that
happen to ourselves as we have towards others to whom bad things happen. For example, in
regards to others’ misfortunes, we’ve probably all thought to ourselves, “these things will
happen.” So what do you think of Epictetus’ advice that we have the same attitude towards
ourselves?
Comment on the comparison between having our bodies taken from us and “handing over” one’s
mind, described in passage 28.
What does he mean by the remark: “duties are universally measured by relations?”
In the last passage (32), Epictetus makes a remark that most modern readers will probably
question. He says “if it is among the things not in our own control, it can be no means be either
good or evil.” Without trying to either defend him or criticize him, explain what he must be
assuming about good and evil to arrive at this startling conclusion. What can be good or evil, on
his view?

Buddhism Historical Background and Key Themes
No Self

Image 1: “Gautama Buddha with two basket of foods,” by Artem Beliaikin on Unsplash. Last accessed 2/12/20.

Buddhism is a philosophy of life expounded by Gautama Buddha ("Buddha" means “awakened”
or "enlightened one"), who lived and taught in northern India in the 6th century B.C. The
Buddha was not a god and the philosophy of Buddhism does not entail a theistic world view.
There is no divinity in Buddhism, and Buddhist practices do not include prayer, devotion,
worship, or other activities we often associate with religion. The teachings of the Buddha are
aimed solely at liberating sentient beings from suffering. To this end, Buddhists advocate
striving towards ethical perfection and purification of the mind, accomplished by meditation,
adopting the proper attitudes, right actions, and ridding oneself of destructive emotions like
anger, jealousy, and greed,
Buddhism’s fundamental emphasis, and the first of the 4 Noble Truths, is the conviction that all
is dukkha (pronounced “dooka”). Dukkha is a broad term and has no precise equivalent in
English, although it is traditionally translated as “suffering.” It includes all manner of
imperfections, disappointments, frustrations, pains, and so forth; negative experiences in their
various forms. We humans all die. That’s dukkha. We all experience dissatisfactions of many
kinds and degrees, from daily setbacks and irritations to life-crippling diseases and afflictions.
Those are all dukkha too. Buddhism is not, however, a dour or depressive outlook, and
Buddhists certainly do not deny that life contains much joy and much to celebrate. Personally,
Buddhists tend to be happy, joyful people. Life’s joys and pleasures, however, do not erase the
fact suffering is an inescapable and pervasive fact of our existence, as well as the existence of
animals. Suffering is to be avoided and overcome by releasing oneself from the attachments that
give rise to it.
Two key metaphysical tenets are important to understanding what is distinctive about Buddhist
ethics. One is the belief in the fundamental continuity of all things; another is the “no-self”
doctrine. Both thoughts are connected to each other, as the key common insight is idea that all
individuality and all metaphysical distinctions between people, animals and all other things are
not really real. Ultimately, the dividing lines and boundaries are merely illusory. Buddhists do
not deny that in a familiar, ordinary sense we think of ourselves as individuals distinct from each
other, our parents and so forth. But such common ways of thinking and talking should not be
taken too seriously. Ultimately, there is no firm separation between my thought and your

thoughts, or your body and that of others, or for that matter, the border between mind and body.
There just is, or there just is what is.
The root of all suffering, says Buddhism, is attachment. (This is the second of the 4 Noble
Truths.) Humans by their nature tend to be narcissistic (focused only on themselves), selfish,
distracted, and pleasure-seeking. While to be sure, the lives of most people contain fleeting and
sometimes substantial pleasures, the pursuit of pleasure and self-interest leads to great
dissatisfactions and pains. Ultimately, lives devoted to getting for oneself – which is for the vast
majority of us, part of what we aim at – are misguided and self-defeating. The more we strive
for ourselves, the worse off we tend to become. Mundane examples of this phenomenon are a
familiar part of our everyday lives. We like the pleasure of eating sweet things, but they satisfy
only temporarily. Soon, we want more. We crave the better job, the prettier spouse, the slicker
car, the bigger house, but they do not satisfy for long. Soon, we want more, better, newer. New
desires become the source of new cravings and pain. The basic source of our discontent is our
attachment to ourselves and the fulfillment of our desires. Only by releasing ourselves from
these attachments – overcoming our devotion to ourselves as distinct and special – can the
suffering be overcome.
Themes:
1) The over-riding emphases in Buddhist ethics are the virtues of compassion and nudita, which
can be roughly translated as “joy in the joy of others.” While other virtues are also important as
well, including gratitude, honesty, and charity, and there are schools of thought other than
Buddhism that recognize the importance of these traits, compassion and nudita are particularly
distinctive in Buddhism. A virtue in the Buddhist sense includes not merely certain kinds of
actions. One can, after all, do occasional compassionate things without being a compassionate
person. To have the virtues of compassion and nudita, one needs two further things beyond right
actions. First, one has to have the proper “mindset,” so to speak. Compassionate people act
compassionately not for the sake of their own happiness, or to live up to some external code or a
set of rules. They do not do compassionate deeds to impress others or achieve “nirvana.”
Rather, compassionate people act out of sincere and genuine love and concern for others.
Second, the behavior of truly compassionate people reflects their deeper character. Thinking and
feeling in the appropriate ways are habitual and instinctive, not actions to be checked off a
checklist or by strenuous acts of willpower.
2) A second key emphasis in Buddhism worth mentioning here, and one that sets it apart from
more western approaches to life, such as Christianity, is the emphasis on practice. Buddhists
advocate meditation as a way to reform the mind. (Scientific studies show that the brain wave
activity of lifelong meditators, such as the “happiest man in the world,” Matthieu Ricard, is
importantly different than that of most people). Also, Buddhists stress ethics as a kind of
fundamental life commitment and orientation. Compare with Christianity, for instance, as
encapsulated in John 3:16: “Whosoever believes in [Jesus, the son of God] shall not perish but
have eternal life.” The stress on “belief” and belief alone is unmistakable, which is not to deny
of course that Christianity also stresses ethics. Christians often speak as though one can be “born
again” through a conversion experience or some other way of “coming to believe” and they

typically think that human nature is in some sense irredeemable without the gift of God’s grace.
Buddhists, by contrast, emphasize habitual training and life reorientation to a greater degree.
© S.Bruton, drafted 2/28/2020

The text below is edited by S. Bruton, adapted from
“The Buddhist Core Values and Perspectives for Protection Challenges: Faith and Protection,” accessed at
https://www.unhcr.org/50be10cb9.pdf on Feb. 2, 2020.

THE BUDDHIST CORE VALUES
I. BACKGROUND

The Basic Teachings of Buddha which are core to Buddhism are:
• The Three Universal Truths;
• The Four Noble Truths; and
• The Noble Eightfold Path.
II. THE THREE UNIVERSAL TRUTHS
1. Nothing is lost in the universe
2. Everything Changes
3. The Law of Cause and Effect
In Buddhism, the law of karma, says "for every event that occurs, there will follow another event
whose existence was caused by the first, and this second event will be pleasant or unpleasant
according as its cause was skillful or unskillful." Therefore, the law of Karma teaches that the
responsibility for unskillful actions is borne by the person who commits them.
After his enlightenment, the Buddha went to the Deer Park near the holy city of Benares and shared
his new understanding with five holy men. They understood immediately and became his disciples.
This marked the beginning of the Buddhist community. For the next forty-five years, the Buddha and
his disciples went from place to place in India spreading the Dharma, his teachings. Their
compassion knew no bounds; they helped everyone along the way, beggars, kings and slave girls. At
night, they would sleep where they were; when hungry they would ask for a little food.
Wherever the Buddha went, he won the hearts of the people because he dealt with their true feelings.
He advised them not to accept his words on blind faith, but to decide for themselves whether his
teachings are right or wrong, then follow them. He encouraged everyone to have compassion for
each other and develop their own virtue: "You should do your own work, for I can teach only the
way."
Once, the Buddha and his disciple Ananda visited a monastery where a monk was suffering from a
contagious disease. The poor man lay in a mess with no one looking after him. The Buddha himself
washed the sick monk and placed him on a new bed. Afterwards, he admonished the other monks:
"Monks, you have neither mother nor father to look after you. If you do not look after each other,
who will look after you? Whoever serves the sick and suffering, serves me."
After many such cycles, if a person releases their attachment to desire and the self, they can attain
Nirvana. This is a state of liberation and freedom from suffering.
The three trainings or practices
These three consist of:
1. Sila: Virtue, good conduct, morality. This is based on two fundamental principles: The
principle of equality: that all living entities are equal. The principle of reciprocity: This is
the "Golden Rule" in Christianity - to do unto others as you would wish them to do unto
you. It is found in all major religions.

2. Samadhi: Concentration, meditation, mental development. Developing one's mind is the
path to wisdom which, in turn, leads to personal freedom. Mental development also
strengthens and controls our mind; this helps us maintain good conduct.
3. Prajna: Discernment, insight, wisdom, enlightenment. This is the real heart of Buddhism.
Wisdom will emerge if your mind is pure and calm.
The first two paths listed in the Eightfold Path, described below, refer to discernment; the last three
belong to concentration; the middle three are related to virtue.
III. THE FOUR NOBLE TRUTHS
The Buddha's Four Noble Truths explore human suffering. They may be described (somewhat
simplistically) as:
1. Dukkha: Suffering exists: Life is suffering. Suffering is real and almost universal. Suffering
has many causes: loss, sickness, pain, failure, and the impermanence of pleasure.
2. Samudaya: There is a cause of suffering. Suffering is due to attachment. It is the desire to
have and control things. It can take many forms: craving of sensual pleasures; the desire for
fame; the desire to avoid unpleasant sensations, like fear, anger or jealousy.
3. Nirodha: There is an end to suffering. Attachment can be overcome. Suffering ceases with
the final liberation of Nirvana (Nibbana). The mind experiences complete freedom,
liberation and non-attachment. It lets go of any desire or craving.
4. Magga: In order to end suffering, you must follow the Eightfold Path. There is a path for
accomplishing this.
The five precepts
These are rules to live by. They are somewhat analogous to the second half of the Ten
Commandments in Judaism and Christianity -- that part of the Decalogue which describes behaviors
to avoid. However, they are recommendations, not commandments. Believers are expected to use
their own intelligence in deciding exactly how to apply these rules:
1. Do not kill. This is sometimes translated as "not harming" or an absence of violence.
2. Do not steal. This is generally interpreted as including the avoidance of fraud and economic
exploitation.
3. Do not lie. This is sometimes interpreted as including name-calling, gossip, etc.
4. Do not misuse sex. For monks and nuns, this means any departure from complete celibacy.
For the laity, adultery is forbidden, along with any sexual harassment or exploitation,
including that within marriage. The Buddha did not discuss consensual premarital sex within
a committed relationship, thus, Buddhist traditions differ on this. Most Buddhists, probably
influenced by their local cultures, condemn same-sex sexual activity regardless of the nature
of the relationship between the people involved.
5. Do not consume alcohol or other drugs. The main concern here is that intoxicants cloud the
mind. Some have included as a drug other methods of divorcing ourselves from reality -e.g. movies, television, and the Internet.
Those preparing for monastic life or who are not within a family are expected to avoid an additional
five activities:

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Taking untimely meals.
Dancing, singing, music, watching grotesque mime.
Use of garlands, perfumes and personal adornment.
Use of high seats.
Accepting gold or silver.

There is also a series of eight precepts which are composed of the first seven listed above, followed
by the eighth and ninth combined as one. "Ordained Theravada monks promise to follow
227 precepts!" THE EIGHTFOLD PATH
The Buddha's Eightfold Path consists of:
Panna: Discernment, wisdom:
1.

Samma ditthi: Right Understanding of the Four Noble Truths. Right View is the true
understanding of the four noble truths.

2.

Samma sankappa: Right thinking; following the right path in life. Right Aspiration is the
true desire to free oneself from attachment, ignorance, and hatefulness.
These two are referred to as Prajna, or Wisdom.

Sila: Virtue, morality:
3.

Samma vaca: Right speech: No lying, criticism, condemning, gossip, harsh language. Right
Speech involves abstaining from lying, gossiping, or hurtful talk.

4.

Samma kammanta Right conduct or Right Action involves abstaining from hurtful
behaviors, such as killing, stealing, and careless sex. These are called the Five Precepts.

5.

Samma ajiva: Right livelihood: Support yourself without harming others. Right Livelihood
means making your living in such a way as to avoid dishonesty and hurting others, including
animals.
These three are referred to as Shila, or Morality.

Samadhi: Concentration, meditation:
6.

Samma vayama: Right Effort: Promote good thoughts; conquer evil thoughts. Right Effort is
a matter of exerting oneself in regards to the content of one's mind: Bad qualities should be
abandoned and prevented from arising again. Good qualities should be enacted and nurtured.

7.

Samma sati: Right Mindfulness: Become aware of your body, mind and feelings. Right
Mindfulness is the focusing of one's attention on one's body, feelings, thoughts, and
consciousness in such a way as to overcome craving, hatred, and ignorance.

8.

Samma samadhi: Right Concentration: Meditate to achieve a higher state of consciousness.
Right Concentration is meditating in such a way as to progressively realize a true
understanding of imperfection, impermanence, and non-separateness

There are, however, many sects of Buddhism and there are different kinds of Buddhist monks all
over the world. The life and customs of Buddhist monks are not only different and unique but
consist of a spiritual meaning. Their daily life follows a strict schedule that revolves around
meditation, study of scriptures, and taking part in ceremonies. There are Buddhist shrines, Buddhist
monasteries, where monks live, Gompas and Buddhist Stupas all over the world.
Thailand is Buddhist, the highest concentration in the world, with Cambodia, Myanmar, Bhutan,

Sri Lanka, Tibet, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Viet Nam, Japan, Macao (China) and Taiwan
Province of China following close behind.
Devotees reaffirm their faith in the five principles called Panchsheel:
1. Do not to take life;
2. Do not to steal;
3. Do not to commit adultery;
4. Do not lie;
5. Do not to consume liquor or other intoxicants.
Contributed by Ven. Phramaha Nopadol Saisuta,
Deputy Dean, Faculty of Buddhism, Mahachulalongkorn Uniserity, Thailand.
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CHAPTER THREE.
THE MIND.
33.
The fugitive, flickering mind,
Hard to guard and hard to bind,
The wise men train as they choose,
As a fletcher fashions a shaft to his use.
34.
Like a fish flung out on the bank;
Drawn from its watery home in a tank,[1]
Flutters this fugitive mind
To leave the realm of Māra behind.[2]
35.
Impalpable, hard to seize,
Eagerly rushing wherever it please,
Good is the taming of mind;
A mind well-tamed is a treasure to find.
36.
Invisible, subtle indeed,
Eagerly rushing its passions to feed,
Let the wise man guard this mind;
A guarded mind is a treasure to find.

37.
Wandering, dwelling apart,
Bodiless there in the cave of the heart,[3]
They who subdue this mind
Leave all the fetters of Māra behind.
38.
If he know not the Doctrine Pure,
If he waver in faith and be not sure,
If his mind be not strong-willed,
The cup of his wisdom is never fulfilled.
39.
If his mind be free from desire,
If his thought be free from anger's fire,
If evil and good he forsake,
There is no fear in the man that's awake.
40.
"Body's a vessel of clay;
Mind must be made like a fort," if he say,
Let him give battle to Mara, arrayed
In the weapons of wisdom, unafraid
Let him conquer and guard him and passionless stay.
41.
Soon, ah! soon on the earth
Will this body lie, a thing of no worth,
Neglected, void of the six
Workings of sense, a mere bundle of sticks.
42.
Whatever the ill that a foe
Doth a foe, whatever the grudge he may owe.
Greater by far will he find
The ill that is done by an ill-trained mind.
43.
Nay, not a father or mother
Could do so much; not a kinsman or other;
Greater by far will he find
The good that is done by a well-trained mind.
[1] The tank is earthly existence. The watery home is the world of desires.

[2] Māra—death, the personification of evil, rules the six highest desire-heaven-worlds: other great Gods are
Mahābrahma and Sakka (Indra). Yama also, death, is the lord of the under-world. We may compare the Greek Gods,
Zeus, Poseidon, and Pluto, who divide the rule of the manifested universe.
[3] Cp. v. 374, suññāgāra.

CHAPTER TWELVE.
The Self.
157.
Hast thou regard for self? Then keep thyself well guarded.
Be wise and keep good watch for one of the three watches.[1]
158.
First ground thyself in fitness; next, another teach.
Thus shalt thou wisdom gain and suffer no reproach.
159.
First carry out thyself whate'er thou teachest others.
Self-tamed, thou'lt tame another; but self is hard to tame.
160.
Self is the lord of self; who else could be the lord?
By taming self one gains a lord most hard to gain.
161.
The evil done by self, self-born and self-begotten,
Crushes the senseless fool, as a bolt the jar of stone.[2]
162.
He who is choked by sins, as a creeper chokes a tree,
Doth to himself what e'en his foes would have him do.
163.
Easy is ill to do and harmful to oneself;
But what is good and wholesome, that is hard to do.
164.
Whose rejects the words of noble righteous saints
On his own head brings ruin by his perversity,

As bamboo trees put forth their fruit and die away.
165.
By self is evil done; by self is one defiled;
Ill deeds not done by self to self bring purity;
Each for himself is pure; each for himself impure;
Thou can'st not cleanse another man's impurity.
166.
Mind thy affairs, not others', however great they be;[3]
Right knowledge of one's own brings more prosperity.
[1] The night is divided into three watches of three hours each. Some regard this passage as referring to childhood,
youth and age.
[2] This may be translated, "as a diamond crushes the stony gem".
[3] Cf. Bhagavad Gītā: "Better one's own dharma, however ill-performed, than others' dharma, well-performed tho'
it be."

CHAPTER FIFTEEN.
Happiness.
[1]

197.
O happily we live
Angerless amid the angry!
O happily we spend our days
Amid the angry angerless!
198.
O happily we live
In health amid the sickly ones!
O happily we spend our days
Amid the sickly ones in health!
199.
O happily we live
Free from greed amid the greedy!
O happily we spend our days

Amid the greedy free from greed!
200.
O happily we live
Who have not anything at all!
Like ever-radiant gods above,
Our food immortal joys shall be.
201.
Hate follows victory;
Conquered ones sit sorrowing.
But the calm live blissfully,
Renouncing conquest and defeat.
202.
There is no fire like lust;
No sin brings such ill-luck[3] as hate;
No pains so great as body's pains;
No bliss is like the perfect Calm.[4]
203.
Hunger's the greatest plague,
Embodied life the greatest woe;
Whoso knows this in truth, can say:
"Nibbāna is the Bliss Supreme."
204.
Health is the greatest gain;
Contentment is the greatest wealth;
Best kinsman is the trusty friend;
Nibbāna is the Bliss Supreme.
205.
Who tastes the savour sweet
Of solitude, who drinks of calm,
Is free from terror, free from sin,
Draining the nectar of the Norm.
206.
'Tis good to see the saints;
To dwell with them is blessedness;
If he should never fools behold,
A man could dwell in happiness.
207.

The company of fools
Ne'er fails to bring distress.
To live with fools brings suffering,
As living with an enemy,
But wise men's company brings bliss,
As being with dear relatives.
208.
If one be good and wise,
Well-versed in lore profound,
Long-suffering, dutiful, a saint,
Righteous and wise; if such there be,
Follow his footsteps, as the moon
Follows the path of the stars.
[1] This chapter applies especially to those who have retired from the world.
[3] Ill-luck, kali, the unlucky throw in playing dice.
[4] Nibbāna.

CHAPTER SIXTEEN.
AFFECTIONS.
209.
He who applies his mind unworthily,
Neglecting discipline,
Forsakes the goal and clings to things beloved,
Then envies those to meditation given.
210.
Join not thyself to things beloved or loathed.
To lack dear company,
To be with those we loathe, brings misery.
211.
Seek not for love; things loved when lost bring woe;
Both are impermanent.
They have no bonds who dwell indifferent.
212.
Sorrow and fear are born of things beloved.
From things beloved set free,
How canst thou sorrow? fearful how canst be?

213.
From things held dear, sorrow and fear are born.
Set free from things held dear,
How canst thou sorrow have? how canst have fear?
214.
Sorrow and fear are children born of pleasure.
No longer pleasure's slave,
How canst thou sorrow, fear how canst thou have?
215.
Sorrow and fear are children of desire.
From all desire set free,
How canst thou sorrow? fearful how canst be?
216.
Sorrow and fear are things of longing born.
From longing if thou part,
Thou hast no fear nor sorrow in thine heart.
217.
Upright and Norm-abiding, speaking truth,
Who minds his own affair,[1]
That is the man whom every one holds dear.
218.
In whom is longing for the Nameless[2] born,
Whose mind It hath enthralled,
Whose thoughts no longer are by passion torn,
That man "a Climber of the Stream" is called.[3]
219.
As when a dweller in some far-off land
Safe home returns at last,
Kin, friends and lovers waiting to greet him stand;
220.
So, when a man on earth good deeds hath done,
When he hath passed beyond,
All his good deeds like kin, await that one.
[1] Attano kamma kubbānam, as in v. 166. Attends to his own spiritual progress without dictating to others how they
should forward their evolution.
[2] "The unborn, uncreate, undeclared" state of Nibbāna.

[3] Uddhamsoto. (Skt. Urdhamsrotas) a name for the anāgāmin "non-returner."

CHAPTER SEVENTEEN.
ANGER.
221.
Conquer anger, banish pride;
Every fetter cast aside;[1]
Clinging not to Name and Form,[2]
Him who calleth nought his own
Sorrow never shall betide.
222.
He who rising wrath restrains,
As one checks a whirling team,
Him a driver true I deem;
Others only hold the reins.
223.
Wrath with kindliness allay,
To the stingy freely give;
Conquer lying words with truth;
Evil deeds with good repay.
224.
Speak the truth nor vexed be;
Give, however scantily.
Following these maxims three,
Thou the blessed gods shalt see.
225.
Sages harm no living thing;
Self-restraint accomplishing
Such men reach the Deathless Lot,[3]
Where all sorrow is forgot.
226.
Ever watchful, night and day
Learning wisdom never cease;
In the one who strives for Peace[4]
All the cravings die away.[5]
227.

There is a saying, Atula,
Of old, not of to-day:
"They blame the man who silent sits,
Or whose tongue wags alway;
And blame the man who keeps the mean;
None in the world is blameless seen."
228.
There never was, nor will be, sure,
Nor lives now among men,
A being blamed exclusively,
Nor one entirely praised.
229-30.
But one whom men of wisdom praise,
Watching him day by day,
Of faultless life, of holy ways,
Thoughtful and wise, like Jambu gold,[6]
Who to blame such a saint is bold?
Neither the gods, nor e'en Brahmā,
From him their praise withhold.
231.
'Gainst angry deeds be on thy guard;
In body be composed;
All bodily misdeeds discard;
With body tread the Way.
232. 'Gainst angry words be on thy guard;
In speech be thou composed;
All wrongful ways of speech discard;
In speech follow the Way.
233. 'Gainst angry thoughts be on thy guard;
In thought be thou composed;
All wrongful ways of thought discard;
In thoughts follow the Way.
234.
In body sages are controlled;
In thoughts as well as speech;
And they are Sages truly called
Who are controlled in each.
[1] The Fetters, saññojanāni, are ten. These are cast off at different stages of the Path, until perfection is reached.

[2] Nāma-rūpa, "abstract and concrete," the five constituents of personality, viz., mind and its factors with the four,
body, feeling, perception, and mental functions.
[3] Nibbāna, 'the changeless, accutaṁ'.
[4] idem.
[5] idem.
[6] A precious gold from the Jambu river; others say, like rose apple in colour.

CHAPTER TWENTY.
THE PATH.
273.
Best is the Eightfold Path: of truths, the four;[1]
Dispassion in the best of states sublime.
Blest is he of human beings, who hath eyes to see.
274.
This is the way; no other way can lead ye
To purify the mind and see the truth.
Walk this Way and free yourselves from Māra's host of ills.
275.
Tread ye this Path, and make an end of sorrow.
Tread ye this Path for I myself have shown it.
Shown it after learning how to pluck away the thorns.[2]
276.
Strive ye yourselves; Buddha's but preach the way
To them that strive. To meditation given
They who walk this Way are free from Māra's every bond.
277.
"All things compounded are impermanent";
Whoso sees this with opened inner eye
Wearies soon of sorrow. 'Tis the Path of Purity.
278.
"All things compounded are of sorrow made";

Whoso sees this with opened inner eye,
Wearies soon of sorrow. 'Tis the Path of Purity.
279.
"All states compounded are without a self";[3]
Whoso sees this with opened inner eye,
Wearies soon of sorrow. 'Tis the Path of Purity.
280.
Whoso strives not when it is time to strive,
Tho' young and strong, to sloth and folly prone,
Weak in will and thought, to knowledge never finds the way.
281.
Who guardeth speech and mind, who doth no wrong
With body, making pure the triple way,[4]
He shall tread the Path of Wisdom by the sages shown.
282.
Wisdom is born of meditation deep,
But lost by mind's distraction; knowing these
Two paths of loss and gain, so let him live,
Let him so direct his life that wisdom may increase.
283.
Cut down trees and undergrowth, and from desire be free![5]
For from this jungle fear of danger's born;
Cut it down, O mendicants, and from desire be free!
284.
If but a trace there be, however small,
Of lust of man for woman, as a calf
Clingeth to its dam, the mind in bondage will be held.
285.
Pluck out the love of self with thine own hand,
Just as the hand an autumn lily plucks;
Tread the Way of Peace declared by Him who hath it trod.
286.
"Here in the rainy season will I dwell;
And here in heat and cold." So thinks the fool,
Little recking of the dangers that may him befall.
287.

Care-stricken, with his thoughts of sons and flocks,
Attached to life, Death comes and seizes him,
As a sleeping village by a flood is swept away.[6]
288.
Not all his sons have power to guard that man;
No sire, no kinsman can protect him now;
How can kinsmen aught avail him in the grasp of Death?
289.
The wise man, when he sees the truth of this,
Restrained by righteous living in the Norm,
Soon will clear the path that leadeth unto Perfect Bliss.

[1] The Eightfold Path is;—Right Views, Right Thought, Right Speech, Right Action, Right Living, Right Effort, Right
Concentration, Right Mental Balance.
The Four Noble Truths are:—Ill, the cause of Ill, the ceasing of Ill, the Path.
[2] The thorns are the stings and torments of desire.
[3] These three dicta are the essence of the Buddha's teaching.
[4] The second, third and fourth steps of the Path.
[5] 'desire', viz.: 'nibbanā hotha, 'be ye free from the jungle (or forest) of desire (nir-vanā, a pun on the word nirvāṇa),
cf. v.344, vanamutto'.
[6] Cf. V. 47.

CHAPTER TWENTY FOUR.
CRAVING.
334.
Even as a creeper groweth,
Creatures that are indolent
Find their craving ever grow;
Like a monkey in the forest
Seeking fruit from bough to bough,

So they wander to and fro.[1]
335.
He who yields to sordid craving
That thro' all the world doth go,
Like the gadding vine that spreadeth,
That man's sorrows ever grow.
336.
He who quiets sordid craving,
Hard in this world to allay,
Like the dewdrop from the lotus,
All his sorrows fall away.
337.
Lo! to all of ye assembled
This the good advice I tell:
"Dig ye up the root of craving,
As men dig the scented grass.
Let not Death so oft assail ye,
Even as the rushing torrent
O'er the river reeds doth pass."
338.
If the root be still uninjured,
Trees cut down will spring again;
If the root of craving liveth,
Still there is rebirth of pain.
339.
When the six and thirty currents[2]
Bring one under pleasure's sway,
Thoughts, like waves, with passion surging.
Sweep him all confused away.
340.
Everywhere those streams are flowing;
Now the creeper of desire
Plants its roots and standeth fast;
Cut it ere it riseth higher,
Cut it with the axe of wisdom,
Root the creeper up at last.
341.
Restless, wanton is men's craving;

They who wander to and fro
In the restless search for pleasure
Birth and death must undergo.
342.
They who in the trap of craving,
Like a hare run to and fro,
By the fetters' bonds entangled,
Long must sorrow undergo.
343.
Beings, in the trap of craving
Like a hare run to and fro:
Mendicants who hope for freedom
Must their passions all forego.
344.
Whoso, free from human passions,
Junglewards to run is fain;[3]
Who, from lust emancipated,
To his lust runs back again;
Lo! the man infatuated
Plunges into bonds of pain.
345.
Not by ties of wood or iron
Nor of rope (the wise men say)
Are men held in bondage strong;
But for jewels, wives and children,
They who passionately crave,
They are held in bondage long.
346.
But the downward-dragging chain,
Yielding, hard to loose again—
This is bondage real (they say):
Who this chain of craving breaks,
Free from lust, the world forsakes.
347.
They who yield to their desires
Down the stream of craving swim;
As we see the spider run
In the net himself hath spun.
Wise men cut the net and go

Free from craving, free from woe.
348.
Loose all behind, between, before;[4]
Cross thou unto the other shore;[5]
With thy mind on all sides free
Birth and death no more shalt see.
349.
He whose mind is tossed with doubt,
Seeing bliss in passion's surge,
Makes his craving grow the longer,
Rivets all his bonds the stronger.
350.
He who joys in calming doubt,
And the loathsome contemplates,[6]
Soon will Māra's bondage leave,
Every fetter soon will cleave.
351.
He who hath attained the goal,
Fearless, free from lust and sin,
Who hath plucked out every thorn,[7]
Nevermore will be reborn.
352.
Free from lust, to nothing clinging,
Who is skilful to interpret
All the wealth of sacred lore;
All the mass of letters knowing
(Whether after or before),[8]
This indeed is his last body,
He's a Master of The Wisdom,
Mighty Being,
He indeed is born no more.
353.
Conqueror of all am I!
Knowing all, from all conditions
Of existence I am free;
By the slaying of desire
I have ended craving's fire.
Who could then my teacher be?
I have now forsaken all,

I myself, by mine own knowledge.
Whom should I my teacher call?[9]
354.
To give The Norm all gifts transcends;
To taste The Norm is sweetest far;
No joy can with its joy compare;
Who raving slays all sorrow ends.
355.
Wealth harms the fool; not him who runs
To win the goal intent;
By lust of wealth the fool harms self
With harm for others meant.
356.
Weeds are the ruin of the fields;
This world by lust is spoiled;
Then great the fruit of gifts to those
By lust who are not soiled.
357.
Weeds are the ruin of the fields;
This world is spoiled by hate;
To those by hatred undefiled
The fruit of gifts is great.
358.
Weeds are the ruin of the fields;
Deluded are mankind;
Then great the fruit of gifts to those
Whom folly doth not blind.
359.
Weeds are the ruin of the fields;
Craving pollutes the world;
Then great the fruit of gifts to those
By craving not enthralled.[10]
[1] In the round of rebirth.
[2] The six sense-organs and the six objects of sense (twelve) are affected by three desires of each, generally taken
as Kāmatanhā, Rūpatanhā, Arūpatanhā, desire for existence in the world of desire, in the worlds of form, in the worlds
of the formless (abstract), thus making thirty-six varieties.
[3] The jungle of passion.

[4] Past, present and future ties.
[5] Cross the stream to Nibbāna.
[6] One of the meditation exercises, to inspire loathing for the body and its corrupt nature.
[7] Cf. above v. 275.
[8] Nirutti-pada-kovido: skilled in the true meaning of the language (Pali) in which the Buddha taught.
[9] This was the reply of the Buddha to an ascetic who, struck by the Master's radiance after attaining Nibbāna,
inquired who was His teacher and what was the cause of His joy.
[10] Bhoga, rāga, dosa, moha, iccha, riches, lust, hate, delusion, craving, are five of the hindrances to the saintly life.

CHAPTER TWENTY-SIX.
THE BRAHMANA.
383.
Cut off the stream,[1] O Brāhmana, right manfully;
Repel desires; when thou hast known the end
Of things conditioned, thou shalt be
A knower of the Uncreate.[2]
384.
When by the twofold law (restraint and ecstasy),
By virtue of the knowledge he hath gained,
The Brāhmana hath crossed the stream;
Then every fetter falls away.
385.
Whoso the stream hath crossed and from this shore hath passed,[3]
Free from all cares, unfettered; one to whom
This shore and that alike are naught;
Him I deem a Brāhmaṇa.
386.
Whoso dwells meditiative, passionless,
And free from all Taints, his course hath run,
Whoso hath won the highest Goal—
Him I deem a Brāmaṇa.
387.
"One who is rid of evil" is a Brāmaṇa;
Samaṇa is one who tranquil hath become;
"Gone forth from all impurity";

The hermit is pabbajjā called.[4]
388.
Let not a Brāhmaṇa assail a Brāhmaṇa;
Nor let him with the assailant angry be,
Woe to the striker; greater woe
To him that, stricken, strikes again.
390.
No little profit cometh to the Brāhmaṇa
Who hath his mind from pleasant things restrained;
Soon as the lust to harm is gone
All sorrowing is laid to rest.
391.
Whoso offendeth not in thought and word and deed,
In whom no evil from these three is seen;
Whoso is in these three controlled;
Him I deem a Brāhmaṇa.
392.
If there be one from whom thou canst obtain the Norm
Which He, the All-Awakened One, declared,
Revere him, as a Brāhmaṇa
The sacrificial fire reveres.
393.
Not matted hair, nor caste, nor noble birth can make
The Brāhmaṇa; but he that knows the truth
And knows the Norm, is blest indeed;
And him I deem a Brāhmaṇa.
394.
Of what avail to thee, O fool, is matted hair?
And what avails thy garment made of skins?
The outer part thou makest clean,
But all is ravening within.[5]
395.
Whoso wears rags from dustheaps picked, whoso is lean,
With veins o'erspread, who in the jungle dwells
And meditates in loneliness;[6]
Him I deem a Brāhmaṇa.
396.

One is not Brāhmaṇa because of race or birth;
"Hail-fellow" is such called, and riches hath.[7]
Possessing naught, free from desire
Is one I call a Brāhmaṇa.
397.
Whoso hath cut all fetters off and hath no fear
Of what may him befall; whoso from bonds
And all attachments is released;
Is one I call a Brāhmaṇa.
398.
Whoso hath cut the strap, the leathern thong, the ropes[8]
And all thereto pertaining, and the bar
Hath lifted; him, the Awakened one;
Him I deem a Brāhmaṇa.
399.
He who endures, tho' innocent of all offence,
Abuse and blows and e'en imprisonment
With patience strong, a host in strength;
Him I deem a Brāhmaṇa.
400.
Who hath no anger, who to all his vows is true,
Upright in life, from passion free, subdued,
No more on earth to be reborn;
Him I deem a Brāhmaṇa.
401.
Who like a dew-drop on a lotus-lily leaf,
Or seed of mustard on a needle's point,
Clings not to any worldly bliss;
Him I deem a Brāhmaṇa.
402.
Who knoweth even in this world his sorrow's end,
Who bath laid down the burden of desire,
Emancipated from his bonds;
Him I deem a Brāhmaṇa.
403.
Whoso is deep in wisdom and intelligence,
Who can with skill discern the right and wrong,
Who hath attained the highest goal;

Him I deem a Brāhmaṇa.
404.
Whoso with householders and wanderers alike
Small dealings hath, who lives the homeless life,
A mendicant of scanty needs;
Him I deem a Brāhmaṇa.
405.
Whoso withholds the rod of painful punishment
From living creatures, be they weak or strong,
Who neither strikes nor makes to strike,
Him I deem a Brāhmaṇa.
406.
Whoso forbearance hath to those that hinder him,
And to the angry showeth gentleness,
Among the greedy without greed;
Him I deem a Brāhmaṇa.
407.
From whom all anger, hate, hypocrisy and pride
Have fall'n away, as from a needle's point
A grain of mustard-seed falls off;
Him I deem a Brāhmaṇa.
408.
Gentle in ways and apt to teach his fellow-men,
Whoso will utter truth and naught but truth,
Whoso in speech offendeth not;
Him I deem a Brāhmaṇa.
409.
He that takes nothing in this world that is not given,
Whatever it may be, or great or small,
Or long or short or good or bad;
Him I deem a Brāhmaṇa.
410.
In whom is seen no more the longing of desire
For this world or beyond, who hath no lust,
Who hath no fetters any more;
Him I deem a Brāhmaṇa.
411.

In whom is seen no craving, who, because he knows,
Asks not in doubt the How or Why, for he
Hath reached Nibbāna's peace profound;
Him I deem a Brāhmaṇa.
412.
Whoso on earth hath passed beyond the opposites
Of good and evil, and is free from grief,
From passion and impurity;
Him I deem a Brāhmaṇa.
413.
Who, like the moon on high, is stainless, pure and calm,
Translucent and serene, who hath restrained
The rise of all delightful states;
Him I deem a Brāhmaṇa.
414.
Whoso hath trod the hard and muddy road of births,
Hath crossed delusion, reached the other shore,
Nor lusts, nor doubts, grasps not, is calm,
Him I deem a Brāhmaṇa.
415.
Who homeless wanders through this world, a mendicant,
Abandoning desires, who hath restrained
The rise of sensual delight;
Him I deem a Brāhmaṇa.
416.
Who homeless wanders through this world a mendicant,
Abandoning his lust; who hath restrained
The rise of craving and desire;
Him I deem a Brāhmaṇa.
417.
Whoso hath left behind all ties that bind on earth,
And e'en the heavenly world transcended hath;
Whoso from every tie is free;
Him I deem a Brāhmaṇa.
415.
Who joy and pain hath left, who from the heat of life
Is cooled, and hath no basis of rebirth,
Heroic conqueror of the worlds;

Him I deem a Brāhmaṇa.
419.
Who knows the rise and fall of things in birth and death,
Who is not of the world, who hath the path
Well trod, who hath become awake;
Him I deem a Brāhmaṇa.
420.
Whose passage[9] hence the gods themselves cannot discern,
Nor demi-gods nor men; a worthy one
In whom the passions are subdued;
Him I deem a Brāhmaṇa.
421.
To whom pertaineth naught of past or future things
Or of the present; one who owneth naught,
Who hath no wish for anything;
Him I deem a Brāhmaṇa.
422.
Dauntless,[10] pre-eminent, heroic mighty seer,
The conqueror, desireless one, made clean,[11]
Whose eyes have opened to the light,[12]
Him I deem a Brāhmaṇa.
423.
Who knows his former births, who sees both heaven and hell,[13]
Who now at last hath reached the end of births;
Perfect in knowledge he who hath done all things well,
That sage I call a Brāhmaṇa.
[1] Cf. v. 178.
[2] Akataññu, "unconditioned," Nibbāṇa.
[3] 'lit. one for whom there exists neither this shore (the stream being not yet entered) nor that shore (Arahantship
being yet unattained) nor both shores (as he has now attained)'.
[4] Sāhita, "removed," the supposed etymology of Brāhmana; as samitatta, "quieted" is here supposed to be that of
samana, ascetic monk. Pabbajjā is one who "goes forth," takes the robes, becomes ordained a Buddhist mendicant
monk.
[5] Cf. the words of the Christ to the Pharisees: "Now do ye Pharisees make clean the outside of the cup and the
platter, but your inward part is full of ravening and wickedness." The word used, gahanam, 'grasping,' may also mean
'jungle'.

[6] These were the marks of the early and stricter ascetics; even to-day the bhikkhus of Ceylon have their robes made
of pieces of cloth sewn together, but these are not picked from the dust-heap.
[7] "Hail-fellow," bhovādi, one who uses the disrespectful term of bho, "I say! man". These Brahmins who did not
accept the Buddha as Master would address Him in this way, and of course they were often wealthy men.
[8] The strap is said to be hate; the thong, desire; the ropes, orthodoxy with its attendant narrowness; the bar,
ignorance that shuts the door of knowledge.
[9] Cuti; gati; the "fall" from other worlds into this one, and the 'going' or passage or state of the next birth.
[10] Like a bull.
[11] Nahātakam, an allusion to the ceremonial bathing of the Brāhmaṇa after finishing his course of studies.
[12] The meaning of buddha.
[13] One who knows earth, heaven and hell, and can range them at will, is called ñānatilōka, "knower of the three
worlds". Such a one is born no more, as he has learned the lessons of these worlds.
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Sermon on the Mount
Below is the World English Bible (WEB) translation of Jesus’s “Sermon on the Mount” from
The New Testament book of Matthew, Chapters 5-7. WEB is a public domain translation of the
Bible accessed at https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Matthew+5-7&version=WEB.
5 Seeing the multitudes, he went up onto the mountain. When he had sat down, his disciples came
to him. 2 He opened his mouth and taught them, saying,
3 “Blessed

are the poor in spirit,

for theirs is the Kingdom of Heaven. (Isaiah 57:15; 66:2)
4 Blessed

are those who mourn,

for they shall be comforted. (Isaiah 61:2; 66:10,13)
5 Blessed

are the gentle,

for they shall inherit the earth.[a] (Psalm 37:11)
6 Blessed

are those who hunger and thirst for righteousness,

for they shall be filled.
7 Blessed

are the merciful,

for they shall obtain mercy.
8 Blessed

are the pure in heart,

for they shall see God.
9 Blessed

are the peacemakers,

for they shall be called children of God.
10 Blessed

are those who have been persecuted for righteousness’ sake,

for theirs is the Kingdom of Heaven.
11 “Blessed

are you when people reproach you, persecute you, and say all kinds of evil against you

falsely, for my sake. 12 Rejoice, and be exceedingly glad, for great is your reward in heaven. For that
is how they persecuted the prophets who were before you.
13 “You

are the salt of the earth, but if the salt has lost its flavor, with what will it be salted? It is then

good for nothing, but to be cast out and trodden under the feet of men.
14 You

are the light of the world. A city located on a hill can’t be hidden. 15 Neither do you light a lamp

and put it under a measuring basket, but on a stand; and it shines to all who are in the house. 16 Even
so, let your light shine before men, that they may see your good works and glorify your Father who is
in heaven.
17 “Don’t

think that I came to destroy the law or the prophets. I didn’t come to destroy, but to

fulfill. 18 For most certainly, I tell you, until heaven and earth pass away, not even one smallest
letter[b] or one tiny pen stroke[c] shall in any way pass away from the law, until all things are

accomplished. 19 Therefore, whoever shall break one of these least commandments and teach others
to do so, shall be called least in the Kingdom of Heaven; but whoever shall do and teach them shall
be called great in the Kingdom of Heaven. 20 For I tell you that unless your righteousness exceeds
that of the scribes and Pharisees, there is no way you will enter into the Kingdom of Heaven.
21 “You

have heard that it was said to the ancient ones, ‘You shall not murder;’ (Exodus 20:13) and

‘Whoever murders will be in danger of the judgment.’ 22 But I tell you that everyone who is angry
with his brother without a cause [d] will be in danger of the judgment. Whoever says to his brother,
‘Raca!’ [e] will be in danger of the council. Whoever says, ‘You fool!’ will be in danger of the fire of
Gehenna.[f]
23 “If

therefore you are offering your gift at the altar, and there remember that your brother has

anything against you, 24 leave your gift there before the altar, and go your way. First be reconciled to
your brother, and then come and offer your gift. 25 Agree with your adversary quickly while you are
with him on the way; lest perhaps the prosecutor deliver you to the judge, and the judge deliver you
to the officer, and you be cast into prison. 26 Most certainly I tell you, you shall by no means get out
of there until you have paid the last penny.[g]
27 “You

have heard that it was said, [h] ‘You shall not commit adultery;’ Exodus 20:14 28 but I tell you

that everyone who gazes at a woman to lust after her has committed adultery with her already in his
heart. 29 If your right eye causes you to stumble, pluck it out and throw it away from you. For it is
more profitable for you that one of your members should perish than for your whole body to be cast
into Gehenna.[i] 30 If your right hand causes you to stumble, cut it off, and throw it away from you.
For it is more profitable for you that one of your members should perish, than for your whole body
to be cast into Gehenna.[j]
31 “It

was also said, ‘Whoever shall put away his wife, let him give her a writing of divorce,

(’Deuteronomy 24:1) 32 but I tell you that whoever puts away his wife, except for the cause of sexual
immorality, makes her an adulteress; and whoever marries her when she is put away commits
adultery.
33 “Again

you have heard that it was said to the ancient ones, ‘You shall not make false vows, but

shall perform to the Lord your vows,’ (Numbers 30:2; Deuteronomy 23:21; Ecclesiastes 5:4) 34 but I
tell you, don’t swear at all: neither by heaven, for it is the throne of God; 35 nor by the earth, for it is
the footstool of his feet; nor by Jerusalem, for it is the city of the great King. 36 Neither shall you
swear by your head, for you can’t make one hair white or black. 37 But let your ‘Yes’ be ‘Yes’ and your
‘No’ be ‘No.’ Whatever is more than these is of the evil one.

38 “You

have heard that it was said, ‘An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth. (’Exodus

21:24; Leviticus 24:20; Deuteronomy 19:21) 39 But I tell you, don’t resist him who is evil; but
whoever strikes you on your right cheek, turn to him the other also. 40 If anyone sues you to take
away your coat, let him have your cloak also. 41 Whoever compels you to go one mile, go with him
two. 42 Give to him who asks you, and don’t turn away him who desires to borrow from you.
43 “You

have heard that it was said, ‘You shall love your neighbor (Leviticus 19:18) and hate your

enemy.’[k] 44 But I tell you, love your enemies, bless those who curse you, do good to those who hate
you, and pray for those who mistreat you and persecute you, 45 that you may be children of your
Father who is in heaven. For he makes his sun to rise on the evil and the good, and sends rain on the
just and the unjust. 46 For if you love those who love you, what reward do you have? Don’t even the
tax collectors do the same? 47 If you only greet your friends, what more do you do than others? Don’t
even the tax collectors[l] do the same? 48 Therefore you shall be perfect, just as your Father in heaven
is perfect.
6 “Be careful that you don’t do your charitable giving[m] before men, to be seen by them, or else you
have no reward from your Father who is in heaven. 2 Therefore, when you do merciful deeds, don’t
sound a trumpet before yourself, as the hypocrites do in the synagogues and in the streets, that they
may get glory from men. Most certainly I tell you, they have received their reward. 3 But when you do
merciful deeds, don’t let your left hand know what your right hand does, 4 so that your merciful
deeds may be in secret, then your Father who sees in secret will reward you openly.
5 “When

you pray, you shall not be as the hypocrites, for they love to stand and pray in the

synagogues and in the corners of the streets, that they may be seen by men. Most certainly, I tell you,
they have received their reward. 6 But you, when you pray, enter into your inner room, and having
shut your door, pray to your Father who is in secret; and your Father who sees in secret will reward
you openly. 7 In praying, don’t use vain repetitions as the Gentiles do; for they think that they will be
heard for their much speaking. 8 Therefore don’t be like them, for your Father knows what things
you need before you ask him. 9 Pray like this:
“‘Our Father in heaven, may your name be kept holy.
10 Let

your Kingdom come.

Let your will be done on earth as it is in heaven.
11 Give

us today our daily bread.

12 Forgive

us our debts,

as we also forgive our debtors.
13 Bring

us not into temptation,

but deliver us from the evil one.
For yours is the Kingdom, the power, and the glory forever. Amen.’[n]
14 “For

if you forgive men their trespasses, your heavenly Father will also forgive you. 15 But if you

don’t forgive men their trespasses, neither will your Father forgive your trespasses.
16 “Moreover

when you fast, don’t be like the hypocrites, with sad faces. For they disfigure their faces

that they may be seen by men to be fasting. Most certainly I tell you, they have received their
reward. 17 But you, when you fast, anoint your head and wash your face, 18 so that you are not seen by
men to be fasting, but by your Father who is in secret; and your Father, who sees in secret, will
reward you.
19 “Don’t

lay up treasures for yourselves on the earth, where moth and rust consume, and where

thieves break through and steal; 20 but lay up for yourselves treasures in heaven, where neither moth
nor rust consume, and where thieves don’t break through and steal; 21 for where your treasure is,
there your heart will be also.
22 “The

light.

lamp of the body is the eye. If therefore your eye is sound, your whole body will be full of

23 But

if your eye is evil, your whole body will be full of darkness. If therefore the light that is in

you is darkness, how great is the darkness!
24 “No

one can serve two masters, for either he will hate the one and love the other, or else he will be

devoted to one and despise the other. You can’t serve both God and Mammon. 25 Therefore I tell you,
don’t be anxious for your life: what you will eat, or what you will drink; nor yet for your body, what
you will wear. Isn’t life more than food, and the body more than clothing? 26 See the birds of the sky,
that they don’t sow, neither do they reap, nor gather into barns. Your heavenly Father feeds them.
Aren’t you of much more value than they?
27 “Which

of you by being anxious, can add one moment[o] to his lifespan? 28 Why are you anxious

about clothing? Consider the lilies of the field, how they grow. They don’t toil, neither do they
spin, 29 yet I tell you that even Solomon in all his glory was not dressed like one of these. 30 But if
God so clothes the grass of the field, which today exists and tomorrow is thrown into the oven, won’t
he much more clothe you, you of little faith?
31 “Therefore

don’t be anxious, saying, ‘What will we eat?’, ‘What will we drink?’ or, ‘With what will

we be clothed?’ 32 For the Gentiles seek after all these things; for your heavenly Father knows that
you need all these things. 33 But seek first God’s Kingdom and his righteousness; and all these things
will be given to you as well. 34 Therefore don’t be anxious for tomorrow, for tomorrow will be anxious
for itself. Each day’s own evil is sufficient.

7 “Don’t judge, so that you won’t be judged. 2 For with whatever judgment you judge, you will be
judged; and with whatever measure you measure, it will be measured to you. 3 Why do you see the
speck that is in your brother’s eye, but don’t consider the beam that is in your own eye? 4 Or how will
you tell your brother, ‘Let me remove the speck from your eye,’ and behold, the beam is in your own
eye? 5 You hypocrite! First remove the beam out of your own eye, and then you can see clearly to
remove the speck out of your brother’s eye.
6 “Don’t

give that which is holy to the dogs, neither throw your pearls before the pigs, lest perhaps

they trample them under their feet, and turn and tear you to pieces.
7 “Ask,

and it will be given you. Seek, and you will find. Knock, and it will be opened for you. 8 For

everyone who asks receives. He who seeks finds. To him who knocks it will be opened. 9 Or who is
there among you who, if his son asks him for bread, will give him a stone? 10 Or if he asks for a fish,
who will give him a serpent? 11 If you then, being evil, know how to give good gifts to your children,
how much more will your Father who is in heaven give good things to those who ask
him! 12 Therefore, whatever you desire for men to do to you, you shall also do to them; for this is the
law and the prophets.
13 “Enter

in by the narrow gate; for the gate is wide and the way is broad that leads to destruction,

and there are many who enter in by it. 14 How[p] the gate is narrow and the way is restricted that
leads to life! There are who find it.
15 “Beware

of false prophets, who come to you in sheep’s clothing, but inwardly are ravening

wolves. 16 By their fruits you will know them. Do you gather grapes from thorns or figs from
thistles? 17 Even so, every good tree produces good fruit, but the corrupt tree produces evil fruit. 18 A
good tree can’t produce evil fruit, neither can a corrupt tree produce good fruit. 19 Every tree that
doesn’t grow good fruit is cut down and thrown into the fire. 20 Therefore by their fruits you will
know them.
21 “Not

everyone who says to me, ‘Lord, Lord,’ will enter into the Kingdom of Heaven, but he who

does the will of my Father who is in heaven. 22 Many will tell me in that day, ‘Lord, Lord, didn’t we
prophesy in your name, in your name cast out demons, and in your name do many mighty
works?’ 23 Then I will tell them, ‘I never knew you. Depart from me, you who work iniquity.’
24 “Everyone

therefore who hears these words of mine and does them, I will liken him to a wise man

who built his house on a rock. 25 The rain came down, the floods came, and the winds blew and beat
on that house; and it didn’t fall, for it was founded on the rock. 26 Everyone who hears these words of
mine and doesn’t do them will be like a foolish man who built his house on the sand. 27 The rain

came down, the floods came, and the winds blew and beat on that house; and it fell—and its fall was
great.”
28 When

Jesus had finished saying these things, the multitudes were astonished at his teaching, 29 for

he taught them with authority, and not like the scribes.
Footnotes:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.
j.
k.
l.
m.
n.
o.
p.

5:5 or, land.
5:18 literally, iota
5:18 or, serif
5:22 NU omits “without a cause”.
5:22 “Raca” is an Aramaic insult, related to the word for “empty” and conveying the idea of
empty-headedness.
5:22 or, Hell
5:26 literally, kodrantes. A kodrantes was a small copper coin worth about 2 lepta (widow’s
mites)—not enough to buy very much of anything.
5:27 TR adds “to the ancients”.
5:29 or, Hell
5:30 or, Hell
5:43 not in the Bible, but see Qumran Manual of Discipline Ix, 21-26
5:47 NU reads “Gentiles” instead of “tax collectors”.
6:1 NU reads “acts of righteousness” instead of “charitable giving”
6:13 NU omits “For yours is the Kingdom, the power, and the glory forever. Amen.”
6:27 literally, cubit
7:14 TR reads “Because” instead of “How”
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Pascal -- Historical Background and Key Themes
Live for God

“France-003236- Blaise Pascal” by Dennis Jarvis is licensed by CC BY-SA 2.0

Blaise Pascal (1623 – 1662) was a French “polymath”: a genius who made lasting contributions
to multiple branches of knowledge. While best known today as a mathematician, and more
specifically, the person who essentially invented statistics and made important contributions to
the mathematics of projective geometry, Pascal also was a prominent scientist, theologian and
philosopher. To this day, many computer science students are required to learn “Pascal,” a
powerful programming language named after him, he designed and built an early calculating
machine and designed Paris’ first public transportation system, and students in college
Introduction to Philosophy classes often learn “Pascal’s Wager,” a clever bit of statistical
reasoning used to show the rationality of belief in God. His mother died when he was only 3,
and he was raised and educated by his father Ètienne, who stepped down from his prestigious
government job to tutor Blaise and his two sisters. Pascal’s unusual intellectual abilities were
obvious at an early age.
Contemporary students may find the following anecdote memorable and amusing. Though he
was an amateur mathematician himself, Ètienne worried that the boy would be so enraptured by
math he wouldn’t continue to pay attention to his other subjects. So he hid his math books in a
locked closet to keep them away from the boy in his youth. When the boy was about 11, the
father found Blaise behind the house doing geometry, having already worked out much of what
Euclid had figured out centuries before. Overcome by joy, Ètienne unlocked all of his math
books and let his son loose on them. By the age of 16, Pascal was presenting his work to a
leading group of French scientists in Paris.1
In his early 20s, the Pascal house was visited by two brothers, the Deschamps, who came to help
Ètienne recover from a broken thigh. The brothers were much influenced by Saint-Cyran’s
1
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theological Christian taught. Saint-Cyran stressed the “nothingness” of human nature and
preached a guilt–heavy brand of Christianity. Gloomy or not, through the influence of the
Deschamps’, Saint-Cyran’s teachings left a heavy mark on Pascal. He became much more
religious after their visit, and by the time he was in his 30’s, Pascal began thinking about writing
his own book on theology. Though he died before the book was written – he was only 39 when
his sickly life ended – in preparation for his book, he started a notebook in which he wrote down
thoughts later to be used in the book. Some of the entries are brief observations or remarks.
Others are longer chunks, in which Pascal is developing an argument or clarifying a concept.
Today, we know this journal as the Pensèes (“Thoughts”).
Much of what is impressive about the Pensèes for today’s reader is Pascal’s striking insights into
human nature and the human condition. While Pascal’s low opinion of man is off-putting to
some, his perceptiveness as to the causes of our wretchedness and our woes is startling, even
today. Often, these insights produce eminently quotable aphorisms (short sayings), like the wellknown aphorism: “The sole cause of man’s unhappiness is that he does not know how to stay
quietly in his room,” an effect of our constant yearning for distraction. Watch Americans today
instinctively grab for their cell phones to scroll through social media feeds as soon as they walk
onto an elevator and you’ll see Pascal had a point.
Themes:
1) Pascal sees mankind’s nature as the product of two different dualities, and as being
(potentially) part of three “orders.” Like other animals we are have instincts and desires, but we
also have “heart,” Pascal’s ennobling way of referring to our emotions. But as long as we lively
solely in these terms, as possessors of desires, instincts and passions, the mere order of nature,
our selfishness dooms us to being wretched and miserable. However, we also have reason and
thought, and this makes us part of the intellectual/rational order. Our rational capacities gives us
natural dignity that other animals lack. But were we consigned solely to the orders of desire and
reason, our lives will be marked by selfishness, boredom, anxiety, and a relentless striving to
avoid the death that surely awaits us all. “Even if the universe were to crush him, man would
still be nobler than his slayer, because he knows that he is dying and the advantage the universe
has over him. The universe knows nothing of this. Thus, all our dignity consists in thought.” So,
while thought gives us a dignity and value other creatures lack, reason and instinct alone won’t
save us from wretchedness.
However, we also are at least potentially part of the third, higher order, the spiritual order, or
what Pascal sometimes calls the order of charity. We are not just natural beings, through God’s
grace we can be favored and saved in a way other animals are not. Passage 234: “The heart has
its order, the mind has its own, which uses principles and demonstrations… Jesus Christ and St.
Paul possess the order of charity, not of the mind, for they wished to humble, not to teach….”
Through this order of grace, an “order” that is not really within our control but is given to us as a
free gift from God, life can become meaningful and worthwhile. Until we accept God’s grace,
we are locked in the prison of our own selfishness, captives of the dual natural capacities for
desire and reason.

2) In his ethics, Pascal can be seen as charting a middle ground between the skepticism of
Montaigne and the dogmatic rigor of Stoics like Epictetus. Pascal’s French predecessor,
Montaigne, doubted the capacity of reason as a guide to goodness and meaning in life. In
response, he suggested that the best policy was simply to follow our natural inclinations, avoid
excesses, and not worry too much. (cf. Apology for Raymond Sebond). Against this kind of
permissive self-indulgence, Pascal fundamentally sides with the Stoic emphasis on moral effort
and the condemnation of passion. However, Pascal disagrees with Stoic position that right
reason is sufficient as a guide and salvific path.
© S.Bruton, drafted 6/8/2020
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Self-love.—The nature of self-love and of this human Ego is to love self only and consider self
only. But what will man do? He cannot prevent this object that he loves from being full of
faults and wants. He wants to be great, and he sees himself small. He wants to be happy, and
he sees himself miserable. He wants to be perfect, and he sees himself full of imperfections.
He wants to be the object of love and esteem among men, and he sees that his faults merit
only their hatred and contempt. This embarrassment in which he finds himself produces in
him the most unrighteous and criminal passion that can be imagined; for he conceives a
mortal enmity against that truth which reproves him, and which convinces him of his faults.
He would annihilate it, but, unable to destroy it in its essence, he destroys it as far as possible
in his own knowledge and in that of others; that is to say, he devotes all his attention to hiding
his faults both from others and from himself, and he cannot endure either that others should
point them out to him, or that they should see them.
Truly it is an evil to be full of faults; but it is a still greater evil to be full of them, and to be
unwilling to recognise them, since that is to add the further fault of a voluntary illusion. We
do not like others to deceive us; we do not think it fair that they should be held in higher
esteem by us than they deserve; it is not then fair that we should deceive them, and should
wish them to esteem us more highly than we deserve.
Thus, when they discover only the imperfections and vices which we really have, it is plain
they do us no wrong, since it is not they who cause them; they rather do us good, since they
help us to free ourselves from an evil, namely, the ignorance of these imperfections. We ought
not to be angry at their knowing our faults and despising us; it is but right that they should
know us for what we are, and should despise us, if we are contemptible.
Such are the feelings that would arise in a heart full of equity and justice. What must we say
then of our own heart, when we see in it a wholly different disposition? For is it not true that
we hate truth and those who tell it us, and that we like them to be deceived in our favour,
and prefer to be esteemed by them as being other than what we are in fact? One proof of this
makes me shudder. The Catholic religion does not bind us to confess our sins
indiscriminately to everybody; it allows them to remain hidden from all other men save one,
to whom she bids us reveal the innermost recesses of our heart, and show ourselves as we
are. There is only this one man in the world whom she orders us to undeceive, and she binds
him to an inviolable secrecy, which makes this knowledge to him as if it were not. Can we
imagine anything more charitable and pleasant? And yet the corruption of man is such that
he finds even this law harsh; and it is one of the main reasons which has caused a great part
of Europe to rebel against the Church.[61]
How unjust and unreasonable is the heart of man, which feels it disagreeable to be obliged
to do in regard to one man what in some measure it were right to do to all men! For is it right
that we should deceive men?
There are different degrees in this aversion to truth; but all may perhaps be said to have it in
some degree, because it is inseparable from self-love. It is this false delicacy which makes

those who are under the necessity of reproving others choose so many windings and middle
courses to avoid offence. They must lessen our faults, appear to excuse them, intersperse
praises and evidence of love and esteem. Despite all this, the medicine does not cease to be
bitter to self-love. It takes as little as it can, always with disgust, and often with a secret spite
against those who administer it.
Hence it happens that if any have some interest in being loved by us, they are averse to
render us a service which they know to be disagreeable. They treat us as we wish to be
treated. We hate the truth, and they hide it from us. We desire flattery, and they flatter us.
We like to be deceived, and they deceive us.
So each degree of good fortune which raises us in the world removes us farther from truth,
because we are most afraid of wounding those whose affection is most useful and whose
dislike is most dangerous. A prince may be the byword of all Europe, and he alone will know
nothing of it. I am not astonished. To tell the truth is useful to those to whom it is spoken, but
disadvantageous to those who tell it, because it makes them disliked. Now those who live
with princes love their own interests more than that of the prince whom they serve; and so
they take care not to confer on him a benefit so as to injure themselves.
This evil is no doubt greater and more common among the higher classes; but the lower are
not exempt from it, since there is always some advantage in making men love us. Human life
is thus only a perpetual illusion; men deceive and flatter each other. No one speaks of us in
our presence as he does of us in our absence. Human society is founded on mutual deceit;
few friendships would endure if each knew what his friend said of him in his absence,
although he then spoke in sincerity and without passion.
Man is then only disguise, falsehood, and hypocrisy, both in himself and in regard to others.
He does not wish any one to tell him the truth; he avoids telling it to others, and all these
dispositions, so removed from justice and reason, have a natural root in his heart.
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I set it down as a fact that if all men knew what each said of the other, there would not be
four friends in the world. This is apparent from the quarrels which arise from the indiscreet
tales told from time to time. [I say, further, all men would be ...]
126
Description of man: dependency, desire of independence, need.
127
Condition of man: inconstancy, weariness, unrest.
128

The weariness which is felt by us in leaving pursuits to which we are attached. A man dwells
at home with pleasure; but if he sees a woman who charms him, or if he enjoys himself in
play for five or six days, he is miserable if he returns to his former way of living. Nothing is
more common than that.
136
A mere trifle consoles us, for a mere trifle distresses us.[68]
137
Without examining every particular pursuit, it is enough to comprehend them under
diversion.
139
Diversion.—When I have occasionally set myself to consider the different distractions of men,
the pains and perils to which they expose themselves at court or in war, whence arise so
many quarrels, passions, bold and often bad ventures, etc., I have discovered that all the
unhappiness of men arises from one single fact, that they cannot stay quietly in their own
chamber. A man who has enough to live on, if he knew how to stay with pleasure at home,
would not leave it to go to sea or to besiege a town. A commission in the army would not be
bought so dearly, but that it is found insufferable not to budge from the town; and men only
seek conversation and entering games, because they cannot remain with pleasure at home.
But on further consideration, when, after finding the cause of all our ills, I have sought to
discover the reason of it, I have found that there is one very real reason, namely, the natural
poverty of our feeble and mortal condition, so miserable that nothing can comfort us when
we think of it closely.
Whatever condition we picture to ourselves, if we muster all the good things which it is
possible to possess, royalty is the finest position in the world. Yet, when we imagine a king
attended with every pleasure he can feel, if he be without diversion, and be left to consider
and reflect on what he is, this feeble happiness will not sustain him; he will necessarily fall
into forebodings of dangers, of revolutions which may happen, and, finally, of death and
inevitable disease; so that if he be without what is called diversion, he is unhappy, and more
unhappy than the least of his subjects who plays and diverts himself.
Hence it comes that play and the society of women, war, and high posts, are so sought after.
Not that there is in fact any happiness in them, or that men imagine true bliss to consist in
money won at play, or in the hare which they hunt; we would not take these as a gift. We do
not seek that easy and peaceful lot which permits us to think of our unhappy condition, nor
the dangers of war, nor the labor of office, but the bustle which averts these thoughts of ours,
and amuses us.

Hence it comes that men so much love noise and stir; hence it comes that the prison is so
horrible a punishment; hence it comes that the pleasure of solitude is a thing
incomprehensible. And it is in fact the greatest source of happiness in the condition of kings,
that men try incessantly to divert them, and to procure for them all kinds of pleasures.
The king is surrounded by persons whose only thought is to divert the king, and to prevent
his thinking of self. For he is unhappy, king though he be, if he think of himself.
They imagine that if they obtained such a post, they would then rest with pleasure, and are
insensible of the insatiable nature of their desire. They think they are truly seeking quiet, and
they are only seeking excitement.
They have a secret instinct which impels them to seek amusement and occupation abroad,
and which arises from the sense of their constant unhappiness. They have another secret
instinct, a remnant of the greatness of our original nature, which teaches them that
happiness in reality consists only in rest, and not in stir. And of these two contrary instincts
they form within themselves a confused idea, which hides itself from their view in the depths
of their soul, inciting them to aim at rest through excitement, and always to fancy that the
satisfaction which they have not will come to them, if, by surmounting whatever difficulties
confront them, they can thereby open the door to rest.
Thus passes away all man's life. Men seek rest in a struggle against difficulties; and when
they have conquered these, rest becomes insufferable. For we think either of the misfortunes
we have or of those which threaten us. And even if we should see ourselves sufficiently
sheltered on all sides, weariness of its own accord would not fail to arise from the depths of
the heart wherein it has its natural roots, and to fill the mind with its poison.
Thus so wretched is man that he would weary even without any cause for weariness from
the peculiar state of his disposition; and so frivolous is he, that, though full of a thousand
reasons for weariness, the least thing, such as playing billiards or hitting a ball, is sufficient
to amuse him.
But will you say what object has he in all this? The pleasure of bragging to-morrow among
his friends that he has played better than another. So others sweat in their own rooms to
show to the learned that they have solved a problem in algebra, which no one had hitherto
been able to solve. Many more expose themselves to extreme perils, in my opinion as
foolishly, in order to boast afterwards that they have captured a town. Lastly, others wear
themselves out in studying all these things, not in order to become wiser, but only in order
to prove that they know them; and these are the most senseless of the band, since they are
so knowingly, whereas one may suppose of the others, that if they knew it, they would no
longer be foolish.
This man spends his life without weariness in playing every day for a small stake. Give him
each morning the money he can win each day, on condition he does not play; you make him
miserable. It will perhaps be said that he seeks the amusement of play and not the winnings.
Make him then play for nothing; he will not become excited over it, and will feel bored. It is
then not the amusement alone that he seeks; a languid and passionless amusement will

weary him. He must get excited over it, and deceive himself by the fancy that he will be happy
to win what he would not have as a gift on condition of not playing; and he must make for
himself an object of passion, and excite over it his desire, his anger, his fear, to obtain his
imagined end, as children are frightened at the face they have blackened.
Whence comes it that this man, who lost his only son a few months ago, or who this morning
was in such trouble through being distressed by lawsuits and quarrels, now no longer thinks
of them? Do not wonder; he is quite taken up in looking out for the boar which his dogs have
been hunting so hotly for the last six hours. He requires nothing more. However full of
sadness a man may be, he is happy for the time, if you can prevail upon him to enter into
some amusement; and however happy a man may be, he will soon be discontented and
wretched, if he be not diverted and occupied by some passion or pursuit which prevents
weariness from overcoming him. Without amusement there is no joy; with amusement there
is no sadness. And this also constitutes the happiness of persons in high position, that they
have a number of people to amuse them, and have the power to keep themselves in this state.
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Diversion.—Men are entrusted from infancy with the care of their honor, their property, their
friends, and even with the property and the honor of their friends. They are overwhelmed
with business, with the study of languages, and with physical exercise;[71] and they are made
to understand that they cannot be happy unless their health, their honor, their fortune and
that of their friends be in good condition, and that a single thing wanting will make them
unhappy. Thus they are given cares and business which make them bustle about from break
of day.—It is, you will exclaim, a strange way to make them happy! What more could be done
to make them miserable?—Indeed! what could be done?
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Man is obviously made to think. It is his whole dignity and his whole merit; and his whole
duty is to think as he ought. Now, the order of thought is to begin with self, and with its
Author and its end.
Now, of what does the world think? Never of this, but of dancing, playing the lute, singing,
making verses, running at the ring, etc., fighting, making oneself king, without thinking what
it is to be a king and what to be a man.
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We do not content ourselves with the life we have in ourselves and in our own being; we
desire to live an imaginary life in the mind of others, and for this purpose we endeavor to
shine. We labor unceasingly to adorn and preserve this imaginary existence, and neglect the
real. And if we possess calmness, or generosity, or truthfulness, we are eager to make it
known, so as to attach these virtues to that imaginary existence. We would rather separate
them from ourselves to join them to it; and we would willingly be cowards in order to acquire

the reputation of being brave. A great proof of the nothingness of our being, not to be satisfied
with the one without the other, and to renounce the one for the other! For he would be
infamous who would not die to preserve his honor.
148
We are so presumptuous that we would wish to be known by all the world, even by people
who shall come after, when we shall be no more; and we are so vain that the esteem of five
or six neighbors delights and contents us.
150
Vanity is so anchored in the heart of man that a soldier, a soldier's servant, a cook, a porter
brags, and wishes to have his admirers. Even philosophers wish for them. Those who write
against it want to have the glory of having written well;[72] and those who read it desire the
glory of having read it. I who write this have perhaps this desire, and perhaps those who will
read it ...
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Pride.—Curiosity is only vanity. Most frequently we wish to know but to talk. Otherwise we
would not take a sea voyage in order never to talk of it, and for the sole pleasure of seeing
without hope of ever communicating it.
153
Of the desire of being esteemed by those with whom we are.—Pride takes such natural
possession of us in the midst of our woes, errors, etc. We even lose our life with joy, provided
people talk of it.
Vanity: play, hunting, visiting, false shame, a lasting name.
159
Noble deeds are most estimable when hidden.
162
Cleopatra's nose: had it been shorter, the whole aspect of the world would have been altered.
165

Thoughts.— If our condition were truly happy, we would not need diversion from thinking
of it in order to make ourselves happy.
168
Diversion.—As men are not able to fight against death, misery, ignorance, they have taken it
into their heads, in order to be happy, not to think of them at all.
170
Diversion.—If man were happy, he would be the more so, the less he was diverted, like the
Saints and God.—Yes; but is it not to be happy to have a faculty of being amused by
diversion?—No; for that comes from elsewhere and from without, and thus is dependent,
and therefore subject to be disturbed by a thousand accidents, which bring inevitable griefs.
171
Misery.—The only thing which consoles us for our miseries is diversion, and yet this is the
greatest of our miseries. For it is this which principally hinders us from reflecting upon
ourselves, and which makes us insensibly ruin ourselves. Without this we should be in a state
of weariness, and this weariness would spur us to seek a more solid means of escaping from
it. But diversion amuses us, and leads us unconsciously to death.
172
We do not rest satisfied with the present. We anticipate the future as too slow in coming, as
if in order to hasten its course; or we recall the past, to stop its too rapid flight. So imprudent
are we that we wander in the times which are not ours, and do not think of the only one
which belongs to us; and so idle are we that we dream of those times which are no more, and
thoughtlessly overlook that which alone exists. For the present is generally painful to us. We
conceal it from our sight, because it troubles us; and if it be delightful to us, we regret to see
it pass away. We try to sustain it by the future, and think of arranging matters which are not
in our power, for a time which we have no certainty of reaching.
Let each one examine his thoughts, and he will find them all occupied with the past and the
future. We scarcely ever think of the present; and if we think of it, it is only to take light from
it to arrange the future. The present is never our end. The past and the present are our
means; the future alone is our end. So we never live, but we hope to live; and, as we are always
preparing to be happy, it is inevitable we should never be so.
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The heart has its reasons, which reason does not know. We feel it in a thousand things. I say
that the heart naturally loves the Universal Being, and also itself naturally, according as it
gives itself to them; and it hardens itself against one or the other at its will. You have rejected
the one, and kept the other. Is it by reason that you love yourself?
278
It is the heart which experiences God, and not the reason. This, then, is faith: God felt by the
heart, not by the reason.
279
Faith is a gift of God; do not believe that we said it was a gift of reasoning. Other religions do
not say this of their faith. They only gave reasoning in order to arrive at it, and yet it does not
bring them to it.
280
The knowledge of God is very far from the love of Him.
282
We know truth, not only by the reason, but also by the heart, and it is in this last way that we
know first principles; and reason, which has no part in it, tries in vain to impugn them. The
sceptics, who have only this for their object, labour to no purpose. We know that we do not
dream, and however impossible it is for us to prove it by reason, this inability demonstrates
only the weakness of our reason, but not, as they affirm, the uncertainty of all our knowledge.
For the knowledge of first principles, as space, time, motion, number, is as sure as any of
those which we get from reasoning. And reason must trust these intuitions of the heart, and
must base them on every argument. (We have intuitive knowledge of the tri-dimensional
nature of space, and of the infinity of number, and reason then shows that there are no two
square numbers one of which is double of the other. Principles are intuited, propositions are
inferred, all with certainty, though in different ways.) And it is as useless and absurd for
reason to demand from the heart proofs of her first principles, before admitting them, as it
would be for the heart to demand from reason an intuition of all demonstrated propositions
before accepting them.
This inability ought, then, to serve only to humble reason, which would judge all, but not to
impugn our certainty, as if only reason were capable of instructing us. Would to God, on the
contrary, that we had never need of it, and that we knew everything by instinct and intuition!
But nature has refused us this boon. On the contrary, she has given us but very little
knowledge of this kind; and all the rest can be acquired only by reasoning.

Therefore, those to whom God has imparted religion by intuition are very fortunate, and
justly convinced. But to those who do not have it, we can give it only by reasoning, waiting
for God to give them spiritual insight, without which faith is only human, and useless for
salvation.
283
Order.—Against the objection that Scripture has no order.
The heart has its own order; the intellect has its own, which is by principle and
demonstration. The heart has another. We do not prove that we ought to be loved by
enumerating in order the causes of love; that would be ridiculous.
Jesus Christ and Saint Paul employ the rule of love, not of intellect; for they would warm, not
instruct. It is the same with Saint Augustine. This order consists chiefly in digressions on
each point to indicate the end, and keep it always in sight.
346
Thought constitutes the greatness of man.
347
Man is but a reed, the most feeble thing in nature; but he is a thinking reed. The entire
universe need not arm itself to crush him. A vapour, a drop of water suffices to kill him. But,
if the universe were to crush him, man would still be more noble than that which killed him,
because he knows that he dies and the advantage which the universe has over him; the
universe knows nothing of this.
All our dignity consists, then, in thought. By it we must elevate ourselves, and not by space
and time which we cannot fill. Let us endeavour, then, to think well; this is the principle of
morality.
348
A thinking reed.—It is not from space that I must seek my dignity, but from the government
of my thought. I shall have no more if I possess worlds. By space the universe encompasses
and swallows me up like an atom; by thought I comprehend the world.
360
What the Stoics propose is so difficult and foolish!
The Stoics lay down that all those who are not at the high degree of wisdom are equally
foolish and vicious, as those who are two inches under water.

365
Thought.—All the dignity of man consists in thought. Thought is therefore by its nature a
wonderful and incomparable thing. It must have strange defects to be contemptible. But it
has such, so that nothing is more ridiculous. How great it is in its nature! How vile it is in its
defects!
But what is this thought? How foolish it is!
379
It is not good to have too much liberty. It is not good to have all one wants.
397
The greatness of man is great in that he knows himself to be miserable. A tree does not know
itself to be miserable. It is then being miserable to know oneself to be miserable; but it is also
being great to know that one is miserable.
400
The greatness of man.—We have so great an idea of the soul of man that we cannot endure
being despised, or not being esteemed by any soul; and all the happiness of men consists in
this esteem.
409
The greatness of man.—The greatness of man is so evident, that it is even proved by his
wretchedness. For what in animals is nature we call in man wretchedness; by which we
recognise that, his nature being now like that of animals, he has fallen from a better nature
which once was his.
412
There is internal war in man between reason and the passions.
If he had only reason without passions ...
If he had only passions without reason ...
But having both, he cannot be without strife, being unable to be at peace with the one without
being at war with the other. Thus he is always divided against, and opposed to himself.

415
The nature of man may be viewed in two ways: the one according to its end, and then he is
great and incomparable; the other according to the multitude, just as we judge of the nature
of the horse and the dog, popularly, by seeing its fleetness, et animum arcendi; and then man
is abject and vile. These are the two ways which make us judge of him differently, and which
occasion such disputes among philosophers.
For one denies the assumption of the other. One says, "He is not born for this end, for all his
actions are repugnant to it." The other says, "He forsakes his end, when he does these base
actions."
417
This twofold nature of man is so evident that some have thought that we had two souls. A
single subject seemed to them incapable of such sudden variations from unmeasured
presumption to a dreadful dejection of heart.

190
Who then will blame Christians for not being able to give a reason for their belief, since they
profess a religion for which they cannot give a reason?... Let us then examine this point, and
say, "God is, or He is not." But to which side shall we incline? Reason can decide nothing here.
There is an infinite chaos which separated us. A game is being played at the extremity of this
infinite distance where heads or tails will turn up. What will you wager? According to reason,
you can do neither the one thing nor the other; according to reason, you can defend neither
of the propositions.
Do not then reprove for error those who have made a choice; for you know nothing about it.
"No, but I blame them for having made, not this choice, but a choice; for again both he who
chooses heads and he who chooses tails are equally at fault, they are both in the wrong. The
true course is not to wager at all."
Yes; but you must wager. It is not optional. You are embarked. Which will you choose then?
Let us see. Since you must choose, let us see which interests you least. You have two things
to lose, the true and the good; and two things to stake, your reason and your will, your
knowledge and your happiness; and your nature has two things to shun, error and misery.
Your reason is no more shocked in choosing one rather than the other, since you must of
necessity choose. This is one point settled. But your happiness? Let us weigh the gain and the
loss in wagering that God is. Let us estimate these two chances. If you gain, you gain all; if
you lose, you lose nothing. Wager, then, without hesitation that He is.—"That is very fine.
Yes, I must wager; but I may perhaps wager too much."—Let us see. Since there is an equal
risk of gain and of loss, if you had only to gain two lives, instead of one, you might still wager.

But if there were three lives to gain, you would have to play (since you are under the
necessity of playing), and you would be imprudent, when you are forced to play, not to
chance your life to gain three at a game where there is an equal risk of loss and gain. But
there is an eternity of life and happiness. And this being so, if there were an infinity of
chances, of which one only would be for you, you would still be right in wagering one to win
two, and you would act stupidly, being obliged to play, by refusing to stake one life against
three at a game in which out of an infinity of chances there is one for you, if there were an
infinity of an infinitely happy life to gain. But there is here an infinity of an infinitely happy
life to gain, a chance of gain against a finite number of chances of loss, and what you stake is
finite. It is all divided; wherever the infinite is and there is not an infinity of chances of loss
against that of gain, there is no time to hesitate, you must give all. And thus, when one is
forced to play, he must renounce reason to preserve his life, rather than risk it for infinite
gain, as likely to happen as the loss of nothingness.
For it is no use to say it is uncertain if we will gain, and it is certain that we risk, and that the
infinite distance between the certainty of what is staked and the uncertainty of what will be
gained, equals the finite good which is certainly staked against the uncertain infinite. It is not
so, as every player stakes a certainty to gain an uncertainty, and yet he stakes a finite
certainty to gain a finite uncertainty, without transgressing against reason. There is not an
infinite distance between the certainty staked and the uncertainty of the gain; that is untrue.
In truth, there is an infinity between the certainty of gain and the certainty of loss. But the
uncertainty of the gain is proportioned to the certainty of the stake according to the
proportion of the chances of gain and loss. Hence it comes that, if there are as many risks on
one side as on the other, the course is to play even; and then the certainty of the stake is equal
to the uncertainty of the gain, so far is it from fact that there is an infinite distance between
them. And so our proposition is of infinite force, when there is the finite to stake in a game
where there are equal risks of gain and of loss, and the infinite to gain. This is demonstrable;
and if men are capable of any truths, this is one.
True. But at least learn your inability to believe, since reason brings you to this, and yet you
cannot believe. Endeavour then to convince yourself, not by increase of proofs of God, but by
the abatement of your passions. You would like to attain faith, and do not know the way; you
would like to cure yourself of unbelief, and ask the remedy for it. Learn of those who have
been bound like you, and who now stake all their possessions. These are people who know
the way which you would follow, and who are cured of an ill of which you would be cured.
Follow the way by which they began; by acting as if they believed, taking the holy water,
having masses said, etc. Even this will naturally make you believe, and deaden your
acuteness.—"But this is what I am afraid of."—And why? What have you to lose?

SECTION VII
MORALITY AND DOCTRINE
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Second part.—That man without faith cannot know the true good, nor justice.
All men seek happiness. This is without exception. Whatever different means they employ,
they all tend to this end.[159] The cause of some going to war, and of others avoiding it, is the
same desire in both, attended with different views. The will never takes the least step but to
this object. This is the motive of every action of every man, even of those who hang
themselves.
And yet after such a great number of years, no one without faith has reached the point to
which all continually look. All complain, princes and subjects, noblemen and commoners, old
and young, strong and weak, learned and ignorant, healthy and sick, of all countries, all times,
all ages, and all conditions.
A trial so long, so continuous, and so uniform, should certainly convince us of our inability to
reach the good by our own efforts. But example teaches us little. No resemblance is ever so
perfect that there is not some slight difference; and hence we expect that our hope will not
be deceived on this occasion as before. And thus, while the present never satisfies us,
experience dupes us, and from misfortune to misfortune leads us to death, their eternal
crown.
What is it then that this desire and this inability proclaim to us, but that there was once in
man a true happiness of which there now remain to him only the mark and empty trace,
which he in vain tries to fill from all his surroundings, seeking from things absent the help
he does not obtain in things present? But these are all inadequate, because the infinite abyss
can only be filled by an infinite and immutable object, that is to say, only by God Himself.
He only is our true good, and since we have forsaken Him, it is a strange thing that there is
nothing in nature which has not been serviceable in taking His place; the stars, the heavens,
earth, the elements, plants, cabbages, leeks, animals, insects, calves, serpents, fever,
pestilence, war, famine, vices, adultery, incest. And since man has lost the true good,
everything can appear equally good to him, even his own destruction, though so opposed to
God, to reason, and to the whole course of nature.
445
Original sin is foolishness to men, but it is admitted to be such. You must not then reproach
me for the want of reason in this doctrine, since I admit it to be without reason. But this
foolishness is wiser than all the wisdom of men, sapientius est hominibus.[167] For without this,

what can we say that man is? His whole state depends on this imperceptible point. And how
should it be perceived by his reason, since it is a thing against reason, and since reason, far
from finding it out by her own ways, is averse to it when it is presented to her?
456
It is a perverted judgment that makes every one place himself above the rest of the world,
and prefer his own good, and the continuance of his own good fortune and life, to that of the
rest of the world!
465
The Stoics say, "Retire within yourselves; it is there you will find your rest." And that is not
true.
Others say, "Go out of yourselves; seek happiness in amusement." And this is not true. Illness
comes.
Happiness is neither without us nor within us. It is in God, both without us and within us.
467
The reason of effects.—Epictetus: Those who say, "You have a headache;" this is not the same
thing. We are assured of health, and not of justice; and in fact his own was nonsense.
And yet he believed it demonstrable, when he said, "It is either in our power or it is not." But
he did not perceive that it is not in our power to regulate the heart, and he was wrong to infer
this from the fact that there were some Christians.
474
Members, To commence with that.—To regulate the love which we owe to ourselves, we must
imagine a body full of thinking members, for we are members of the whole, and must see
how each member should love itself, etc....
476
We must love God only and hate self only.
477
It is false that we are worthy of the love of others; it is unfair that we should desire it. If we
were born reasonable and impartial, knowing ourselves and others, we should not give this
bias to our will. However, we are born with it; therefore born unjust, for all tends to self. This

is contrary to all order. We must consider the general good; and the propensity to self is the
beginning of all disorder, in war, in politics, in economy, and in the particular body of man.
The will is therefore depraved.
If the members of natural and civil communities tend towards the weal of the body, the
communities themselves ought to look to another more general body of which they are
members. We ought therefore to look to the whole. We are therefore born unjust and
depraved.
482
Morality.—God having made the heavens and the earth, which do not feel the happiness of
their being, He has willed to make beings who should know it, and who should compose a
body of thinking members. For our members do not feel the happiness of their union, of their
wonderful intelligence, of the care which has been taken to infuse into them minds, and to
make them grow and endure. How happy they would be if they saw and felt it! But for this
they would need to have intelligence to know it, and good-will to consent to that of the
universal soul. But if, having received intelligence, they employed it to retain nourishment
for themselves without allowing it to pass to the other members, they would hate rather than
love themselves; their blessedness, as well as their duty, consisting in their consent to the
guidance of the whole soul to which they belong, which loves them better than they love
themselves.
485
The true and only virtue, then, is to hate self (for we are hateful on account of lust), and to
seek a truly lovable being to love. But as we cannot love what is outside ourselves, we must
love a being who is in us, and is not ourselves; and that is true of each and all men. Now, only
the Universal Being is such. The kingdom of God is within us;[182] the universal good is within
us, is ourselves—and not ourselves.
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Study Guide: 4. Pascal
Pascal thinks our self-love and human Ego is a chief source of our misery and our morally
depraved (sinful, corrupt) condition. Describe some of the many ways Pascal thinks this selflove shapes our tendencies, actions, and instincts.
How is our heart different from a “heart full of equity and justice”?
How is it that human society is “founded on mutual deceit”? What does Pascal mean by this,
and is he right?
How do we seek diversion, and what are we seeking diversion from?
In what does mankind’s whole dignity, whole merit, and whole duty consist?
Comment on Pascal’s analysis of pride and vanity. Are they useful qualities, or admirable traits?
Are Pascal’s views on these matters in sync with what American pop culture values and
admires? Why or why not?
One of Pascal’s better-known and loved aphorisms is his claim that “the heart has its reasons,
which reason does not know.” What’s the relevance of that to Pascal’s larger views about how
we should live?
How many orders are there? What is an order, after all? Describe Pascal’s concept of an order
for someone who may not be familiar with this use of the term.
On what grounds does Pascal criticize Stoicism?
What does Pascal mean by the following: “The greatness of man is great in that he knows
himself to be miserable. A tree does not know itself to be miserable. It is then being miserable
to know oneself to be miserable; but it is also being great to know that one is miserable.” In
what sense could it be “great” to know oneself to be miserable?
When Pascal argues that “God is, or He is not,” but that “reason can decide nothing here,” what’s
the point? Should we believe in God, and on what basis?
Can mankind become happy “on his own”? Comment on Pascal’s notion of “the true and only
virtue.”

Frankl -- Historical Background and Key Themes
The Importance of Meaning

Image 1: Dr. Viktor Frankl; Photo by Prof. Dr. Franz Vesely
This file is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 Germany license; Accessed at:
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Viktor_Frankl2.jpg.

Viktor Frankl (1905 – 1997) was an Austrian neurologist, psychiatrist, author, and Holocaust
survivor. He founded “logotherapy” (“healing through meaning”), a novel form of
psychotherapy. While he authored almost 40 books, he is best-known for the perennial bestseller Man’s Search for Meaning, which describes his experience and insights from having been
a prisoner at several different Nazi concentration camps.
Prior to being sent to the concentration camps because he was Jewish, Frankl had risen to the
head of neurology at Vienna’s Rothchild Hospital. Following his liberation from the camps, he
established a private practice, became head of neurology at Vienna Policlinic Hospital, authored
books, and later became highly sought after as a lecturer and public speaker. By the end of his
life, he’d received 29 honorary doctoral degrees, and was internationally beloved. In 1991,
Man’s Search for Meaning was listed as “one of the ten most influential books in the U.S.” by
the Library of Congress.
The key idea in logotherapy is that the search for meaning in life is the primary motivational
force human beings. The “therapy” involves helping clients find meaning in their own life and
practicing ways to purse meaningful goals. As identified in later writings, Frankl recognized
three chief ways of finding meaning: 1) making a difference in the world through our actions and
creative activities (“Creative Values”), 2) experiencing things of value (e.g., beauty, love) or
encountering people (love) (“Experiential Values), 3) Maintaining a courageous and admirable
attitude in situations of unavoidable suffering and lack of control (“Attitudinal Values”).
Themes:
1) As described above, Frankl’s life recommendations focus on the importance of finding and
pursuing meaning in life. However, he is not dogmatic about what meaning consists in,
acknowledging that individuals have to find meaning for themselves. His emphasis on meaning
is captured in his favorite of Nietzsche’s aphorisms: “those who have a ‘why’ to live can bear
with almost any ‘how’.” He does not believe that becoming happy or achieving success are
worthwhile life goals; the more these became the focus of our lives, the more they will elude us.
“Success, like happiness,” cannot be pursued; it must ensue, and it only does so as the
unintended side effect of one’s personal dedication to a cause greater.”

2) Echoing a theme from Stoicism, Frankl emphasizes the importance of choosing one’s attitude.
“Everything can be taken from a man but one thing: the last of the human freedoms – to choose
one’s attitude in any given set of circumstances, to choose one’s own way.” Faced with years in
concentration camps, living with minimal basis for hope and little or no control over the most
basic aspects of life, Frankl’s conclusion was, “When we are no longer able to change a
situation, we are challenged to change ourselves.” Even suffering itself can be re-purposed in a
quest for meaning: “In some ways suffering cease to be suffering at the moment it finds a
meaning, such as the meaning of a sacrifice.”
© S.Bruton, drafted 6/12/2020
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Study Guide: 5. Frankl
Viktor Frankl, Man’s Search for Meaning
Reading Chunk Number 1: Experiences in a Concentration Camp (beginning) up to the
paragraph that begins: “Apathy, the main symptom of the second phase….”
Questions:
What/who were the Capos?
What/who are the SS?
How are the prisoners known to the guards, e.g., by last names, derogatory nick names, numbers,
ID badges, or what?
Frankl says there are various stages of reaction prisoners go through in adjusting to the reality of
being in the camp. How many?
The majority of prisoners upon first arrival to the camp were sent where?
Frankl’s most possession, which he tries in vain to keep from being seized by the greedy and
cruel guards, is ___________.
Dostoyesky, famed Russian author, is remembered by Frankl to have claimed that man can
___________.
The first phase of adjusting to camp life, Frankl claims, is characterized by _____________.
Prior to being sent to the camp, Frankl’s work as a doctor was at _______________
The prisoners’ food, what little they received, typically consisted of ____________
Reading Chunk Number 2: The paragraph that begins: “Apathy, the main symptom of the second
phase….” up to the paragraph that begins: “Long after I had resumed….”.
One thing that was constantly in the minds and dreams of the most prisoners was….
Frankl came to grasp what he describes as the greatest secret that human poetry and human
thought have to impart: the salvation of man is through ________.
“In a position of utter desolation, when man cannot express himself in positive action, when his
only achievement may consist in enduring his sufferings in the right way – an honorable way –
in such a position man can, through loving contemplation of the image he carries
of___________, achieve fulfillment.”
“For the first time in my life, I was able to understand the meaning of the words, ‘The angels are
lost in perpetual contemplation of an infinite _______’”.
Later on in his internment, Frankl wonders if his wife:
Prisoners lost/did not entirely lose their appreciation for beauty?
The lack of a chimney at a camp signals________.

Frankl’s closest friend in the camp was________.
“Delousing,” as he describes it, was needed to _________.
Reading Chunk #3: The paragraph that begins: “Long after I had resumed normal life again (that
means a long time after my release from camp)…..” up to the paragraph that begins: “We have
stated that that which was ultimately responsible for the state of the prisoner’s inner self…”
1. Despite being in the “sick quarters” at the time, Frankl, volunteered to___________.
2. When living in a world that made individuals into “objects to be exterminated,” Frankl
compares the threatened loss of personal identity to being________________.
3. Frankl helped to hide 3 men from a transport headed to Dachau by helping conceal them in
_________.
4. In order to save his brother from being transferred to another camp, one young prisoner had
to____.
5. In the tragic little tale of the servant trying to flee Death, the servant tries to evade
by_________.
6. The first sign of the outsiders who would rescue them was___________________.
7. Those who had escaped just before the white flag of surrender was raised was a group that 8.
Frankl narrowly missed being a part of. The group ended up______.
9. Even under the most severe mental and physical stress, Frank affirms that man always retains
a last “spiritual” freedom, which is the freedom to__________.
10. Dostoevsky claimed that the one things he dreaded was _______________.
11. Their spiritual freedom that makes life purposeful and meaningful is the last inner freedom to
___________.
12. The young woman who was about to die describes the only friend she had in those last days.
The friend, who she talked to____________.
Reading Chunk #4: The paragraph that begins: “We have stated that that which was ultimately
responsible for the state of the prisoner’s inner self…..” through to the end of Part I, and short
selections from Part II (Logotherapy).
1. “Only people who allowed their inner hold on their moral and spiritual selves to _______
eventually fell victim to the camp’s degenerating influences.”
2. One of the keys to survival, and holding onto to a sense of one’s ultimate meaning in life, was
the ability to see ____________.
4. Frankl quotes Spinoza, the great 17th Jewish philosopher, as claiming that the emotion of
suffering ceases to be suffering as soon as we ______________.
5. The prisoners who lost their faith in the future ____________.
6. Frankl tells a striking story of a prisoner who dreamed that their camp would be rescued
March 30, 1945. On the 30th, the day his dream had predicted, as it became clear that they would
not be rescued that day after all, the prisoner _________________.
7. Nietzche’s words (again): He who has a why to live can bear with almost any _______.
8. What mattered, in the end, was not what they the prisoners expected from life, but from “what
life expected from us.” By this point, Frankl means to stress the importance of each individual’s
___________________-.
9. Frankl thinks man’s “destiny” is ___________________.
10. The camp had a strict rule forbidding interference with those _____________.

11. Frankl also cites the famous Nietzsche quote: “That which does not kill me,….”
12. The “third stage” of the prisoners’ reactions to camp life was _________.
13. The two “races” of men in the world are the “race” of ______ men and the “race” of
________ men.
14. Frankl cites the principle that no one has a right to do wrong, not even if wrong has been
done to them in reaction to a fellow prisoner who tries to rationalize __________.
15. In their homecoming, the wonderful feeling the surviving prisoners experienced was the
feeling that there is nothing he need fear any more, except __________.
16. Logotherapy sees the essence of human existence in __________.
Pascal thinks our self-love and human Ego is a chief source of our misery and our morally
depraved (sinful, corrupt) condition. Describe some of the many ways Pascal thinks this selflove shapes our tendencies, actions, and instincts.
How is our heart different from a “heart full of equity and justice”?
How is it that human society is “founded on mutual deceit”? What does Pascal mean by this,
and is he right?
How do we seek diversion, and what are we seeking diversion from?
In what does mankind’s whole dignity, whole merit, and whole duty consist?
Comment on Pascal’s analysis of pride and vanity. Are they useful qualities, or admirable traits?
Are Pascal’s views on these matters in sync with what American pop culture values and
admires? Why or why not?
One of Pascal’s better-known and loved aphorisms is his claim that “the heart has its reasons,
which reason does not know.” What’s the relevance of that to Pascal’s larger views about how
we should live?
How many orders are there? What is an order, after all? Describe Pascal’s concept of an order
for someone who may not be familiar with this use of the term.
On what grounds does Pascal criticize Stoicism?
What does Pascal mean by the following: “The greatness of man is great in that he knows
himself to be miserable. A tree does not know itself to be miserable. It is then being miserable
to know oneself to be miserable; but it is also being great to know that one is miserable.” In
what sense could it be “great” to know oneself to be miserable?
When Pascal argues that “God is, or He is not,” but that “reason can decide nothing here,” what’s
the point? Should we believe in God, and on what basis?
Can mankind become happy “on his own”? Comment on Pascal’s notion of “the true and only
virtue.”

Schopenhauer – Historical Background and Key Themes
All is Suffering

Image 1: "Arthur Schopenhauer colorized.png" by Artistosteles is licensed under CC0 1.0
Arthur Schopenhauer (1788 – 1860 CE) is often called the most pessimistic philosopher in
history, and for good reason. He is also the first western philosopher to have taken seriously (and
to have been seriously influenced by) eastern philosophy. His master work, The World as Will
and Representation, was written and published when Schopenhauer was a young man. However,
it was virtually ignored through most of his life. His accomplishments brought him recognition
and fame only in his 60’s, and arguably, his work has never received the respect and attention it
deserves. But he has been a profound influence on some important figures, including the great
German opera composer, Richard Wagner, and a keen admirer of both Schopenhauer and
Wagner, Friedrich Nietzsche, as well as the great physicists Albert Einstein and Erwin
Schrödinger.
The details of Schopenhauer’s views are tied to his unique metaphysical conception of the world.
Schopenhauer followed his great German predecessor, Immanuel Kant, in drawing an important
distinction between the world as it is “in itself” (that is, independent of how we understand it)
and the world as we experience it. (The former is the noumenal world, the latter is the
phenomenal world.) As for Kant, Schopenhauer thought of the phenomenal world as a world
structured by our sense experience; it is a world that exists in space and time, governed by laws
of cause and effect. It is the world we see, hear, feel, and so forth. Departing from Kant,
Schopenhauer thought of the world in itself as consisting of a blind, purposeless energy, a
“drive” or a “striving” he called the “Will.” The Will is a kind of relentless and senseless force,
all-encompassing and always operative. For human beings, the underlying reality of this
universal Will manifests itself as raw desires, impulses, and cravings, such as we see in every
organic being’s striving to survive. Creatures continue living by competing relentlessly: “dog eat
dog,” as we often say. Animals endure only as long as they can consume other beings and avoid
being consumed by creatures that are bigger, stronger, and more ruthless. On a human level, this
striving is manifested in our attitudes towards the natural world – as a world there to be exploited
for our own benefit – and in basic human desires for food and sex and power. In a curious way,
Schopenhauer largely agrees with the Buddhist doctrine of “no self.” What each of us really is is
a collection of cravings, instincts, and urges. Neither is there is a God; “the original sin,” he
thinks, “is the crime of existence itself.”

Schopenhauer draws several important conclusions about how we should live based on this
rather dismal picture. First, he thinks our existence, and the existence of all animals, is
essentially a life of suffering. What makes our fate even worse than that of the “brutes” is that
we’re acutely conscious of our sufferings and anticipate them. (Animals enjoy blissful ignorance
to a significant degree.) On this point, he and Pascal are in full agreement. Also, our capacity
for boredom, largely unknown to brutes, makes our lot much worse. To be sure, through our
acquisitions, we may attain fleeting satisfactions and a temporary respite from our own relentless
drives. But such pleasures are short-lived; soon we become slaves to different, even stronger
cravings.
Second, for Schopenhauer, there are only two antidotes to this suffering: compassion, and the
temporary relief that comes from aesthetic experience (art, music, literature, and so forth). Each
in their own way, compassion and art have the ability to take people “outside” of themselves, as
it were, and distract them from their own miserable conditions. Similar to Buddhists,
Schopenhauer thought caring and compassionate concern for others was important because
there’s ultimately no meaningful distinction to be made between different things. At bottom, we
are all part of the same, amorphous “oneness” of being. As for Buddhists, harming others is just
a less obvious way of harming oneself. Kind people seem to know a sort of “deep down” truth:
when it is all said and done, the distinction between living creatures is an illusion. Compassion
is “selfless,” we sometimes say, and in this description there is wisdom. The kind person shows
an ego-less connection to others. Release from the demands of one’s own ego, one’s own
striving self, is a relief.
Key Themes
1. All is Suffering
Suffering is the substance of life; death is the only true escape. As he wrote in The Wisdom of
Life, “the most general survey shows us that the two foes of human happiness are pain and
boredom. We may go further; and say that in the degree in which we are fortunate enough to get
away from the one, we approach the other. Life presents, in fact, a more or less violent
oscillation between the two.” We struggle to rid ourselves from pain, but almost as soon as a
temporary asylum from pain is attained, we find ourselves bored. The boredom is merely a
different way of being dissatisfied.
2. Compassion is the key ethical virtue; Escape through the arts
Like Buddhists, Schopenhauer was not a fan of ascetic self-denial. The ascetic life is a life of
self-induced, pointless pain. Asceticism, which was an important aspect of many early
Christians’ practice of spirituality, reflects a kind of life-denying hatred of existence that he
thinks is fundamental to the Christian, “New Testament” understanding of the world. Neither
would Schopenhauer have been a fan of the materialist consumerism of contemporary America.
The life of self-gratification, far from freeing ourselves from ourselves, only immerses us more
deeply in our primitive drives. Compassion, a way of living for others, is one way out. But we
also have another means of relief at our disposal: the arts. Schopenhauer thought music was the
highest form of art, because unlike literature, for example, it is not trying to portray or represent

anything besides itself. “Because it’s not ‘mimetic,’ or a copy of anything else as, say painting
is, music depicts the will itself.” Music is pure expression, a “true universal language”
understood everywhere. The great composer “reveals the innermost nature of the world, and
expresses the profoundest wisdom, in a language that his reasoning faculty does not understand.”
(It’s little mystery that Wagner, the great composer and an individual hardly lacking in ego,
thought Schopenhauerian philosophy was quite grand.)
© S.Bruton, drafted 4/29/2020
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On the Sufferings of the World
Unless suffering is the direct and immediate object of life, our existence must entirely fail of its
aim. It is absurd to look upon the enormous amount of pain that abounds everywhere in the
world, and originates in needs and necessities inseparable from life itself, as serving no purpose
at all and the result of mere chance. Each separate misfortune, as it comes, seems, no doubt, to be
something exceptional; but misfortune in general is the rule.
I know of no greater absurdity than that propounded by most systems of philosophy in declaring
evil to be negative in its character. Evil is just what is positive; it makes its own existence
felt. Leibnitz is particularly concerned to defend this absurdity; and he seeks to strengthen his
position by using a palpable and paltry sophism.[1] It is the good which is negative; in other
words, happiness and satisfaction always imply some desire fulfilled, some state of pain brought
to an end.
This explains the fact that we generally find pleasure to be not nearly so pleasant as we expected,
and pain very much more painful.
The pleasure in this world, it has been said, outweighs the pain; or, at any rate, there is an even
balance between the two. If the reader wishes to see shortly whether this statement is true, let
him compare the respective feelings of two animals, one of which is engaged in eating the other.
The best consolation in misfortune or affliction of any kind will be the thought of other people
who are in a still worse plight than yourself; and this is a form of consolation open to every one.
But what an awful fate this means for mankind as a whole!

We are like lambs in a field, disporting themselves under the eye of the butcher, who chooses out
first one and then another for his prey. So it is that in our good days we are all unconscious of the
evil Fate may have presently in store for us--sickness, poverty, mutilation, loss of sight or reason.
No little part of the torment of existence lies in this, that Time is continually pressing upon us,
never letting us take breath, but always coming after us, like a taskmaster with a whip. If at any
moment Time stays his hand, it is only when we are delivered over to the misery of boredom.
But misfortune has its uses; for, as our bodily frame would burst asunder if the pressure of the
atmosphere was removed, so, if the lives of men were relieved of all need, hardship and
adversity; if everything they took in hand were successful, they would be so swollen with
arrogance that, though they might not burst, they would present the spectacle of unbridled folly-nay, they would go mad. And I may say, further, that a certain amount of care or pain or trouble
is necessary for every man at all times. A ship without ballast is unstable and will not go straight.
Certain it is that work, worry, labor and trouble, form the lot of almost all men their whole life
long. But if all wishes were fulfilled as soon as they arose, how would men occupy their lives?
what would they do with their time? If the world were a paradise of luxury and ease, a land
flowing with milk and honey, where every Jack obtained his Jill at once and without any
difficulty, men would either die of boredom or hang themselves; or there would be wars,
massacres, and murders; so that in the end mankind would inflict more suffering on itself than it
has now to accept at the hands of Nature.
In early youth, as we contemplate our coming life, we are like children in a theatre before the
curtain is raised, sitting there in high spirits and eagerly waiting for the play to begin. It is a
blessing that we do not know what is really going to happen. Could we foresee it, there are times
when children might seem like innocent prisoners, condemned, not to death, but to life, and as
yet all unconscious of what their sentence means. Nevertheless, every man desires to reach old
age; in other words, a state of life of which it may be said: "It is bad to-day, and it will be worse
to-morrow; and so on till the worst of all."
If you try to imagine, as nearly as you can, what an amount of misery, pain and suffering of
every kind the sun shines upon in its course, you will admit that it would be much better if, on
the earth as little as on the moon, the sun were able to call forth the phenomena of life; and if,
here as there, the surface were still in a crystalline state.
Again, you may look upon life as an unprofitable episode, disturbing the blessed calm of nonexistence. And, in any case, even though things have gone with you tolerably well, the longer
you live the more clearly you will feel that, on the whole, life is a disappointment, nay, a cheat.
If two men who were friends in their youth meet again when they are old, after being separated
for a life-time, the chief feeling they will have at the sight of each other will be one of complete
disappointment at life as a whole; because their thoughts will be carried back to that earlier time
when life seemed so fair as it lay spread out before them in the rosy light of dawn, promised so
much--and then performed so little. This feeling will so completely predominate over every other
that they will not even consider it necessary to give it words; but on either side it will be silently
assumed, and form the ground-work of all they have to talk about.
He who lives to see two or three generations is like a man who sits some time in the conjurer's
booth at a fair, and witnesses the performance twice or thrice in succession. The tricks were

meant to be seen only once; and when they are no longer a novelty and cease to deceive, their
effect is gone.
While no man is much to be envied for his lot, there are countless numbers whose fate is to be
deplored.
Life is a task to be done. It is a fine thing to say defunctus est; it means that the man has done his
task.
If children were brought into the world by an act of pure reason alone, would the human race
continue to exist? Would not a man rather have so much sympathy with the coming generation as
to spare it the burden of existence? or at any rate not take it upon himself to impose that burden
upon it in cold blood.
I shall be told, I suppose, that my philosophy is comfortless--because I speak the truth; and
people prefer to be assured that everything the Lord has made is good. Go to the priests, then,
and leave philosophers in peace! At any rate, do not ask us to accommodate our doctrines to the
lessons you have been taught. That is what those rascals of sham philosophers will do for you.
Ask them for any doctrine you please, and you will get it. Your University professors are bound
to preach optimism; and it is an easy and agreeable task to upset their theories.
I have reminded the reader that every state of welfare, every feeling of satisfaction, is negative in
its character; that is to say, it consists in freedom from pain, which is the positive element of
existence. It follows, therefore, that the happiness of any given life is to be measured, not by its
joys and pleasures, but by the extent to which it has been free from suffering--from positive evil.
If this is the true standpoint, the lower animals appear to enjoy a happier destiny than man. Let us
examine the matter a little more closely.
However varied the forms that human happiness and misery may take, leading a man to seek the
one and shun the other, the material basis of it all is bodily pleasure or bodily pain. This basis is
very restricted: it is simply health, food, protection from wet and cold, the satisfaction of the
sexual instinct; or else the absence of these things. Consequently, as far as real physical pleasure
is concerned, the man is not better off than the brute, except in so far as the higher possibilities of
his nervous system make him more sensitive to every kind of pleasure, but also, it must be
remembered, to every kind of pain. But then compared with the brute, how much stronger are the
passions aroused in him! what an immeasurable difference there is in the depth and vehemence
of his emotions!--and yet, in the one case, as in the other, all to produce the same result in the
end: namely, health, food, clothing, and so on.
The chief source of all this passion is that thought for what is absent and future, which, with
man, exercises such a powerful influence upon all he does. It is this that is the real origin of his
cares, his hopes, his fears--emotions which affect him much more deeply than could ever be the
case with those present joys and sufferings to which the brute is confined. In his powers of
reflection, memory and foresight, man possesses, as it were, a machine for condensing and
storing up his pleasures and his sorrows. But the brute has nothing of the kind; whenever it is in
pain, it is as though it were suffering for the first time, even though the same thing should have
previously happened to it times out of number. It has no power of summing up its feelings.
Hence its careless and placid temper: how much it is to be envied! But in man reflection comes
in, with all the emotions to which it gives rise; and taking up the same elements of pleasure and
pain which are common to him and the brute, it develops his susceptibility to happiness and

misery to such a degree that, at one moment the man is brought in an instant to a state of delight
that may even prove fatal, at another to the depths of despair and suicide.
If we carry our analysis a step farther, we shall find that, in order to increase his pleasures, man
has intentionally added to the number and pressure of his needs, which in their original state
were not much more difficult to satisfy than those of the brute. Hence luxury in all its forms;
delicate food, the use of tobacco and opium, spirituous liquors, fine clothes, and the thousand
and one things than he considers necessary to his existence.
And above and beyond all this, there is a separate and peculiar source of pleasure, and
consequently of pain, which man has established for himself, also as the result of using his
powers of reflection; and this occupies him out of all proportion to its value, nay, almost more
than all his other interests put together--I mean ambition and the feeling of honor and shame; in
plain words, what he thinks about the opinion other people have of him. Taking a thousand
forms, often very strange ones, this becomes the goal of almost all the efforts he makes that are
not rooted in physical pleasure or pain. It is true that besides the sources of pleasure which he has
in common with the brute, man has the pleasures of the mind as well. These admit of many
gradations, from the most innocent trifling or the merest talk up to the highest intellectual
achievements; but there is the accompanying boredom to be set against them on the side of
suffering. Boredom is a form of suffering unknown to brutes, at any rate in their natural state; it
is only the very cleverest of them who show faint traces of it when they are domesticated;
whereas in the case of man it has become a downright scourge. The crowd of miserable wretches
whose one aim in life is to fill their purses but never to put anything into their heads, offers a
singular instance of this torment of boredom. Their wealth becomes a punishment by delivering
them up to misery of having nothing to do; for, to escape it, they will rush about in all directions,
traveling here, there and everywhere. No sooner do they arrive in a place than they are anxious to
know what amusements it affords; just as though they were beggars asking where they could
receive a dole! Of a truth, need and boredom are the two poles of human life. Finally, I may
mention that as regards the sexual relation, a man is committed to a peculiar arrangement which
drives him obstinately to choose one person. This feeling grows, now and then, into a more or
less passionate love,[2] which is the source of little pleasure and much suffering.
It is, however, a wonderful thing that the mere addition of thought should serve to raise such a
vast and lofty structure of human happiness and misery; resting, too, on the same narrow basis of
joy and sorrow as man holds in common with the brute, and exposing him to such violent
emotions, to so many storms of passion, so much convulsion of feeling, that what he has suffered
stands written and may be read in the lines on his face. And yet, when all is told, he has been
struggling ultimately for the very same things as the brute has attained, and with an
incomparably smaller expenditure of passion and pain.
But all this contributes to increase the measures of suffering in human life out of all proportion to
its pleasures; and the pains of life are made much worse for man by the fact that death is
something very real to him. The brute flies from death instinctively without really knowing what
it is, and therefore without ever contemplating it in the way natural to a man, who has this
prospect always before his eyes. So that even if only a few brutes die a natural death, and most of
them live only just long enough to transmit their species, and then, if not earlier, become the prey
of some other animal,--whilst man, on the other hand, manages to make so-called natural death
the rule, to which, however, there are a good many exceptions,--the advantage is on the side of
the brute, for the reason stated above. But the fact is that man attains the natural term of years

just as seldom as the brute; because the unnatural way in which he lives, and the strain of work
and emotion, lead to a degeneration of the race; and so his goal is not often reached.
The brute is much more content with mere existence than man; the plant is wholly so; and man
finds satisfaction in it just in proportion as he is dull and obtuse. Accordingly, the life of the
brute carries less of sorrow with it, but also less of joy, when compared with the life of man; and
while this may be traced, on the one side, to freedom from the torment of care and anxiety, it is
also due to the fact that hope, in any real sense, is unknown to the brute. It is thus deprived of
any share in that which gives us the most and best of our joys and pleasures, the mental
anticipation of a happy future, and the inspiriting play of phantasy, both of which we owe to our
power of imagination. If the brute is free from care, it is also, in this sense, without hope; in
either case, because its consciousness is limited to the present moment, to what it can actually
see before it. The brute is an embodiment of present impulses, and hence what elements of fear
and hope exist in its nature--and they do not go very far--arise only in relation to objects that lie
before it and within reach of those impulses: whereas a man's range of vision embraces the
whole of his life, and extends far into the past and future.
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Following upon this, there is one respect in which brutes show real wisdom when compared with
us--I mean, their quiet, placid enjoyment of the present moment. The tranquillity of mind which
this seems to give them often puts us to shame for the many times we allow our thoughts and our
cares to make us restless and discontented. And, in fact, those pleasures of hope and anticipation
which I have been mentioning are not to be had for nothing. The delight which a man has in
hoping for and looking forward to some special satisfaction is a part of the real pleasure
attaching to it enjoyed in advance. This is afterwards deducted; for the more we look forward to
anything, the less satisfaction we find in it when it comes. But the brute's enjoyment is not
anticipated, and therefore, suffers no deduction; so that the actual pleasure of the moment comes
to it whole and unimpaired. In the same way, too, evil presses upon the brute only with its own
intrinsic weight; whereas with us the fear of its coming often makes its burden ten times more
grievous.
It is just this characteristic way in which the brute gives itself up entirely to the present moment
that contributes so much to the delight we take in our domestic pets. They are the present
moment personified, and in some respects they make us feel the value of every hour that is free
from trouble and annoyance, which we, with our thoughts and preoccupations, mostly disregard.

But man, that selfish and heartless creature, misuses this quality of the brute to be more content
than we are with mere existence, and often works it to such an extent that he allows the brute
absolutely nothing more than mere, bare life. The bird which was made so that it might rove over
half of the world, he shuts up into the space of a cubic foot, there to die a slow death in longing
and crying for freedom; for in a cage it does not sing for the pleasure of it. And when I see how
man misuses the dog, his best friend; how he ties up this intelligent animal with a chain, I feel
the deepest sympathy with the brute and burning indignation against its master.
We shall see later that by taking a very high standpoint it is possible to justify the sufferings of
mankind. But this justification cannot apply to animals, whose sufferings, while in a great
measure brought about by men, are often considerable even apart from their agency.[3] And so
we are forced to ask, Why and for what purpose does all this torment and agony exist? There is
nothing here to give the will pause; it is not free to deny itself and so obtain redemption. There is
only one consideration that may serve to explain the sufferings of animals. It is this: that the will
to live, which underlies the whole world of phenomena, must, in their case satisfy its cravings by
feeding upon itself. This it does by forming a gradation of phenomena, every one of which exists
at the expense of another. I have shown, however, that the capacity for suffering is less in
animals than in man. Any further explanation that may be given of their fate will be in the nature
of hypothesis, if not actually mythical in its character; and I may leave the reader to speculate
upon the matter for himself….
According to the doctrines of Buddhism, the world came into being as the result of some
inexplicable disturbance in the heavenly calm of Nirvana, that blessed state obtained by
expiation, which had endured so long a time--the change taking place by a kind of fatality. This
explanation must be understood as having at bottom some moral bearing; although it is
illustrated by an exactly parallel theory in the domain of physical science, which places the
origin of the sun in a primitive streak of mist, formed one knows not how. Subsequently, by a
series of moral errors, the world became gradually worse and worse--true of the physical orders
as well--until it assumed the dismal aspect it wears to-day. Excellent!... But that a God like
Jehovah should have created this world of misery and woe, out of pure caprice, and because he
enjoyed doing it, and should then have clapped his hands in praise of his own work, and declared
everything to be very good--that will not do at all! In its explanation of the origin of the world,
Judaism is inferior to any other form of religious doctrine professed by a civilized nation; and it
is quite in keeping with this that it is the only one which presents no trace whatever of any belief
in the immortality of the soul.[4]
Even though Leibnitz' contention, that this is the best of all possible worlds, were correct, that
would not justify God in having created it. For he is the Creator not of the world only, but of
possibility itself; and, therefore, he ought to have so ordered possibility as that it would admit of
something better.
There are two things which make it impossible to believe that this world is the successful work
of an all-wise, all-good, and, at the same time, all-powerful Being; firstly, the misery which
abounds in it everywhere; and secondly, the obvious imperfection of its highest product, man,
who is a burlesque of what he should be. These things cannot be reconciled with any such belief.
On the contrary, they are just the facts which support what I have been saying; they are our
authority for viewing the world as the outcome of our own misdeeds, and therefore, as something
that had better not have been. Whilst, under the former hypothesis, they amount to a bitter
accusation against the Creator, and supply material for sarcasm; under the latter they form an

indictment against our own nature, our own will, and teach us a lesson of humility. They lead us
to see that, like the children of a libertine, we come into the world with the burden of sin upon
us; and that it is only through having continually to atone for this sin that our existence is so
miserable, and that its end is death.
There is nothing more certain than the general truth that it is the grievous sin of the world which
has produced the grievous suffering of the world. I am not referring here to the physical
connection between these two things lying in the realm of experience; my meaning is
metaphysical. Accordingly, the sole thing that reconciles me to the Old Testament is the story of
the Fall. In my eyes, it is the only metaphysical truth in that book, even though it appears in the
form of an allegory. There seems to me no better explanation of our existence than that it is the
result of some false step, some sin of which we are paying the penalty…
[Consider] the Christian idea of death and the Christian coffin, draped in mournful black and
surmounted with a crucifix! It points to a symbol of suffering and death, points to the denial of
the will to live, to redemption from this world, the domain of death and devil. The contrast which
the New Testament presents when compared with the Old, according to the ecclesiastical view of
the matter, is just that existing between my ethical system and the moral philosophy of Europe.
The Old Testament represents man as under the dominion of Law, in which, however, there is no
redemption. The New Testament declares Law to have failed, frees man from its
dominion,[6] and in its stead preaches the kingdom of grace, to be won by faith, love of neighbor
and entire sacrifice of self. This is the path of redemption from the evil of the world. The spirit of
the New Testament is undoubtedly asceticism, however your protestants and rationalists may
twist it to suit their purpose. Asceticism is the denial of the will to live; and the transition from
the Old Testament to the New, from the dominion of Law to that of Faith, from justification by
works to redemption through the Mediator, from the domain of sin and death to eternal life in
Christ, means, when taken in its real sense, the transition from the merely moral virtues to the
denial of the will to live. My philosophy shows the metaphysical foundation of justice and the
love of mankind, and points to the goal to which these virtues necessarily lead, if they are
practised in perfection. At the same time it is candid in confessing that a man must turn his back
upon the world, and that the denial of the will to live is the way of redemption. It is therefore
really at one with the spirit of the New Testament, whilst all other systems are couched in the
spirit of the Old; that is to say, theoretically as well as practically, their result is Judaism--mere
despotic theism. In this sense, then, my doctrine might be called the only true Christian
philosophy--however paradoxical a statement this may seem to people who take superficial
views instead of penetrating to the heart of the matter.
If you want a safe compass to guide you through life, and to banish all doubt as to the right way
of looking at it, you cannot do better than accustom yourself to regard this world as a
penitentiary, a sort of a penal colony, or [Greek: ergastaerion] as the earliest philosopher called
it.[7] Vanini puts it forcibly. Man, he says, is so full of every kind of misery that, were it not
repugnant to the Christian religion, I should venture to affirm that if evil spirits exist at all, they
have posed into human form and are now atoning for their crimes.[10]And true Christianity-using the word in its right sense--also regards our existence as the consequence of sin and error.
If you accustom yourself to this view of life you will regulate your expectations accordingly, and
cease to look upon all its disagreeable incidents, great and small, its sufferings, its worries, its
misery, as anything unusual or irregular; nay, you will find that everything is as it should be, in a
world where each of us pays the penalty of existence in his own peculiar way. Amongst the evils

of a penal colony is the society of those who form it; and if the reader is worthy of better
company, he will need no words from me to remind him of what he has to put up with at present.
If he has a soul above the common, or if he is a man of genius, he will occasionally feel like
some noble prisoner of state, condemned to work in the galleys with common criminals; and he
will follow his example and try to isolate himself.
In general, however, it should be said that this view of life will enable us to contemplate the socalled imperfections of the great majority of men, their moral and intellectual deficiencies and
the resulting base type of countenance, without any surprise, to say nothing of indignation; for
we shall never cease to reflect where we are, and that the men about us are beings conceived and
born in sin, and living to atone for it. That is what Christianity means in speaking of the sinful
nature of man.
Pardon's the word to all![11] Whatever folly men commit, be their shortcomings or their vices
what they may, let us exercise forbearance; remembering that when these faults appear in others,
it is our follies and vices that we behold. They are the shortcomings of humanity, to which we
belong; whose faults, one and all, we share; yes, even those very faults at which we now wax so
indignant, merely because they have not yet appeared in ourselves. They are faults that do not lie
on the surface. But they exist down there in the depths of our nature; and should anything call
them forth, they will come and show themselves, just as we now see them in others. One man, it
is true, may have faults that are absent in his fellow; and it is undeniable that the sum total of bad
qualities is in some cases very large; for the difference of individuality between man and man
passes all measure.
In fact, the conviction that the world and man is something that had better not have been, is of a
kind to fill us with indulgence towards one another. Nay, from this point of view, we might well
consider the proper form of address to be, not Monsieur, Sir, but my fellow-sufferer, my
companion in misery! This may perhaps sound strange, but it is in keeping with the facts; it puts
others in a right light; and it reminds us of that which is after all the most necessary thing in life-the tolerance, patience, regard, and love of neighbor, of which everyone stands in need, and
which, therefore, every man owes to his fellow.

Footnotes[edit]
1. ↑ Translator's Note, cf. Thèod, §153.--Leibnitz argued that evil is a negative quality--i.e., the absence
of good; and that its active and seemingly positive character is an incidental and not an essential part
of its nature. Cold, he said, is only the absence of the power of heat, and the active power of
expansion in freezing water is an incidental and not an essential part of the nature of cold. The fact is,
that the power of expansion in freezing water is really an increase of repulsion amongst its molecules;
and Schopenhauer is quite right in calling the whole argument a sophism.
2. ↑ I have treated this subject at length in a special chapter of the second volume of my chief work.
3. ↑ Cf. Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, vol. ii. p. 404.
4. ↑ See Parerga, vol. i. pp. 139 et seq.
5. ↑ Translator's Note.--Matthias Claudius (1740-1815), a popular poet, and friend
of Klopstock, Herder and Leasing. He edited the Wandsbecker Bote, in the fourth part of which
appeared the treatise mentioned above. He generally wrote under the pseudonym of Asmus, and
Schopenhauer often refers to him by this name.
6. ↑ Cf. Romans vii; Galatians ii, iii.
7. ↑ Cf. Clem. Alex. Strom. L. iii, c, 3, p. 399.

8. ↑ Augustine de cìvitate Dei., L. xi. c. 23.
9. ↑ Cf. Fragmenta de philosophia.
10. ↑ De admirandis naturae arcanis; dial L. p. 35.
11. ↑ "Cymbeline," Act v. Sc. 5.
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Nietzsche is a German philosopher from the late 19th century (1844 – 1900), an exciting
intellectual rebel whose work is reactionary, passionate and often difficult to interpret. He lived
a very sickly life and suffered extended periods of intense physical pain. He became mostly
blind and eventually went insane, quite possibly as a result of the syphilis he was infected with in
his youth. While for a time he planned on following his father’s footsteps in the ministry, soon
he abandoned that idea. His early academic training was focused in philology and classics, and
he was an accomplished scholar of Ancient Greek literature, drama and philosophy. In fact, he
earned his doctorate degree in philology from University of Leipzig and was appointed as a
professor at the University of Basel at the age of 25. Soon enough, however, he took leave of his
university duties and for most of his adult life he was quite poor, subsisting on minimal residual
support from his former teaching position, generosity of family, friends, and meager earnings
from his books. His writings not particularly popular in his own life, however.
Nietzsche never married. For a time, he was very close to the great German romantic operatic
composer, Richard Wagner and Wagner’s wife Cosima. While the relationship with Wagner left
lasting marks on Nietzsche, they had a falling out, leading to enduring bitterness. For much of
the 20th century, Nietzsche’s reputation as a philosopher was undermined by the ways his sister
Elizabeth distorted his views after his death. She was quite selfish and racist – no other way to
describe it. Among other scurrilous activities, she encouraged the Nazis to make use of
Nietzsche’s concept of the “will to power” in their propaganda. While Nietzsche does in fact
make much of the “will to power,” what he meant by it and what the Nazis used it to mean were
completely different. Nietzsche is also famous for having written that “God is dead.” This, too,
is usually misunderstood as a remark about God’s actual existence (or rather, non-existence). In
fact, the target of Nietzsche’s quip was the “deadness” of much Christian belief. That is, he’s
criticizing Christians for the decadent and lifeless nature of their religious practices. (Think of
the ruthless business person who sits piously and quietly in the pew at Sunday morning worship
service, and who may say grace at Thanksgiving dinner, but whose life otherwise seems
unaffected by professed religious beliefs.)
Nietzsche’s writings tend to be highly aphoristic. (An aphorism is a short saying, often
superficially puzzling or obscure in its meaning.) In part, this is because his poor eyesight and
painful ailments often made it difficult for him to write more than a sentence or two at a time. In

part, it is also due to the fact that Nietzsche tries to provoke the reader into engagement with his
ideas. Aphorisms are a useful way to get people to think for themselves. Nietzsche thought
most people lived their lives as thoughtless conformists and mindless drones. He unabashedly
praises the rare few who are willing to break the mold and push themselves relentlessly in a
quest to become better and better versions of themselves. One of his own favorite maxims was
Pindar’s “become what you are.” Of course in a trivial sense, each of us already is who we are.
The point, obviously, is we should become what we are capable of becoming.
Key Themes
1. Ethics of Self-Mastery
Early in his philosophical development, Nietzsche was much impressed by Schopenhauer’s
pessimistic determinism and his notion that all life is suffering. Schopenhauer’s recommended
response, as Nietzsche saw it, was the essentially romantic notion that we should escape into the
arts. (Schopenhauer particularly valued musical experiences in this connection.) While
Nietzsche certainly shared this enthusiasm for the arts, his mature ethics are an attempt to ground
meaning in life in something beyond this kind of escapism. Rather than try to avoid suffering,
we should “turn into it,” as it were. Embrace the suffering and the challenges it presents. One of
Nietzsche’s best-known aphorisms is: “Whatever does not kill me makes me stronger.” And that
which makes me stronger, should be valued.
In some of Nietzsche’s best-known works, he praises the “Übermensch” [“overman,” or “aboveman,”]. This mysterious character surpasses the herd-like mediocrity of those around him and
becomes a new type of person, eager to defy conventional norms and passive conformity. The
Übermensch attains a “will to power” not through the domination over others, but through selfmastery. He (or “she,” although Nietzsche was in fact quite sexist) lives by his own rules,
embraces every challenge as a chance to become better and stronger, as someone who reshapes
social values rather than succumbs to them. Much of Nietzsche’s condemnation of Christianity
stems from revulsion at the thought of people submissively resigning themselves to their lowly
positions. It’s not the meek who shall inherit the earth, or those who beg forgiveness for their
inherent wretchedness, but rather those willing to “recreate values” and blaze their own trails.
His is not an ethic of being “nice” or “kind,” or seeking happiness – although this is not to say
that Nietzsche advocates “being mean to people” or that we should actively try to make
ourselves miserable. We should be hard on ourselves, but this does not mean we should live in
endless masochism. Rather, life is to be eagerly embraced in all its glory, pain, and difficulty;
life is to be affirmed.
2. Eternal Recurrence
Another one of Nietzsche’s ideas that has been widely misunderstood is his concept of the
eternal recurrence, according to which all events in history will continue to occur over and over
again unchanged in an endless loop for all eternity. The common misunderstanding is to think
that Nietzsche is making a prediction about how things will play out from now until infinity. But
a more plausible interpretation of the doctrine of the eternal recurrence is that we should live our
lives such that we would be eager to have them replayed over and over again until eternity. This

is say, it’s not so much a view about how things will be as it a view about how we should live.
Live at all times in a way you would want to recur again and again from now until eternity.
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Nietzschean Aphorisms
I am the first German to have mastered the aphorism, and aphorisms are a form of eternity. It is
my ambition to say in ten sentences what everyone else says in a whole book – what
everyone else does not say in a whole book. (Twilight of the Idols, “Skirmishes of an
Untimely Man,” Sec. 51)
Man is a rope fastened between animal and superman – a rope over an abyss. (Thus Spoke
Zarathustra, “Zarathustra’s Prologue,” Part I, Sec. 4)
He who fights with monsters should look to it that he does not become a monster himself. And if
you gaze long into the abyss, the abyss gazes back into you. (Beyond Good and Evil,
“Epigrams and Entra’actes,” 146)
Art is the supreme task, the truly metaphysical activity in this life. (The Birth of Tragedy,
foreword to “Richard Wagner.”)
Even gods can’t escape boredom. (The Antichrist, Sec. 48)
Isn’t life a hundred times too short to be bored? (Beyond Good and Evil, “Our Virtues,” Section
227)
The objective of all human arrangements is through distracting one’s thoughts to cease to be
aware of life. (Untimely Meditations, “Schopenhauer as Educator,” Section 227)
Haste is universal because everyone is in flight from himself. (Untimely Meditations,
Schopenhauer as Educator,” Section 5)
Christianity is a romantic hypochondria for those unsteady on their feet. (Notebook 10, Autumn
1887, 127)
The Kingdom of Heaven is a condition of the heart – not something that comes “upon the earth”
or “after death.” (The Antichrist, Sec. 39)
St. Luke 18 verse 14 improved – He that humbleth himself wishes to be exalted. (Human, All
Too Human, “On the History of Moral Sensations,” Section 87)
I am not a man, I am dynamite. (Ecce Homo, “Why I Am a Destiny,” Sec. 1)
My formula for human greatness: amor fati, love your fate. Want nothing different, neither
backward or forward for all eternity. Not just to tolerate necessity – but to love it… (Ecce
Homo, “Why I Am so Clever,” Section 10)
God is dead; but given the way of men, there may still be caves to thousands of years in which
his shadow will be shown. – And we – we still have to vanquish his shadow, too. (The Gay
Science, Book III, sec. 108)

God is dead! God remains dead! And we have killed him. How shall we comfort ourselves, the
murderers of all murderers? What was holiest and mightiest of all that the world has yet
owned has bled to death under our knives: who will wipe this blood off us? What water is
there for us to clean ourselves? What festivals of atonements, what sacred games shall we
have to invent? Is not the greatness of this deed too great for us? Must we ourselves not
become gods simply to appear worthy of it? (The Gay Science, Book III, sec. 125)
Is man God’s mistake, or is God man’s mistake? (Twilight of the Idols¸”Epigrams and Maxims,”
sect. 7)
Become what you are. (The Gay Science, Book III. Sec. 270)
Man is a bridge, not a goal. (Thus Spoke Zarathustra, “Zarathustra’s Prologue,” Part I, Sec. 4)
No one can construct for you the bridge on which you must cross the stream of life, no one but
you alone. (Untimely Meditations, “Schopenhauer as Educator,” Sect. 1)
Life itself is will to power. (Beyond Good and Evil, “On the Prejudices of Philosophers,” Sec.
13)
Live dangerously! Build your cities on the slopes of Vesuvius! (The Gay Science, Book IV,
Section 283)
To give birth to a dancing star one must first have chaos within. (Thus Spoke Zarathustra,
“Zarathustra’s Prologue,” Part 1, Sec. 5)
We want to be poets of our life – first of all in the smallest most everyday matters. (The Gay
Science, Book IV Sec. 299)
What doesn’t kill me makes me stronger. (Twilight of the Idols, Epigrams and Maxims, Sec. 8)
He who has a why? in life can tolerate almost any how? (Twilight of the Idols, (Epigrams and
Maxims, Sec. 12)
Man does not strive for happiness; only the Englishman does that. (Twilight of the Idols,
Epigrams and Maxims, Sec. 12)
One should take a bold and dangerous line with existence; whatever happens, we’re bound to
lose it. (Untimely Medications, “Schopenhauer as Education,” Sec. 1)
How can a man know himself? He is a thing dark and veiled, and if the hare has seven skins,
man can slough off seventy times seven and still be able to say: “this is really you, this is no
longer outer shell.” (Untimely Meditations, “Schopenhauer as Educator,” Sec. 1)
No victor believes in chance. (The Gay Science Book III, Sec. 258)

The advantage of a bad memory is that one can enjoy the same good thing for the first time
several times. (Human, All Too Human, “Man Alone with Himself,” Sec. 580)
Virtue no longer meets with any belief; its attraction has disappeared. Someone would have to
think of way of marketing it afresh, perhaps as an unusual form of adventure and excess.
(Notebook 9, Autumn 1887, 135)
Some men have sighed over the abduction of their wives, but more over the fact that nobody
wished to abduct them. (Human, All Too Human, “Woman and Child,” Section 388)
Even if the existence of a metaphysical world were demonstrated, it is certain that knowledge of
it would be as useless as knowledge of the chemical composition of water to a shipwrecked
sailor. (Human, All Too Human, “Of First and Last Things,” Sec. 9)
Without music, life would be a mistake. Germans even imagine God singing songs. (Twilight of
the Idols, “Epigrams and Maxims,” 33)
Deutschland, Deutschland, uber Alles,” I’m afraid that was the end of German philosophy.
(Twilight of the Idols, “What the Germans Lack,” Sec. 1)
For even if I am bad German, I am at all events a very good European,” (Letter to his mother,
August 1886)
To live alone one must be an animal or a god, says Aristotle. But you can be both – a
philosopher. (Twilight of the Idols, “Epigrams and Maxims,” Sect. 3)
Today’s philosophers want to enjoy the divine principle of incomprehensibility. (Daybreak,
Book V, Sec. 544)
Mystical explanations are considered deep, the truth is they are not even shallow. (The Gay
Science, Book III, Sec. 126)
Philosophy offers an asylum to a man into which no tyranny can force its way, the inward cave,
the labyrinth of the heart – and that annoys the tyrants. (Untimely Meditations, “Schopenhauer as
Educator,” Sec. 3)
Thoughts are the shadows of our feelings – always darker, emptier, simpler. (The Gay Science,
Book III, Sec. 179)
The Socratic equation: reason = virtue = happiness was opposed to all the instincts of the earlier
Greeks. (Twilight of the Idols, “The Problem of Socrates,” sec. 4)
You repay a teacher badly by becoming merely a pupil. (Ecce Homo, Foreword, sect. 4)

How to ruin a youth: instruct him to hold in high esteem only those who think like him.
(Daybreak, Book IV, Sec. 297)
Morality is herd instinct in the individual. (The Gay Science, Book III, Sec. 116)
Every one who has ever built a “new heaven” only mustered the power he needed trough his own
hell. (On the Genealogy of Morality, Essay 3, Sec. 10)
No one talks more passionately about his rights than he who in the depths of his soul doubts
whether he has any. (Human, All Too Human, “Man Alone with Himself,” Sec. 597)
Possession usually diminishes the possession. (The Gay Science, Book I, Sec. 14)
One possesses one’s opinions the way one possesses fish – insofar, that is, that one possesses a
fishpond. One has to go fishing and be lucky – then one has one’s own fish, one’s own opinions.
I am speaking here of living fish. Others are content to possess a cabinet of stuffed fish – and in
their heads, convictions. (Human, All Too Human, Book IV, “The Wanderer and His Shadow.”)
Convictions are more dangerous enemies of truth than lies. (Human, All Too Human, “Man
Alone with himself,” Sec. 483)
People live in an age of corruption are witty and slanderous, they known that there are other
kinds of murder than by dagger or assault, they also know that whatever is well said is believed.
(The Gay Science, Book I, Section 23)
The most perfidious way of harming a cause consists of defending it deliberately with faulty
arguments. (The Gay Science, Book III, Sec. 191)
Without cruelty there is no festival: thus the longest and most ancient part of human history
teaches – and in punishment there is so much that is festive! (On the Genealogy of Morality,
Essay 2, Sec. 6)
To see other suffer does one good, to make others suffer even more. (On the Genealogy of
Morality, Essay 2, Sec. 6)
The distinction that lies in being unhappy (as if to feel happy were a sign of shallowness, lack of
ambition, ordinariness) is so great that when someone says, “But how happy you must be!” we
usually protest. (Human, All Too Human, “Man Alone with Himself,” Sec. 534)
For those who need consolation no means of consolation is so effective as the assertion that in
their case no consolation is possible: it implies to great a degree of distinction that they at once
hold up their heads again. (Daybreak, Book IV, Sec. 380)
Sex: the thorn and stake of all body-despisers for it mocks and makes fools of all teachers…
Sex: the slow fire on which the rabble are stewed in lust…
Sex: innocent and free for free hearts…

Sex: I shall fence my thoughts and my heart so pigs and pilfered not break in… (Thus Spoke
Zarathustra, Part III, “On the Three Evils,” Sec. 2)
The state wants men to render it the same idolatry they used to render the church. (Untimely
Meditations, “Schopenhauer as Educator,” Sec. 4)
Everything the state says is a lie, and everything it has it has stolen. (Thus Spoke Zarathustra¸
Part I, “On the New Idol”)
State is the name of the coldest of all cold monsters. Coldly it lies; and this lie slips from its
mouth: “I, the state, am the people.” (Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Part I, “On the New Idol”)
Philosophy, so far as I have understood it and lived it so far, is living freely in ice and high
mountains. (Ecce Homo, Preface, Section 3)
Even the most beautiful scenery is no longer assured of our love after we have lived in it for
three months, and some distant coast attracts our avarice. (The Gay Science, Book I, Sec. 14)
Never trust a thought that occurs to you indoors. (Ecce Homo, “Why I Am so Clever,” Sec. 1)
There are no moral phenomena, only moral interpretations of phenomena. (Beyond Good and
Evil, “Epigrams and Entr’actes,” Sec. 108)
The fact that something happens regularly and predictably does not mean that it happens
necessarily. (Notebook 9, Autumn 1887, 91)
The irrationality of a thing is no argument against it – rather a condition of it. (Human, All Too
Human, “Man Alone with Himself,” Sec. 515)
There are no facts, only interpretations. (Notebooks, Summer 1886 – Autumn 1887, Sec. 91)
Overwork, inquisitiveness and compassion – our modern vices. (Notebook 9, Autumn 1887, Sec.
141)
It is the misfortune of active men that their activity is almost always a bit irrational. For
example, one must not enquire of the cash-amassing banker what the purpose for his restless
activity is: it is irrational. Active people roll like a stone, conforming to the stupidity of
mechanics. (Human, All Too Human, “Tokens of Higher and Lower Culture,” Sec. 283)
Today as always, men fall into two groups: slaves and free men. Whoever does not have twothirds of his day for himself is a slave, whatever he may be: a statesman, a businessman, an
official, or a scholar. (Human, All Too Human, “Token of Higher and Lower Culture,” Sec. 283)
Whoever lives for the same of combat has an interest in the enemy staying alive. (Human, All
Too Human, “Man Alone with Himself,” Sec. 531)

Only those with very large lungs have the right to write long sentences. (“Rules of Writing” set
out to Lou Salomé)
Thoughts in a poem. The poet presents his thoughts festively, on the carriage of rhythm: usually
because they could not walk. (Human, All Too Human, From the Souls of artists and Writers,”
Sec. 189)
The waters of religion are ebbing away, leaving swamps and stagnant pools; the nations are
drawing away from each other in the most hostile fashion, longing to tear each other to pieces.
(Untimely Meditations, “Schopenhauer as Educator,” Sec. 4)
If it is true that the forest are going to get thinner, might time come when libraries should be
used for firewood? Since most books are born out of smoke and vapor of the brain, maybe they
should return to that state. If they have no fire in them, fire should punish them for it. (Untimely
Meditations, “Schopenhauer as Educator,” Sec. 4)
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49.
THE NEW FUNDAMENTAL FEELING: OUR FINAL CORRUPTIBILITY.—In
former times people sought to show the feeling of man's greatness
by pointing to his divine descent. This, however, has now
become a forbidden path, for the ape stands at its entrance,
and likewise other fearsome animals, showing their teeth in a
knowing fashion, as if to say, No further this way! Hence people
now try the opposite direction: the road along which humanity
is proceeding shall stand as an indication of their greatness and
their relationship to God. But alas! this, too, is useless! At the far
end of this path stands the funeral urn of the last man and gravedigger (with the inscription, Nihil humani a me alienum puto).
To whatever height mankind may have developed—and perhaps
in the end it will not be so high as when they began!—there is as
little prospect of their attaining to a higher order as there is for
the ant and the earwig to enter into kinship with God and
eternity at the end of their career on earth. What is to come will
drag behind it that which has passed: why should any little star,
or even any little species on that star, form an exception to that
eternal drama? Away with such sentimentalities!
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79.
A PROPOSAL.—If, according to the arguments of Pascal and
Christianity, our ego is always hateful, how can we permit and
suppose other people, whether God or men, to love it? It would
be contrary to all good principles to let ourselves be loved when
we know very well that we deserve nothing but hatred—not to
speak of other repugnant feelings. “But this is the very Kingdom
of Grace.” Then you look upon your love for your neighbour as
a grace? Your pity as a grace? Well, then, if you can do all this,
there is no reason why you should not go a step further: love
yourselves through grace, and then you will no longer find your
God necessary, and the entire drama of the Fall and Redemption
of mankind will reach its last act in yourselves!
80.
THE COMPASSIONATE CHRISTIAN.—A Christian's
compassion in the presence of his neighbour's suffering has
another side to it: viz. his profound suspicion of all the joy of his
neighbour, of his neighbour's joy in everything that he wills and
is able to do.

[083]
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82.

Book II.
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104.
OUR VALUATIONS.—All actions may be referred back to
valuations, and all valuations are either one's own or adopted,
the latter being by far the more numerous. Why do we adopt them?
Through fear, i.e. we think it more advisable to pretend
that they are our own, and so well do we accustom ourselves to
do so that it at last becomes second nature to us. A valuation
of our own, which is the appreciation of a thing in accordance
with the pleasure or displeasure it causes us and no one else,
is something very rare indeed!—But must not our valuation of
our neighbour—which is prompted by the motive that we adopt [101]
his valuation in most cases—proceed from ourselves and by our
own decision? Of course, but then we come to these decisions
during our childhood, and seldom change them. We often
remain during our whole lifetime the dupes of our childish and
accustomed judgments in our manner of judging our fellow-men
(their minds, rank, morality, character, and reprehensibility), and
we find it necessary to subscribe to their valuations.
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114.
ON THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE SUFFERER.—The state of sick men
who have suffered long and terribly from the torture inflicted upon
them by their illness, and whose reason has nevertheless not been in any
way affected, is not without a certain amount of value
in our search for knowledge—quite apart from the intellectual
benefits which follow upon every profound solitude and every
sudden and justified liberation from duties and habits. The man
who suffers severely looks forth with terrible calmness from
his state of suffering upon outside things: all those little lying
enchantments, by which things are usually surrounded when
seen through the eye of a healthy person, have vanished from
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the sufferer; his own life even lies there before him, stripped of
all bloom and colour. If by chance it has happened that up to
then he has lived in some kind of dangerous fantasy, this extreme
disenchantment through pain is the means, and possibly the only
means, of extricating him from it. (It is possible that this is
what happened to the Founder of Christianity when suspended
from the Cross; for the bitterest words ever pronounced, “My
God, My God, why hast Thou forsaken Me?” if understood in
their deepest sense, as they ought to be understood, contain the
evidence of a complete disillusionment and enlightenment in
regard to the deceptions of life: in that moment of supreme
suffering Christ obtained a clear insight into Himself, just as in
the poet's narrative did the poor dying Don Quixote.)
The formidable tension of the intellect that wishes to hold
its own against pain shows everything that one now looks upon
in a new light, and the inexpressible charm of this new light
is often powerful enough to withstand all the seductiveness of
suicide and to make the continuation of life seem very desirable
to the sufferer. His mind scornfully turns to the warm and
comfortable dream-world in which the healthy man moves about
thoughtlessly, and he thinks with contempt of the noblest and
most cherished illusions in which he formerly indulged. He
experiences delight in conjuring up this contempt as if from the
depths of hell, and thus inflicting the bitterest sufferings upon his
soul: it is by this counterpoise that he bears up against physical
suffering—he feels that such a counterpoise is now essential! In
one terrible moment of clear-sightedness he says to himself, “Be
for once thine own accuser and hangman; for once regard thy
suffering as a punishment which thou hast inflicted on thyself!
Enjoy thy superiority as a judge: better still, enjoy thine own will
and pleasure, thy tyrannical arbitrariness! Raise thyself above
thy life as above thy suffering, and look down into the depth of
reason and unreason!”
Our pride revolts as it never did before, it experiences an
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incomparable charm in defending life against such a tyrant as
suffering and against all the insinuations of this tyrant, who
would fain urge us to give evidence against life,—we are taking
the part of life in the face of this tyrant. In this state of mind
we take up a bitter stand against all pessimism in order that it
may not appear to be a consequence of our condition, and thus
humiliate us as conquered ones. The charm of being just in our
judgments was also never greater than now; for now this justice
is a triumph over ourselves and over so irritated a state of mind
that unfairness of judgment might be excused,—but we will not
be excused, it is now, if ever, that we wish to show that we need
no excuse. We pass through downright orgies of pride.
And now appears the first ray of relief, of recovery, and one
of its first effects is that we turn against the preponderance of
our pride: we call ourselves foolish and vain, as if we had
undergone some unique experience. We humiliate ungratefully
this all-powerful pride, the aid of which enabled us to endure
the pain we suffered, and we call vehemently for some antidote
for this pride: we wish to become strangers to ourselves and to
be freed from our own person after pain has forcibly made us
personal too long. “Away with this pride,” we cry, “it was only
another illness and convulsion!” Once more we look longingly
at men and nature and recollect with a sorrowful smile that now
since the veil has fallen we regard many things concerning them
in a new and different light,—but we are refreshed by once more
seeing the softened lights of life, and emerge from that fearfully
dispassionate daylight in which we as sufferers saw things and
through things. We do not get angry when we see the charms
of health resume their play, and we contemplate the sight as if
transformed, gently and still fatigued. In this state we cannot
listen to music without weeping.

.
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149.

[162]

LITTLE UNCONVENTIONAL ACTIONS ARE NECESSARY!—To act
occasionally in matters of custom against our own better
judgments; to yield in practice while reserving our own
intellectual liberty; to behave like everybody else and thus
to show ourselves amiable and considerate to all, to compensate
them, as it were, even if only to some extent, for our
unconventional opinions—all this among many tolerably liberalminded men is looked upon not only as permissible but even
as “honourable,” “humane,” “tolerant,” and “unpedantic,” or
whatever fine words may be used to lull to sleep the intellectual
conscience. So, for example, one man, although he may be an
atheist, has his infant baptized in the usual Christian fashion;
another goes through his period of military service, though he
may severely condemn all hatred between nations; and a third
runs into the Church with a girl because she comes from a
religious family, and makes his vows to a priest without feeling
ashamed of it. “It is of no importance if one of us does what
every one else does and has done”—so says ignorant prejudice!
What a profound mistake! For nothing is of greater importance
than that a powerful, long-established, and irrational custom
should be once again confirmed by the act of some one who is
recognised as rational. In this way the proceeding is thought to
be sanctioned by reason itself! All honour to your opinions! but
little unconventional actions are of still greater value.

Book III.

143

163.
AGAINST ROUSSEAU.—If it is true that there is something
contemptible about our civilisation, we have two alternatives: of
concluding with Rousseau that, “This despicable civilisation is
to blame for our bad morality,” or to infer, contrary to Rousseau's view,
that “Our good morality is to blame for this contemptible civilisation.
Our social conceptions of good and evil, weak and effeminate as they
are, and their enormous influence over both
body and soul, have had the effect of weakening all bodies and souls
and of crushing all unprejudiced, independent, and self-reliant men,
the real pillars of a strong civilisation: wherever we still find the evil
morality to-day, we see the last crumbling ruins of these pillars.” Thus
let paradox be opposed by paradox! It is quite impossible for the truth
to lie with both sides: and can we say, indeed, that it lies with either?
Decide for yourself.
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251.
STOICAL.—The Stoic experiences a certain sense of cheerfulness
when he feels oppressed by the ceremonial which he has
prescribed for himself: he enjoys himself then as a ruler.

[243]

252.
CONSIDER.—The man who is being punished is no longer he who
has done the deed. He is always the scapegoat.
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262.

THE DEMON OF POWER.—Neither necessity nor desire, but the
love of power, is the demon of mankind. You may give men
everything possible—health, food, shelter, enjoyment—but they
are and remain unhappy and capricious, for the demon waits and
waits; and must be satisfied. Let everything else be taken away
from men, and let this demon be satisfied, and then they will
nearly be happy—as happy as men and demons can be; but why
do I repeat this? Luther has already said it, and better than I have
done, in the verses:

“And though they take our life,
Goods, honour, children, wife,
Yet is their profit small,
These things shall vanish all,
The Kingdom it remaineth.”
The Kingdom! there it is again!
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370.
TO WHAT EXTENT THE THINKER LOVES HIS ENEMY.—Make it a rule never
to withhold or conceal from yourself anything that may be [291]
thought against your own thoughts. Vow it! This is the essential
requirement of honest thinking. You must undertake such a
campaign against yourself every day. A victory and a conquered
position are no longer your concern, but that of truth—and your defeat
also is no longer your concern!
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475. BECOMING HEAVY.—You know him not; whatever weights he
may attach to himself he will nevertheless be able to raise them all
with him. But you, judging from the weak flapping of your own
wings, come to the conclusion that he wishes to remain below,
merely because he does burden himself with those weights.

477.
FREED FROM SCEPTICISM.—
A. Some men emerge from a general moral scepticism badtempered and feeble, corroded, worm-eaten, and even partly
consumed—but I on the other hand, more courageous and
healthier than ever, and with my instincts conquered once more.
Where a strong wind blows, where the waves are rolling angrily,
and where more than usual danger is to be faced, there I feel
happy. I did not become a worm, although I often had to work
and dig like a worm.

B. You have just ceased to be a sceptic; for you deny!
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484.
GOING OUR OWN WAY.—When we take the decisive step, and make
up our minds to follow our own path, a secret is suddenly revealed to
us: it is clear that all those who had hitherto been friendly to us and
intimate
terms
with
us
judged
themselves
on
to be superior to us, and are offended now. The best among them
are indulgent, and are content to wait patiently until we once more
find the “right path”—they know it, apparently. Others make fun
of us, and pretend that we have been seized with a temporary
attack of mild insanity, or spitefully point out some seducer. The
more malicious say we are vain fools, and do their
best to blacken our motives; while the worst of all see in us their
greatest enemy, some one who is thirsting for revenge after many years
of dependence,—and are afraid of us. What, then, are we
to do? My own opinion is that we should begin our sovereignty
by promising to all our acquaintances in advance a whole year's
amnesty for sins of every kind.

A. But why this solitude?
B. I am not angry with anybody. But when I am alone it
seems to me that I can see my friends in a clearer and rosier light
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522.
WISDOM WITHOUT EARS.—To hear every day what is said about
us, or even to endeavour to discover what people think of us, will
in the end kill even the strongest man. Our neighbours permit us
to live only that they may exercise a daily claim upon us! They
certainly would not tolerate us if we wished to claim rights over
them, and still less if we wished to be right! In short, let us offer
up a sacrifice to the general peace, let us not listen when they
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556.
THE FOUR VIRTUES.—Honest towards ourselves, and to all and
everything friendly to us; brave in the face of our enemy;
generous towards the vanquished; polite at all times: such do the
four cardinal virtues wish us to be.
[387]
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567.
IN THE FIELD.—“We should take things more cheerfully than they
deserve; especially because for a very long time we have taken
them more seriously than they deserved.” So speak the brave
soldiers of knowledge.

568.
POET AND BIRD.—The bird Phœnix showed the poet a glowing
scroll which was being gradually consumed in the flames. “Be
not alarmed,” said the bird, “it is your work! It does not contain
the spirit of the age, and to a still less extent the spirit of those
who are against the age: so it must be burnt. But that is a good
sign. There is many a dawn of day.”

[393]
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573.
CASTING ONE'S SKIN.—The snake that cannot cast its skin
perishes. So too with those minds which are prevented from
changing their views: they cease to be minds.

574.
NEVER FORGET!—The higher we soar the smaller we appear to
those who cannot fly.

575.

[395]

WE AERONAUTS OF THE INTELLECT.—All those daring birds that
soar far and ever farther into space, will somewhere or other
be certain to find themselves unable to continue their flight,
and they will perch on a mast or some narrow ledge—and will
be grateful even for this miserable accommodation! But who
could conclude from this that there was not an endless free space
stretching far in front of them, and that they had flown as far as
they possibly could? In the end, however, all our great teachers
and predecessors have come to a standstill, and it is by no means
in the noblest or most graceful attitude that their weariness has
brought them to a pause: the same thing will happen to you and
me! but what does this matter to either of us? Other birds will
fly farther! Our minds and hopes vie with them far out and on
high; they rise far above our heads and our failures, and from
this height they look far into the distant horizon and see hundreds
of birds much more powerful than we are, striving whither we
ourselves have also striven, and where all is sea, sea, and nothing
but sea!

Book V.
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And where, then, are we aiming at? Do we wish to cross
the sea? whither does this over-powering passion urge us, this
passion which we value more highly than any other delight?
Why do we fly precisely in this direction, where all the suns of
humanity have hitherto set? Is it possible that people may one
day say of us that we also steered westward, hoping to reach
India—but that it was our fate to be wrecked on the infinite? Or,
my brethren? or—?

***END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE
DAWN OF DAY***
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Study Guide: 6. Nietzsche
Describe Nietzsche’s criticism of Pascal and Christianity in general in section 79. What, exactly,
is the criticism?
Give an example of the kind of “valuation” Nietzsche might be thinking of in section 104.
Section 114 provides a glimpse of Nietzsche’s own sufferings, and an early attempt of his to
express some of the ideas that later become sloganized in the “will to power.” How do the
metaphors of “accuser and hangman” and “superiority as a judge,” express Nietzsche’s
perspective on suffering?
What are the two alternative ways of making sense of our “contemptible civilization” described
in section 163? What does Nietzsche find contemptible about our civilization?
Comment on the “demon of mankind” criticized in section 262.
The “essential requirement of honest thinking,” as Nietzsche describes it in section 370, is what?
Is he right? Would he say honest thinking is an obligation? Why not just think whatever you
want – what’s the harm?
What is the “decisive step” of section 484? In your view, do many people take this decisive
step? Is there a discrepancy between people who might say they’ve taken the step from those
who actually have taken it?
In one of Nietzsche’s best-known books, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, the hero character goes away
by himself for years. In some of the passages in these sections, Nietzsche gives some hints as to
why Zarathustra may have gone away. What do you think?
Nietzsche’s list of the “four virtues” may seem surprising in light of his scathing critiques of
Christianity, given that there would seem to be similarities between Nietzsche’s list and some
vaunted Christian values? Comment on similarities and differences.
Snakes that cannot cast their skins are like…. what?

Aristotelian Syllogisms

Aristotle, public domain image, available at:
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Aristotle_Altemps_Inv8575.jpg

The great Greek philosopher Aristotle (384 to 322 B.C.E.) studied at Plato’s Academy and went
on to be one of the most influential and creative philosophers of all time. Among his many,
extraordinary accomplishments, Aristotle invented what we now know of as logic, the study of
good reasoning. Aristotle distinguished between good reasoning and bad reasoning by analyzing
simple argument forms called syllogisms. Syllogisms are short arguments with two premises
and a conclusion. Here’s a standard example:
All humans are mortal.
Socrates is a human.
Therefore, Socrates is mortal.
The first premise, “All humans are mortal,” states a general claim. In this case, it states a general
claim about humans. The second premise, “Socrates is a human,” that ties something particular
(Socrates) to the general type of thing that is the subject of the first premise (humans). These two
premises, taken together, imply the conclusion that Socrates is mortal.
Another one of Aristotle’s great innovations in logic was the distinction between theoretical and
practical reasoning. Theoretical reasoning is aimed at figuring out how the world is, so to speak.
The Socrates syllogism above is an instance of theoretical reasoning, because it is about the way
humans are. It is based on a fact about humans, we might say. Practical reasoning, on the other
hand, is based on what ought or should be done. The “ought” here refers not only to moral or
ethical reasoning, but anything we’re trying to decide on doing. “I ought to watch that next
episode of _______,” I might think to myself, “because I enjoyed the last episode a lot.” That
sort of deciding and reasoning is also practical. As for theoretical reasoning, Aristotle thought
practical reasoning worked by means of syllogisms. Here is one of his examples:
Premise 1, “Major Premise”: Adultery is to be avoided.
Premise 2, “Minor Premise”: This act (I’m considering) would be an act of adultery.
Conclusion: Therefore, I ought to avoid this. (In other words, “I ought not to do this,” or “I
should not do this,” or doing this would be wrong).
The first premise, “Adultery is to be avoided” states a general ethical or moral principle, that is,
some broad statement or generalization indicating that certain types of actions ought or ought not

to be done. The same point can be stated in different ways: “Adultery ought not be done,” “One
should not commit adultery,” or “Adultery is wrong.” These are all different ways of indicating
that a certain kind of action is okay or not okay to do, permissible or impermissible, justifiable or
unjustifiable, or something similar.
The second premise, “This act would be adultery” states a more specific or particular detail that
makes the general principle relevant to the present circumstances. It links the first premise to the
issue the deliberating agent is trying to figure out in the moment.
Taken together, these two premises imply a specific conclusion about what should or should not
be done.
I find that as a teaching tool, it is useful for students to construct Aristotelian syllogisms. One
way it is useful is that stating the general principle justifications rely on helps clarify issues.
Often in life, we might have a vague sense that it would be wrong or okay to do a certain thing,
but without further reflection, we might have difficulty explaining why. Stating these principles
directly often helps us get clear on whether an action is or is not wrong. Another way
Aristotelian syllogisms can be helpful is that often when two people disagree about the rightness
or wrongness of some action, articulating relevant syllogisms can help zero in on what, exactly,
they are disagreeing about. For example, using Aristotle’s syllogism about adultery above, we
can see that some people might disagree with the first (major) premise. Or, perhaps more likely,
two people might be disagreeing about whether a certain action would count as adultery. (After
all, the boundaries of what constitutes adultery or not are not entirely obvious – there are
disputable borderline cases.)
Here’s a couple other examples.
It is wrong to deliberately escape a legally imposed punishment if one has implicitly agreed to
obey the city’s laws. (One of the principles relevant to Socrates’ reasoning in the Crito.)
By breaking out of jail and fleeing his death sentence, Socrates would be violating a legally
imposed punishment.
Therefore, Socrates would be wrong to break out of jail.
One should not worry about things that are out of one’s control. (One of the most fundamental
ideas in Stoicism.)
One’s physical appearance is out of one’s control
Therefore, one should not worry about one’s own physical appearance.

PHI 171 – Ethics Cases 1 – You Decide – Anti-Social Security
Shotgun Microphone 2 by Juhele

Background: Aristotelian Ethical Syllogisms
The great moral philosopher Aristotle (384 – 322 B.C.E.), a student of Plato and philosophical
descendent of Socrates, thought that moral reasoning and in fact all practical reasoning uses
simple argument forms called “syllogisms.” Here is one of Aristotle’s examples:
Premise 1: Adultery is to be avoided.
Premise 2: This act (the act I’m thinking about doing) would be an act of adultery.
Conclusion: Therefore, I ought not do this.
The first premise, “Adultery is to be avoided” states a general ethical principle or proposition. It
makes a claim about what ought to be done, morally speaking. We could state the same idea in
different ways, e.g. “Adultery is wrong,” or “One ought not to commit adultery.” Moral
principles tell us what we ought to do and ought not to do, or what it would be right to do or
wrong to do, rather than describing some fact about the world. (Most people, I think, would
agree with Aristotle as regards his claim about the wrongness of adultery.)
The second premise, “This act would be adultery” states a more specific or particular detail that
makes the general principle relevant to the present circumstances. It asserts that a particular act
is an instance of the type of behavior mentioned in the first premise.
Lastly, the “therefore” claim (the “conclusion”) puts the first two premises together and draws
the logical conclusion from their combination. Thus, Aristotelian syllogisms, like all syllogisms,
involve two premises followed by a conclusion. If the syllogism captures good reasoning, the
conclusion “follows logically” or is “implied” or “entailed” by the two premises take together.
The Case: Anti-Social Security
Hypothetically, would it be unethical to place a security firm’s lawn signs around my front yard
even though I have not installed its security system? These fake “caveats” would discourage
intruders, and the security firm would get free advertising for its product. So who’s hurt?
(submitted to the The New York Times “Ethics Guy” Column by James Morgan, New Brunswick,
NJ)
Randy Cohen, Be Good: How to Navigate the Ethics of Everything (San Francisco, CA:
Chronicle Books, 2012), p. 40.
Assignment:

State an Aristotelian syllogism that would ethically justify using the company’s yard sign
without installing the security system. (The conclusion will be something like “I may use this
firm’s yard sign in my front yard.”)
State a different Aristotelian syllogism showing that it would be wrong to use the company’s
yard sign without installing the security system. (The conclusion will be something like “I may
not use this firm’s yard sign in my front yard.”)

PHI 171- Ethics Cases 2 – You Decide – Framing
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Many psychological findings show the importance of what is called “framing.” Briefly, the
framing effect refers to the way our impressions, views, and opinions are often shaped not just be
the relevant facts, but the way the facts are presented or “framed.” Often, the framing involves
placing the facts in a kind of story or explanation: a broader narrative context or theory about
things, people and events.
Examples:
In one study, 93% of PhD students registered early for classes when a penalty free for late
registration was emphasized, whereas only 67% did so when prices were described as a discount
for early registration.1 In another study, people were found more likely to choose meat presented
as “75% lean” than meat presented as “25% fat”.2
Framing is obviously of important in many ethical contexts. A non-hypothetical and tragic
example of the framing effect concerns the deaths that occurred in Mississippi’s prisons late
December. In the Clarion Ledger, former governor Phil Bryant is quoted attributing the prison
problems to gang activity: "Phil Bryant, Mississippi’s outgoing governor, on Monday blamed
gangs operating inside the prison system, saying prisons are difficult to manage “under the best
of circumstances.”3 Bryant spoke specifically about the infamous Mississippi State Penitentiary
at Parchman, and it is no doubt true that gang activity was an important factor in the inmates’
deaths. However, Bryant’s framing of the issue overlooks the fact that in 2014, Bryant and state
legislators slashed funding for the prisons and diverted much of the funding to tax cuts for
wealthy Mississippians.
Read the following:
https://www.propublica.org/article/trump-hailed-mississippi-prison-reforms-national-model-butthe-numbers-reflect-grimreality?fbclid=IwAR2cgAxgdAgc8Mj_SYIo5Ljpp_GYhbJOujJFo5j0jmbadqxrQNncjv9hzXw

1

Gächter, S. et al. (2009). “Are experimental economists prone to framing effects? A natural field experiment”.
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 70(3): 443-46.
2
Revlin, R. (2012). “Chapter 11: Solving Problems,” in Cognition: Theory and Practice. New York, Worth
Publishers.
3
Amy J. and Pettur, E. W. (2020). “Foretold ‘uprising’ hits cash-starved Mississippi prisons,” Associated Press, Jan.
7.
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I am an African American male looking for Web programming work. When I used my
ethnically identifying first name on my resume, I got few calls for job interviews. Now I use my
middle name instead, and I’ve been getting more interviews. My resume is accurate about my
education and experience. Is it wrong to change my first name to conceal my ethnicity?
(submitted to the The New York Times “Ethics Guy” Column by Malik Raymond, Brooklyn, NY)
Randy Cohen, Be Good: How to Navigate the Ethics of Everything (San Francisco, CA:
Chronicle Books, 2012), p. 162.
Formulate two Aristotelian syllogisms, one with the conclusion that it would be wrong for this
applicant to change his first name to conceal his identity, and another that concludes that the
name change would be permissible.
There is strong empirical evidence showing that discrimination against people with “ethnicsounding” names occurs and does so in a variety of contexts. Job applications are one context: a
well-known field experiment conducted by the National Bureau of Economic Research found
that, “Job applicants with white names needed to send about 10 resumes to get one callback;
those with African-American names needed to send around 15 resumes to get one callback.”
(See Bertrand and Mullainathan, “Are Emily and Greg More Employable than Lakisha and
Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination,” 2003, available at
https://www.nber.org/papers/w9873.). Other studies of job applications have found even larger
disparities. A different, more recent, study found discrimination on the basis of names in the
selection of interns. “A résumé audit study with more than 11,500 applications reveals that
employers are… less likely to respond to applicants with black-sounding names and when the
applicant is more distant from the firm.” (See Jaeger, Nunley, Seals and Wilbrandt, “The
Demand for Interns,” 2020, available at
http://www.djaeger.org/research/wp/DFI_NBER_WP.pdf). Another study showed differential
success in obtain federal research grant funds on the basis of the ethnicity of the applicant’s
name. (See Ginther, Schaffer, Schnell, Masimore, Liu, Haak, and Kington, “Race, Ethnicity, and
NIH Awards”, 2011, Science 333: pp. 1015-1019.). Such discrimination also occurs in rental
markets, loan applications, and housing sales.

PHI 171 – Ethics Cases 4 – You Decide – The Benevolent Lie
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While in general, lying is wrong, most people recognize that under certain conditions – perhaps
only fairly rare circumstances - lying is the right thing to do. Standard examples of justified lies
are cases in which a lie is necessary to save someone’s life. Imagine one is living in Nazi
Germany, and the Germans are going door-to-door rounding up Jews to ship off to concentration
camps where they will likely be killed. Suppose a homeowner is hiding Jews in a secret attic
upstairs. If the Nazis come knocking and ask if there are Jews inside, isn’t lying to them the
right thing to do? (Lying might of course put the homeowner at some risk, but that’s a different
issue.)
People have a tendency to rationalize lying when it is done for less noble reasons, of course. But
how about other kinds of lies intended for the benefit of others? Are these all permissible?
Consider the following case, drawn from a well-known article by philosopher Tom Hill.
The Case: The Benevolent Lie
A college professor had a student he was tutoring. The student began showing signs of severe
and suicidal depression. The student was later found dead, but the circumstances were
ambiguous, and the death could be seen as either suicide or an accident. The professor helped to
gather up the boy’s belongings to return to his mother, and no suicide note was found. But the
mother, a devout Roman Catholic, was deeply worried about her son’s soul, and she asked the
professor point blank whether he had any reason to suspect suicide. The professor, an atheist,
wanted to comfort her and so, by a quite deliberate lie, he assured her that as far as he knew, the
boy had been in good spirits. Was the lie justified?
Thomas E. Hill, Jr. (1984) “Autonomy and Benevolent Lies.” The Journal of Value Inquiry, 18,
pp. 251-267.
Assignment:
State an Aristotelian syllogism that would ethically justify the professor’s lie to the mother. (The
conclusion will be something like “This lie was the right thing to do.”)
State a different Aristotelian syllogism showing that the professor’s lie was wrong. (The
conclusion will be something like “This lie was the wrong thing to do.”)

PHI 171 - Ethics Cases 5 – You Decide - The Housing Allowance1
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Wilson Mutambara, a native of Rambia, gets hired by NewCom after earning a Master’s of
Business Administration in the U. S. NewCom transfers Mutambara to his home city, the capital
of Rambia, to work in a newly opened office. Much of the housing in the capital is of poor
quality and unsafe, so NewCom gives its Rambian employees up to $2,000 housing allowance so
they can live in safe parts of town and in a style appropriate to the company’s image. In order to
claim the housing allowance, NewCom’s employees must turn in receipts, and every month
Mutambara submits an itemized statement for $2,000 from his landlord. However, NewCom
discovers that Wilson is actually living with relatives; the receipts are fraudulent.
When his deceit is discovered, Mutambara defends himself by arguing, “Every other
NewCom employee in Rambia receives $2,000 a month. If I live economically, why should I be
penalized? I should receive the same as everyone else.” When his supervisor points out that the
allowance is also to uphold the company’s image and that Wilson’s housing is “unseemly,”
Mutambara protests that “I’m not just a NewCom employee; I’m also a Rambian… it’s insulting
to be told that the area I grew up in is ‘unseemly’ or inappropriate for a company employee” (p.
568). He is using the housing allowance to help pay school fees for eight nieces and nephews.
Assignment:
State an Aristotelian syllogism that would ethically justify Mutambara’s deceitful claiming of the
housing allowance. (The conclusion will be something like “It is ethically permissible for
Mutambara to turn in the fraudulent receipts.”)
State a different Aristotelian syllogism showing that it would be wrong for Mutambara to turn in
the fraudulent receipts. (“It is ethically wrong for Mutambara to turn in the fraudulent receipts.”)

1

Shaw, W., and Barry, V. (2010). Moral issues in business. 11th ed. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, pp. 568-569.
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Tik Tok is a video-sharing app used by hundreds of millions of users around the world. The
product is owned by ByteDance, a company headquartered in Beijing, China. According to
recent reporting by The Intercept, based on some internal company documents obtained from the
company, Tik Tok’s corporate moderators were to told suppress posts by users who were “too
ugly, poor, or disabled for the platform.” In addition, moderators were instructed to censor
several kinds of political speech, including posts that hurt “national [Chinese] honor” or that
criticized “state organs such as the police.” Users posting illicit political posts were also banned
from the platform.
Unacceptable political materials included livestreamed military movements, videos that
“defamed civil servants,” and other content deemed threatening to “national security.” Videos
showing poverty conditions, slums, beer bellies and other images of overweight people were
suppressed, as were pictures of people with crooked smiles, unattractive faces, and more serious
deformities. One document told moderators to check for “disreputable decorations,” cracked
walls, and peeling paint in users’ homes and to narrow the audiences of such users. The
company set up sophisticated computer algorithms to scan for offending videos.
A different company document describes how various physical, bodily and environmental
characteristics deemed “too unattractive” were scanned to prevent the offending videos from the
special “For You” section of the app, where select Tik Tok videos were funneled to a vast
audience. The list of unattractive features includes “ugly facial looks,” “dwarfism,” “too many
wrinkles” and various other “low quality traits.” The stated rationale for such manipulation was
that undesirable users could “decrease the short-term new user retention rate,” and thus limit the
product’s popularity. The company also padded users’ feeds with content from “shadow
accounts” operated by company employees posing as regular users, and it held regular coaching
sessions with key “influencers” advising them how to insure their posts stayed clear of the
company’s automated filters. The company also downloaded popular Instagram posts and
reshared them on Tik Tok to maintain a steady supply of appealing content.
While a corporate spokesman interviewed by The Intercept claimed that the policy of
suppressing videos featuring unattractive, disabled, or poor users was no longer in effect, sources
indicate it was in effect until at least late 2019.
On the face of it, the ethics of such screening practices are somewhat complicated. While
screening out posts of unattractive and poor people offends most peoples’ sense of justice and
fairness, and the company actively hides its use of such tactics from users, one can also argue
that social networking companies have a right to promote their own products in various ways, as
companies have traditionally done through various forms of advertising and media. What makes

social networking companies distinctive, however, is the extent to which the value of their
products depends on active participation and contributions from users.
Formulate two Aristotelian syllogisms, one with the conclusion that Tik Tok’s screening of the
unattractive is wrong, and another showing that it is ethically permissible.
(1Derived from S. Biddle, P. V. Ribeiro, and T. Dias, “Invisible Censorship,” The Intercept
(March 15), accessed at https://theintercept.com/2020/03/16/tiktok-app-moderators-usersdiscrimination/, last accessed 3/31/20).
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Our master’s degree program in public policy requires students to devise solutions to a real-life
policy problem – this year, the crisis in military recruitment and retention. The best paper will
be forwarded to the Department of Defense. We students oppose the war in Iraq and the
military’s rejection of gay recruits, and see each as a cause of the recruitment problem. Is it
ethical to require us to participate in an exercise aimed at assisting an institution whose policies
we morally oppose?
(submitted to the The New York Times “Ethics Guy” Column by H. V. Singleton and A. Kasdan,
Cambridge, MA)
Derived from Randy Cohen, Be Good: How to Navigate the Ethics of Everything (San Francisco,
CA: Chronicle Books, 2012), p. 152.
Formulate two Aristotelian syllogisms, one with the conclusion that the students’ participation in
the exercise can be required, and another that concludes it would be wrong to require the
students’ participation.

PHI 171 – Ethics Cases 8 – You Decide – Whistleblowing
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Socrates’ main argument against escaping from jail and avoiding his impending execution is
based on what we might call his “Principle of Obedience”. As he phrases it in the Apology: “For
wherever a man's place is, whether the place which he has chosen or that in which he has
been placed by a commander, there he ought to remain in the hour of danger; he should not
think of death or of anything but of disgrace.” In other words, one’s duty is to obey, come
what may. A similar idea comes up in the Crito, of course, where the basic argument is that
Socrates must not try to escape and disobey his death sentence imposed by Athens, since “he
agreed to be governed by [his fellow citizens] in word and in deed.” (52d). Again, his obligation
is to obey the laws he agreed to obey.
Does that mean Socrates would always disapprove of whistleblowers?
“Whistleblowing” refers to the act of disobeying laws, employment policies, or agreements by
releasing non-public information for the sake of the public good. Unlike ordinary journalists or
reporters, whistleblowers are not simply giving people new information about what is going on.
Rather, by their releasing of non-public documents, plans, or other details, whistleblowers are
acting in a seemingly disloyal way. They are violating the directives of a superior, or
commander, or in some cases, violating the law. Whistleblowing differs from other kinds of
protect or civil disobedience in that it involves a disclosure of non-public information. Rosa
Parks’ sitting on the bus in Montgomery was a violation of a Montgomery city ordinance, but it
did not involve disclosure of non-public information or documents.
Daniel Ellsberg is arguably the best-known American whistleblower of the last century. After
earlier in his career serving as military analyst, Ellsberg came across a top-secret Pentagon Study
while working for the RAND Corporation, a giant U. S. Defense Department contractor. The
study detailed how Presidents Johnson, Kennedy, Nixon, and other high-ranking officials had
systematically lied to the American public about the Vietnam War. It showed that while the war
was going on in the 1960s and 1970s, top officials recognized that the war was unwinnable. Yet
rather than stop the war, again and again they tried to reassure the public of eventual victory and
ramped up U.S. troop involvement and resource commitment. The result was the needless loss
of thousands of American lives, vast amounts of money, and untold Vietnamese casualties.

Image 2: "Daniel Ellsberg" by ALA - The American Library Association is
licensed under CC BY-NC-SA 2.0

In 1971, while the war was still going on, Ellsberg shared what came to be known as the
“Pentagon Papers” with The New York Times. The paper published a first installment before
further publication was halted for several days by means of a court order obtained by the Nixon
administration. Ellsberg then leaked the documents to The Washington Post, and soon
afterwards the Supreme Court decreed that the documents could be freely published. (The Post’s
important role in the affair is the subject of a recent movie, The Post, starring Tom Hanks and
Meryl Streep.)
Days later, Ellsberg publicly revealed that he was the source of the documents. In defending his
decision, Ellsberg said:
“I felt that as an American citizen, as a responsible citizen, I could no longer cooperate in
concealing this information from the American public. I did this clearly at my own jeopardy and
I am prepared to answer to all the consequences of this decision.”1
The Pentagon Papers played a crucial role in turning public opinion against the war. Ellsberg
has continued an active public life, often voicing support for other political causes and other
whistleblowers. Those Ellsberg has supported include Julian Assange, founder of WikiLeaks,
which revealed American War crimes in Iraq, Private Chelsea Manning, who provided Assange
with classified video of U.S. helicopter gunships killing Iraqi civilians, and Edward Snowden,
who revealed the top-secret surveillance programs of the NSA (National Security
Administration).
Assignment:
Is there any way to reconcile Socrates’ principle of obedience with instances of justified
whistleblowing? Does Socrates say or do anything that might imply justified whistleblowing?
Would he think Ellsberg acted wrongly in releasing the Pentagon Papers?

1

"The Pentagon Papers". 1971 Year in Review. UPI. 1971. Accessed January 23, 2020. See also Ellsberg’s
extensive commentary in the 1974 documentary, Hearts and Minds,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v0DTs6edZjs, especially from 1:17:00 on. Accessed January 23, 2020.
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When I asked to be excused from jury duty, the judge berated me for leaving my civic duty to the
“poor.” I did not oppose her diatribe, but I make good money and feel it’s more efficient for
society if I work, pay taxes, support charities, and leave jury duty others. Isn’t this like leaving
other essential functions – trash pickup, policing, dentistry – to others? Alternatively, couldn’t I
defer service to a less onerous period, like retirement?
(submitted to the The New York Times “Ethics Guy” Column by “name withheld,” San
Francisco, CA.)
Randy Cohen, Be Good: How to Navigate the Ethics of Everything (San Francisco, CA:
Chronicle Books, 2012), p. 76-77.
Assignment:
State an Aristotelian syllogism that would ethically justify The Reluctant Juror’s preference to be
excused from jury duty because of his or her contributions to the tax base and charities, deferring
jury service until retirement. (The conclusion will be something like “It is ethically permissible
for people who contribute to society in other ways to try to be excused from jury duty.”)
State a different Aristotelian syllogism showing that it would be wrong for the Reluctant Juror to
try to be excused from jury duty.

PHI 171 – Ethics Cases 10 – You Decide – The Death Penalty
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What is commonly called the “death penalty” or “capital punishment” is the practice of
government-authorized executions (putting people to death) as punishment for crimes. In the
majority of countries around the world, the death penalty is illegal or is used only rarely. In
every country in the European Union and in England it is outlawed. However, the death penalty
is practiced regularly in four of the most populated countries in the world, namely, China, India,
Indonesia and the United States.
In the United States, capital punishment is legal in the majority of states (31), including
Mississippi and other southern states, although it is illegal in 19 states and the District of
Columbia. Since 1976, U.S. federal and state governments have executed over 1,400 people. In
a 1972 U.S. Supreme Court decision, in a case titled “Furman v. Georgia,” the Court ruled that
the death penalty violated the legal prohibition of “cruel and unusual punishment” found in the
8th Amendment to the U. S. Constitution and was therefore illegal. The Court’s basis for this
decision was evidence that the death penalty had been used in “arbitrary” and discriminatory”
ways. However, in 1976 The Supreme Court ruled that the death penalty could be used so long
as safeguards were put in place to prevent its arbitrary application. In the U.S., the death penalty
is an option only for “crimes against the state” such as treason or espionage and for “aggravated
murder,” that is, murder which is made worse by some additional factor.
Perhaps not surprisingly, there are large sex and racial differences in who gets executed in the
United States. Since its re-institution in 1976, only about 1 percent of people executed have been
women. While African Americans constitute about 12% of the U. S. population, over 34 percent
of those executed since 1976 have been black. Statistics also show that African Americans
convicted of killing a white person are much more likely to be executed than whites convicted of
killing African Americans.
In a Pew Research Poll conducted in 2018, 54% of Americans said they are in favor of the death
penalty for people found guilty of murder, while 39% said they were opposed. The same poll
showed that while the majority of whites favor the death penalty (59%), it is supported only by
36% of blacks and 47% of Hispanics.1 Men also tend to be more approving of capital
punishment than women.
Ethical Justification – Pro and Con
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Because capital punishment necessarily involves something that is in and of itself is very bad –
intentional killing of another human being – its ethical justification is not obvious. Philosophers
customarily distinguish between two kinds of arguments used to justify the death penalty. One
of these arguments is based on consequentialism, the view that actions are ethically justified
when their overall effects on everyone are best. Consequentialist support for the death penalty is
often expressed using the term “deterrence.” Even though the death penalty is clearly very
harmful to the person being executed, many people think these bad effects are morally
outweighed by the benefits to society that result. One benefit is so-called “special deterrence”:
the death penalty prevents the executed person from committing any more crimes. The death
penalty is also often thought to provide “general deterrence”: it discourages others in society
from committing similar crimes. The consequentialist case for deterrence is therefore that the
good that comes from these two kinds of deterrence more than balance out the harms the death
penalty causes.
A very different kind of argument for the death penalty is often expressed with the biblical
injunction of “an eye for an eye” (Exodus 21:24; Leviticus 24:20, Deuteronomy 19:21), or in
Latin, the lex talionis. The basic idea here is that justice requires that murderers receive the fate
they have inflicted on others: death. In other words, the death penalty the best way of giving
killers what they deserve.
People who oppose the death penalty are often referred to as “abolitionists.” Abolitionists tend
to disagree with both of the pro-death penalty arguments given above and also add additional
arguments against the practice. According to abolitionists, the main difficulty with
consequentialist deterrence-based arguments is that they have the facts wrong. There is no good
empirical evidence that the death penalty deters criminals, despite countless studies by social
scientists trying to establish the link. For example, murder rates are often unchanged before and
after states start using the death penalty.2 Neither do studies show that people have less
inclination to do terrible things when threatened with execution rather than mere life
imprisonment. Most criminals either do not think they will be caught or they do not think about
what will happen if they are.
Abolitionists typically respond to the “eye for an eye” point by simply denying that murderers
deserve to die for their crimes. There are various ways of making this point. Some simply
counter with the maxim that “two wrongs don’t make a right.” If murder is bad and wrong, how
does killing the killer makes things then all right again? Also, for a wide range of crimes, we
make no attempt to punish according to an “eye for eye.” We do not punish rape by raping
rapists, we do not punish robbery by robbing from the robbers, etc., etc. For that matter, few
people have objections in principle to allowing plea bargains, pardons, reduced sentences for
good behavior, and other ways of departing from strict demands of lex talionis. So what makes
killing murderers such a demand of justice?
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Two other important abolitionist arguments are worth mentioning briefly. One is sometimes
called the “inconsistency” argument: this is the idea that it is inconsistent and thus wrong for
governments to insist both that killing human beings is wrong and that punishing by killing is
morally justified. “Wrong is wrong,” an abolitionist might say. A defender of capital
punishment might respond to this by pointing out that actually very few people believe that
killing is wrong under all circumstances. Standard examples of justified killings include selfdefense and justified war (which is itself a kind of self-defense). To this point, an abolitionist
might counter that the issue of self-defense is irrelevant. The death penalty is not needed for
self-defense, since life imprisonment works just as well.
A different abolitionist tactic is to appeal to the fact that capital punishment is likely to put
innocent people to death, and in all likelihood, it has already done so, perhaps many, many times.
Given the fact that many people have been shown to be innocent and wrongfully convicted after
years or decades spent in jail, it is difficult to believe the list of the wrongfully convicted persons
does not include at least a few people who were executed. Death penalty advocates sometimes
respond to this by pointing out that sometimes evidence of guilt is overwhelming. Sometimes
this is true, of course, but often people are convicted of murder on rather flimsy and
circumstantial evidence. The fact that sometimes the evidence is irrefutable does not mean that it
always is.
In this connection, think about the recent tragic saga of Curtis Flowers. Mr. Flowers is an
African American man from Mississippi who has been tried six times for the heinous killing of
four people at a furniture store in Winona. Four of these trials ended in convictions, but these
four convictions were overturned on appeal. The first two were overturned by the Mississippi
Supreme Court due to the prosecutor’s misconduct. (The Prosecutor for five of the six trials is a
white man, Doug Evans, who has consistently sought the death penalty for Flowers.). Two other
trials ended in mistrials. In June 2010, a majority white jury convicted Flowers and sentenced
him to death in his sixth trial. This verdict was eventually overturned by the U. S. Supreme
Court in June 2019 due to racial bias in jury selection. In December 2019, Flowers was released
for the first time since his original arrest on $250,000 bond. All and all, he has served over 20
years on death row at Parchman prison and despite his past failures, it is possible that Prosecutor
Evans will try Flowers a seventh time.
Throughout, the evidence against Flowers has been shaky. While the bullets used in the killing
were of the same caliber as a gun stolen from a car near the crime, no direct evidence has ever
connected Flowers to the gun or the gun to the crime. While witnesses claim to have seen
Flowers near the store before the killing, there are also reasons to doubt the veracity of the
witnesses. Other witnesses who later claimed Flowers confessed to the murders in jail turned out
to be lying. The only other reasons for suspecting Flowers in the first place were that he had
been fired from the store 13 days prior to the murders, supposedly he owed one of the owners
$30 for a cash advance on his paycheck, and there were a couple other bits of inconsequential
circumstantial evidence. The whole affair was covered extensively in an award-winning podcast
series, In the Dark, Season 2, by American Public Media.3
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PHI 171 – Ethics Cases 11 – You Decide – Fair Pay
Shotgun Microphone 2 by Juhele

When I hire local teenagers to do odd jobs – weeding, hauling boxes – I pay about what they’d
earn at a fast-food restaurant. I pay adults doing similar work at least twice as much and add a
hefty tip, since they have families and basic living expenses. It’s not the money but the message;
I don’t want the teens to think this sort of labor might provide a lucrative career. Is this pay
inequality ethical?
(submitted to the The New York Times “Ethics Guy” Column by Joan Hess, Fayetteville, AK)
Randy Cohen, Be Good: How to Navigate the Ethics of Everything (San Francisco, CA:
Chronicle Books, 2012), p. 166.
Formulate two Aristotelian syllogisms, one with the conclusion that it would be wrong to pay
teenagers and adults differently for what is essentially the same work, and another showing that
such pay inequality is morally permissible. Critically comment: which of the arguments is
more compelling, and why?

PHI 171 – Ethics Cases 12 – You Decide – Genetic Enhancement
Shotgun Microphone 2 by Juhele

What are commonly called “genetic modifications” are deliberate changes to the genetic material
(DNA) of organisms to somehow change or improve their functioning. In some of its forms,
genetic modification has been occurring for thousands of years and is ethically uncontroversial.
Consider, for example, agricultural cross-fertilization and breeding practices aimed at increasing
crop yields and improving plant resistance to disease. However, recent scientific developments
have brought on the very real possibility of much more sudden and controversial ways of
changing the genetics of plants and animals alike.
To a certain extent, scientists have been directly manipulating the genetic material of select
plants and animals already over the past couple of decades. So-called “GMO” (genetically
modified organism) crops now include tomatoes that are more resistant to freezing temperatures,
which was accomplished by insertion of genetic material from a fish (a winter flounder).
Scientists have also created potatoes that do not bruise and apples that do not brown. Thousands
of acres of Mississippi cropland features GMO corn engineered to be resistant to “Roundup”
pesticide, so farmers can douse their fields with Roundup and the corn will survive, and most soy
grown in the U.S. is now GMO as well. Scientists have engineered a goat that produces silk in
its milk and sheep whose milk can be used to treat cystic fibrosis. Yeast and bacteria have been
modified to help make insulin which is then used to treat people with Type 1 diabetes.
So-called “genetic enhancement” offers the promise of more radical changes still. While it is
difficult to draw a sharp conceptual distinction between “modification,” and “enhancement,” the
intuitive idea is whereas modifications involve repairing defects and removing vulnerabilities,
enhancements are ways of making organisms function even better-than-normal. Genetically
enhanced humans, for example, could potentially be smarter, more attractive, or longer living.
Or perhaps it will be possible to change people such that they are more gifted artistically, or
better at math, or have better memories. The possibilities seem endless, especially given new
“CRISPR-cas9” technology. CRISPR was developed using the ability of some bacteria to keep
parts of the DNA from viruses that infect them. (CRISPR, last accessed 2/10/20).
But what about the ethics of genetic enhancement? To some extent, the ethics of possible
practices like this are difficult to assess confidently, since many important as-of-yet-unknown
details will greatly shape future ethical debates. For example, it matters a great deal whether the
genetic enhancements being considered are done to children, who are too young to legally give
informed consent, or to adults who are better equipped to understand potential risks and benefits.
It also matters a lot whether the enhancements affect only individuals given the genetic
treatments directly or whether, through changes made to the human germline, the children of
those who have been genetically enhanced would also have the enhancements.

Even given such uncertainties, however, it is worth sketching some important arguments that
have been made on both sides of this ethical debate. In terms of the arguments for enhancement,
the main point that is made is that if indeed it is possible to make humans better, particularly if
this can be accomplished in ways that make human life better for us all, then it seems worth
doing, subject to appropriate precautions and safeguards. One might also add that given the
almost-certain availability of the technology, it seems unlikely that humans can somehow
collectively prevent it from being used, at least on small scales. Genetic enhancement is bound
to start happening whether we want it or not, so the best we can hope for is to put systems in
place to shape its use for good rather than ill. Sticking our heads in the sand and merely hoping
we do not have to confront these issues is unrealistic.
Two of the most common arguments against genetic enhancement are what we might call the
“naturalness” argument and the “playing God” argument. The naturalness argument can be
rendered like this:
Premise: It is wrong for humans to deliberately change what is biologically “natural” to them.
Premise: Genetic enhancement deliberately changes what is biologically natural.
Therefore, genetic enhancement is wrong.
The “playing God” argument is very similar, in fact, pretty much just a more theological version
of the same thought:
Premise: It is wrong for humans to deliberately “Play God.” (Only God can legitimately “play
God.”)
Premise: Genetic enhancement involves “playing God.”
Therefore, genetic enhancement is wrong.
There are two main problems with both arguments, and in both cases, the problems involve the
first premises. The first problem is that the divide between what is natural and unnatural, or
playing God vs. not playing God, is far from clear. So much of the way we live now has been
shaped by technological advances, cultural changes, changes in the food supply, lifestyle and so
forth, exactly what is “natural” any more and what is not? What counts as “Playing God” and
what does not? But perhaps the bigger problem is that much that seems in one sense “unnatural”
or “playing God” seems not wrong at all. When surgeons perform emergency surgeries to save
the lives of people with ruptured appendices, this is not something our ancestors five thousand
years ago did. Does that mean such life-saving surgeries are wrong? Surely not. When
battlefield doctors decide which soldiers to treat and which to allow to die because the odds of
saving their lives are so slim, the doctors are in a sense “playing God” in helping determine
which soldiers live and which die. But that is exactly what is needed to save the most lives,
which is obviously a good thing, is it not?
Recently, Harvard philosopher Michael Sandel has offered subtle and thoughtful ethical
arguments against genetic enhancement. It is difficult to summarize Sandel’s arguments
concisely, but the main thought turns on the idea that viewing life as a gift is a very important
moral attitude. The desire to genetically enhance ourselves and our children stems from our
problematic desire to control and dominate everything. These desires are a product of some of

the worst aspects of American culture: our hyper-competitiveness, our need for mastery, and the
moral narrowness of thinking we are actually making people more valuable by making them
smarter, taller, prettier, or what have you. Parents, for example, should view their children as
gifts and blessings, not as sets of abilities to be maximized for useful purposes. Quoting Sandel
directly:
The bigger stakes are of two kinds. One involves the fate of human goods embodied in important
social practice–norms of unconditional love and an openness to the unbidden, in the case of
parenting; the celebration of natural talents and gifts in athletic and artistic endeavors; humility
in the face of privilege, and a willingness to share the fruits of good fortune through institutions
of social solidarity. The other involves our orientation to the world that we inhabit, and the kind
of freedom to which we aspire. ..But changing our nature to fit the world, rather than the other
way around, is actually the deepest form of disempowerment. It distracts us from reflecting
critically on the world, and deadens the impulse to social and political improvement. Rather than
employ our new genetic powers to straighten ‘the crooked timber of humanity,’ we should do
what we can to create social and political arrangements more hospitable to the gifts and
limitations of imperfect human beings…1
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PHI 171 – Ethics Cases 13 – You Decide – Drones and Targeted Killings
––
Shotgun Microphone 2 by Juhele

As a result of the terrorist attack against the United States on September 11, 2001, the US
military ramped up development of a lethal force of aerial drones. Fleets of American unmanned
aerial vehicles (UAVs) stationed around the globe have become the weapons-of-choice against
known and suspected terrorists in a number of countries. The program to hunt down and take out
terrorists was first revealed to the American public in 2013. It was made public by a government
whistleblower, as reported in the book, The Assassination Complex, by Jeremy Scahill along
with reporters for the intercept.com website.
The book and subsequent coverage by the news media generated concern about the way the US
government was deciding which of the reported 460,000 people, suspected as terrorists by the
CIA and the military, were being added to the list of potential drone targets. A panel of national
advisors is responsible for selecting those to be added to the kill list, sometimes reportedly listing
individuals who had merely drawn the attention of authorities by their posts on social media.
The President is ultimately responsible for signing off on their fate as clear and imminent threats
to American lives.
At the time, one of those names belonged to an American citizen, Anwar al-Awlaki. Legal
experts noted that he was not being accorded due legal process, including the right to stand trial
for his alleged activities. In October of 2011, he was killed by a drone strike in Yemen. Two
weeks later, his son, Abdulrahman al-Awlaki, who was also a US citizen but not on a kill list,
also died in a US drone strike against someone else, thus becoming collateral damage in the war
on terrorism.
While scores of intended targets have been killed, so have hundreds of innocent victims,
according to the Bureau of Investigative Journalism.
Aside from Constitutional and moral questions raised by the drone program, a Defense
Department task force has concluded that, rather than killing terrorists, it would be preferable to
capture them along with any matériel. Furthermore, many US commanders have been quoted as
saying drone attacks have led to increasingly radicalized terrorists and the recruitment of new
members to their ranks.
(*case description adapted from “Cases for the Twenty-First Intercollegiate Ethics Bowl
National Championship,” available at
https://usuphilosophy.files.wordpress.com/2017/01/2017_cases_for_nationals.pdf, prepared by
Robert Boyd Skipper (Committee Chair), Peggy Connolly, RuthAnn Althaus, Robert A. Currie,
and Heidi Malm, Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-

NoDerivatives 4.0 International License. © 2016 Robert Skipper, Peggy Connolly, RuthAnn
Althaus, Robert Currie, and Heidi Malm.)
Let us suppose the President acts based on information provided through the CIA via a
particular informant in the middle East indicating that a certain US citizen, living in Afghanistan,
is associated with a known terrorist group. The suspected terrorist is not given a criminal trial,
nor is there evidence that as of yet, this person has violated any U.S. laws. Is the President
justified in ordering a drone bombing attack on a house in which this target is reported to be
staying? Bear in mind that others, who may or may not be associated with the suspected terrorist
(such as children or spouses), are quite likely to be in the house as well.
Construct two Aristotelian syllogisms, one showing that the President would be justified in
ordering a drone attack on this house, and another showing that the President would not be
justified in ordering such an attack.

PHI 171 – Ethics Cases 14 – You Decide – Famine Relief
Shotgun Microphone 2 by Juhele

This case –at least the specific version of it discussed below – is from a famous philosophical
paper published in 1972: “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” Peter Singer, Philosophy and
Public Affairs, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 229-243.
Singer’s article was inspired by a crisis in Bengal (near India). Millions of people were dying
due to a famine produced by a drought. The thrust of Singer’s argument is that those of us
capable of doing something to relieve this suffering, at least to some degree or other, have an
obligation to do so. The basic reasoning can be nicely captured in an Aristotelian syllogism:
1) People (morally) ought to reduce others’ suffering so far as they can, provided they do not
sacrifice anything of comparable moral importance.)
2) Most individuals in the west (e.g. United States) can do things (e.g., make significant financial
contributions) that would relieve the suffering of famine victims in Bengal without sacrificing
anything of comparable moral importance.
3) Thus, most individuals in the west morally ought to (are morally obligated to) make such
contributions.
The above reasoning is simple and elegant.
One might make various objections to it, however. One might, for example, argue that although
it would be quite nice of someone to donate to relieve Bengali suffering, Americans and other
westerners have no moral obligation to do so. Singer’s response is simply to deny that this is
merely a matter of niceness, as opposed to an issue of genuine obligation. He argues that the fact
that these people are in Bengal (far away) rather than nearby, makes no moral difference. (He
admits that the case may feel differently psychologically, but this makes no moral difference.
It’s easier to forget about those who are far away, but this makes no difference as to whether or
not it is okay to do so.) Consider, by analogy, someone who walks by a shallow neighborhood
pond and notices a small child drowning in the pond. Surely, he argues, everyone will admit that
to ignore the child’s plight, to walk on by and do nothing, would be shameful wrongdoing.
(Imagine one only has to wade into the water up to the knees.) So what’s the moral difference
with Bengal? In both cases, helping out costs us relatively little, and yet could make a huge
difference to the well-being of those we help. (We could save someone’s life for the price of a
few cups of Starbucks coffee!) Surely there’s an obligation to do something if we can.
A different objection imagines that while there is an obligation to do something, it is not my
obligation. Rather, it’s the obligation of our government, or rich Americans, or Bengali
immigrants to the United States. However, Singer argues that the fact that others may also have
obligations to help does not get me off the moral hook. Unless others are relieving the suffering
entirely – and they’re not, far from it! – it is still an obligation of mine to do what I can. (By
analogy, the fact that other bystanders who see the child drowning in the pond are not doing

anything does not lessen my obligation to do what I can.) And most of us (college professors,
for example) could give a lot: hundreds or thousands of dollars’ worth, and the sacrifice to
ourselves would be a few less Starbucks coffees, or something on the same moral level.
Thus, Singer argues, most of us not only have such obligations in response to the suffering of
others, at home and abroad, but that also, most of us fail to fulfill these obligations regularly and
in rather dramatic ways.
It seems clear that if Singer is right about the obligations, then most of us fall short. But is there
such an obligation? Make a direct argument against Singers’ conclusion, e.g., by challenging
one or more of the premises in his argument. Then respond to your own objection, and explain
whether or not your first point is a serious objection to Singer. (Compelling? Reasonable?)

PHI 171– Ethics Cases 15 – You Decide – Fair Play?
Shotgun Microphone 2 by Juhele

There’s obviously big money at stake in elite college sports, especially Men’s Division 1 football
and basketball. CBS/Turner pays the NCAA over a billion dollars a year to broadcast “March
Madness,” the annual men’s basketball tournament.1 In 2019, college football’s top 25 most
valuable programs are estimated to have generated a whopping $2.7 billion in total revenue for a
profit of $1.5 billion. After winning the national championship in 2018, Clemson took in a
school-record $40 million in athletic contributions alone, aside from gate receipts, broadcasting
rights fees, and merchandise sales. And it is lucrative to be a coach of such programs, especially
a head coach. A New York Times article from September 14, 2016 reported that in forty states,
the highest paid public employee is a college coach. In 2019, the highest paid state employee in
Mississippi was ex-Ole Miss football coach Matt Luke. He earned a salary of $3.1 million,
dwarfing the $122 thousand dollar salary of governor Phil Bryant.2 And salary alone is only a
share of a glamorous head coach’s annual earnings, since it excludes additional compensation
from endorsement deals, shoe contracts, speaker’s fees, and so forth.
Players – those competing on the field and on the court, the people who the fans pay to see – are
excluded from the direct financial compensation, as is required by their NCAA status as
“students athletes.” To be sure, most players earn athletic scholarships that pay for their tuition,
room and board, and the costs associated with their athletic compensation. Additionally, many
dream of careers in professional sports, and participation in college sports often gives them the
training and exposure needed to make those dreams a reality. But the number of college players
who end up with pro careers is very small – somewhere around 1% - and even many who make it
to the “next level” don’t hang around there long. For every Tom Brady or Steph Curry with a
long, lucrative tenure in the pros, there are many whose pro careers last little longer than the
proverbial “cup of coffee” in the big leagues.
Given the relatively small direct rewards college sports provides to its players, and the outsize
benefits it provides to schools, coaches, athletic administrators, television and radio networks,
etc., many argue that the situation has become unfairly exploitative of athletes. After all, high
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school prospects looking towards possible pro careers have little choice but to play college ball:
the NFL refuses to draft or try out high school players looking to bypass college. For the NFL,
college sports is effectively a free minor league system, where the most promising prospects can
hone their skills until they are intellectually and physically mature enough for the pros.
Basketball is similar, except that the NBA will now draft players as early as early as a year after
entering college. Meanwhile, colleges get to retain the bulk of the revenue the best of them
generate while there.
Make Aristotelian syllogistic arguments on both sides of the equation: an argument showing that
the current system is unfair to elite college athletes, and an argument defending the current nonpayment of college athletes as fair and permissible.

PHI 171 – Ethics Cases 16 – You Decide – Using Chinese Research
Shotgun Microphone 2 by Juhele

In the late 1940s, after Allied Forces defeated Nazi Germany and world saw for itself the
colossal horror of the death camps, attention focused on some of the research the Nazis had been
conducting on Jews and other “undesirables” (Romani, Sinti and ethnic Poles, as well as Soviet
Prisoners of War) kept in the camps. A certain number of prisoners – rather than being killed
directly – had been forced to serve involuntarily in experiments conducted by the Nazis. For
example, study subjects were placed naked in subfreezing temperatures outdoors to study the
effects of cold exposure. Some prisoners at Dachau camp were forced to sit in tanks of freezing
water to up to three hours to study the effectiveness of various reheating techniques. Others had
bones removed without anesthesia to try bone transplantation techniques. Some prisoners were
deliberately injected with jaundice or given severe chemical burns from exposure to mustard gas
to investigate the efficacy of treatment methods. Children were intentionally infected with
tuberculosis and later murdered.1 The cruelty and suffering caused by these and other shockingly
inhumane tests can scarcely be overstated.
(https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/nazi-medical-experiments)
After the war, some of the Nazi doctors were tried for their crimes against humanity at
the “Doctor’s Trial.” Worldwide revulsion led to the formulation of the Nuremberg Code of
medical ethics, perhaps the first attempt to articulate systematically ethical principles for human
subjects research. The Nuremburg Code was influential in the development of later sets of
principles, including the Helsinki Code, first drafted in the 1950s, and the 1978 Belmont Report2
in the United States. The Belmont Report formed the ethical basis of U. S. federal regulations on
human subjects research first implemented in the 1980s. Federal action was spurred by public
disclosure of the Tuskegee Syphilis study. This notorious decades-long experiment on black
men in Alabama had come to light only in the early 1970s.
One of the controversies that emerged after the war is whether or not it is ethical to use
the results from the Nazi experiments. Some people object on ethical grounds alone, arguing
that it would be unethical to use results from experiments that had been conducted unethically.
(Everyone acknowledges that the research had been performed in the most grossly unethical
ways possible.) Others refused to use the results based solely on scientific grounds, citing
inconsistencies of methodological and experimental methods that limited the scientific
usefulness of the findings. However, most scientists admitted that the data were of some
experimental value, particularly since many of the experiments could not be replicated in more
humane ways. Many scientists and ethicists have argued that it would be unethical not to use the
Nazi research, given that it has the potential to save lives. For example, Dr. John Wayward from
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the University of Victoria and University of Minnesota researcher Dr. Robert Pozos have argued
in favor of using the work. By contrast, Arnold S. Relman, editor of the prestigious The New
England Journal of Medicine from 1977 to 1991, refused to publish any study that cited the Nazi
experiments. Some of the same ethical concerns surround the use of Japanese wartime
experiments conducted to explore the effects of weapons of biological warfare.
A new version of this problem has arisen relating to recent research conducted in China.
Some leading scientific journals have begun retracting papers that use data from experiments
performed using the organs of prisoners executed in China. China alone tops the United States
in the number of executions it performs, and in contrast to the United States, many of the
executions are performed on prisoners guilty of “political” crimes of various sorts. Many
observers, particularly in the west, have objected that many of those executed are killed in
violation of their human rights. Thus, the argument in favor of retracting articles that report data
obtained by experimenting on the organs of executed Chinese prisoners is that as in the Nazi
case, it is unethical to use data that has been unethically obtained. A typical journal notice, in
this case, an “expression of concern” by the editors of Biomarkers, reads as follows:
“The Editors and Publisher of Biomarkers wish to issue an Expression of Concern for the published
article.
Yi Li, Mingli Zhu, Qiang Xia, Siyue Wang, Jiaqi Qian, Renhua Lu, Miaolin Che, Huili Dai,
Qingwei Wu, Zhaohui Ni, Bengt Lindholm, Jonas Axelsson & Yucheng Yan, Urinary neutrophil
gelatinase-associated lipocalin and L-type fatty acid binding protein as diagnostic markers of early
acute kidney injury after liver transplantation, Biomarkers, 17:4, 336-342,
https://doi.org/10.3109/1354750X.2012.672458
Concerns have been raised that the study described in the article did not adhere to ethical guidelines
as outlined in the Declaration of Helsinki and the Declaration of Istanbul and guidance from the
World Health Organization and the World Medical Association regarding the source of transplanted
human organs. Specifically, the British Medical Journal Open (BMJ Open) published an article
highlighting many papers in which there is concern that transplanted organs were harvested from
executed prisoners in China.
In response to these concerns we contacted the authors to clarify the source of the transplanted
organs received by the patients described in their study. However, despite multiple attempts to
contact the authors and their institutions, no response was received. The Editors of Biomarkers
would like to alert readers of this. We will provide an update if we receive any further information.3

Make an argument of your own either defending or disagreeing with the principle:
“it is unethical to use the results of experiments that were performed unethically.”
Your answer should be at least a solid paragraph in length. Compare with analogous
circumstances in non-scientific contexts, if you can think of any.

3

Accessed at: https://retractionwatch.com/2020/04/15/journals-have-retracted-or-flagged-more-than-40-papersfrom-china-that-appear-to-have-used-organ-transplants-from-executed-prisoners/
(Last Accessed, April 24, 2020).

PHI 171 – Ethics Case 17 – You Decide – Animal Suffering
Shotgun Microphone 2 by Juhele

Philosophers before the 20th Century were not much concerned with animal rights or animal
suffering. Schopenhauer is an interesting exception – as can be seen in the short piece of his we
read and elsewhere in his writings, he’s very sensitive to the issue of animal suffering. In AngloAmerican philosophy, Peter Singer (discussed previously as the author of “Famine, Affluence,
and Morality”) is as responsible as any one for putting the issue of animal suffering on
philosopher’s agenda. His book Animal Rights spurred a lot of interest and work in this field.
Since it was published in the 1970s, the issue of animal rights has remained a staple topic for
many collegiate “applied ethics” classes.

Image 2: “Peter Singer” by Mal Vickers is licensed by CC0 1.0 Public Domain
Dedication

Singer’s basic argument on behalf of animal rights is a straightforward and generalized version
of the principle we saw in Case 14:
People (morally) ought to reduce others’ suffering so far as they can, provided they do not
sacrifice anything of comparable moral importance.
Generalizing the principle slightly, we get this:
1. People (morally) ought to suffering reduce suffering in the world so far as they can, provided
that in so doing they do not produce an equal or greater amount of suffering elsewhere.
So think about the trade-offs most of us are making when we have a nice piece of meat for
dinner. (Americans tend to eat more animals per person and feature meat more regularly at their
meals than citizens of virtually any other country in the world.) We like the taste of meat, and
were we to substitute, say, some beans or bread or something for the meat, the meal would not be
as pleasurable. So morally speaking, what speaks in favor of eating the meat is the boost in
pleasure most of us get from meat vs. the alternative. However, meat consumption comes at a
huge cost, namely, the life of the animal we’re eating. Of course one cow or pig can be used for
many meals. But Singer’s argument is that when you add up all the pleasures we get from eating

that cow or pig compared to the pain and loss of its continued life, the moral “calculus” is that
much less suffering would occur in the world if we ate fewer animals and more beans (or wheat,
or whatever is being substituted for the meat.)
The basic argument in Singer is independent of special contexts you might think of. In these
debates, people tend to start thinking of dramatic scenarios in which they’re alone on a small
island with no other source of food (no beans, no pineapple!), and all that’s available to eat is an
animal. Then, isn’t it okay to eat the animal? Sure, says Singer, because other things being
equal, pains and pleasures of humans are in some measure more important – morally weightier –
than the pains of animals. (This is even more true if we’re talking about eating fish or shrimp
rather than cows or pigs. Chickens, perhaps, are somewhere in between. And it would be
cheating to think vegetarians don’t enjoy their meals at all – they do! – often more than
carnivores.) But Singer’s response is that the island scenario is clearly not the kind of situation
most of us are in, and so it is irrelevant. Most of us eat meat simply because we find it slightly
more pleasurable than the alternative of eating meatless. Nutritionally, vegetarianism is a
perfectly viable way to sustain oneself, particularly if one supplements plant sources of food with
Vitamin B12 and one is willing to mix in the occasional egg or slice of cheese. Protein is easy
enough to get from beans and other plant sources if one is smart about it. (On the other hand, my
niece’s “vegetarian” diet of pasta with butter and potato chips is definitely not nutritionally
sound.) And Singer need not insist that total vegetarianism is the only way we can fulfill our
moral obligations. His reasoning is gradualist, meaning that the world is better off whenever we
skip the meat and eat plants instead, even if we are not willing to live meatlessly entirely.
(Michael Pollan, author of the bestselling Omnivore’s Dilemma and other great books on food,
argues that most people can do very well nutritionally with approximately one 4 oz. serving of
meat per week. Think how many fewer animals we’d be slaughtering daily were we to live like
this!)
And there’s no doubt that humans impose tremendous suffering on animals. Industrialized
agriculture has deliberately done a good job of shielding most of us from the horrors of mass
feedlots, not to mention the incredible waste and resource use brought on by industrialized meat
production. But the suffering is there, nonetheless. Consider the following from Dominion,
Matthew Scully’s moving account of the tragedy of death in a feedlot:
Squealing hogs funnel into an area where they are electrocuted, stabbed in the jugular, then tied,
lifted, and carried on a winding journey through the plant. They are dunked in scalding water,
their hair is removed, they are run through a fiery furnace (to burn off residual hair), then
disemboweled and sliced by an army of young, usually immigrant workers…. The
electrocutors, stabbers, and carvers who work on the floor wear earplugs to muffle the
screaming.1

As Scully emphasizes, the moral cost of this mass death is not borne by the animals alone; it is
also tragic for the humans involved. He quotes a New York Times writer Charles LeDuff who
worked undercover at the meat plant for a summer. LeDuff writes, “Slaughtering swine is
repetitive, brutish work… Five thousand quit and five thousand are hired every year. You hear
1

Scully, M (2003). Dominion: The Power of Man, the Suffering of Animals, and the Call to Mercy (St. Martin’s), p.
282.

people say, ‘They don’t kill pigs in the plan, they kill people.’” He reports that the plant “reeks
of sweat and scared animal, steam and blood,” and continues:
Kill-flor work is hot, quick and bloody. The hog is herded in from the stockyard, then stunned
with an electric gun. It is lifted into a conveyor belt, dazed but not dead, and passed to a
waiting group of men wearing bloodstained smocks and blank faces. They slit the neck, shackle
the hind legs and watch the machine lift the carcass into the air, letting its life flow out in a
purple gush, into a collection trough.2

As of almost two decades ago, when Scully’s book was written, some 38 million cows and
calves were slaughtered annually in the U.S., not to mention the pigs and over 8 billion chickens.
That’s a lot of death.
Formulate an Aristotelian syllogism both for and against the consumption of meat for pleasure.
(Assume what’s at issue is not complete meat abstinence, but Americans’ tendency to include
meat as part of most meals, simply because they like eating meat.)

2

Scully (2003), p. 283.

PHI 171 Ethics Case 18 – You Decide – Paying for Voters
Shotgun Microphone 2 by Juhele

In the 2016 Presidential election, only 55.7% of Americans eighteen years or older exercised
their right to vote. That level of participation puts the US in the bottom third of the developed
countries worldwide. In non-Presidential elections, participation is lower still, dropping into the
single digits for primary races. The problem of participation is particularly evident in younger
adults. Surely, a big reason for the fact that many of our social welfare programs (social
security, Medicare) skew in favor of older Americans is that older folks are much more likely to
vote. Politicians reward those who put them in office.
Commentators frequently lament this lack of voter participation, and quite clearly, electoral
results would be more representative of US citizens’ views as a whole if electoral turnout was
greater. But what can be done? Eight states have automatic voter registration on individuals’
18th birthdays unless they opt out. Other states are considering options to make voting and voter
registration easier, although the tendency in states leaning politically right has been to make
voting harder, not easier. States are experimenting with online voting and more voting by mail.
No state has of yet made voting mandatory, however. Australia and Belgium require citizens to
vote, and Australia even imposes a $20 fine on those who fail to discharge this civic duty.
Yale Law professor Stephen L. Carter has recently proposed paying citizens to vote.1 He reasons
that perhaps this would help encourage more young people, minorities, and lower income voters
to show up at the polls. This proposal, as compared to the option of requiring voting, could be
argued to better respect citizens’ right to choose. On this other hand, it would increase the costs
of holding elections considerably, and there’s of course no guarantee that someone who is paid to
vote will vote responsibly. (Of course, there’s also no way at present of insuring that people vote
responsibly.)
Set aside the likelihood that a law paying people to vote would actually get passed. (Seem quite
unlikely, on the face of it.) Make an Aristotelian argument in favor of paying people to vote, and
an argument against it.

1

Carter, S.L (2015) “Want More Voters? Pay Them.” Bloomberg (April 2). Accessed at:
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2015-04-02/want-more-voters-pay-them (Last accessed April 29,
2020).
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Movie Assignment:
The assignment is to watch one of the movies on the list below and take a brief quiz based on
what you’ve seen. A longer, reflective essay about the movie will appear on the final exam, so
you should take good notes about the ethical message of the film, so that in preparation for the
final exam, you can review your thoughts.
1) The movie you choose to watch must be drawn from the list below. I welcome your
suggestions as to possible movies to add to the list for future sessions of the class, but for this
semester you are restricted to one of the movies from the following list.
2) The quiz is up and available on Canvas for you to take at any time. When you go to take the
movie quiz on Canvas, you will first select the movie to be quizzed on, and that selection will
populate the quiz with questions appropriate to that movie choice.
3) The quizzes are brief and time-constrained, designed not to allow you time to look up answers
on Google or something of the kind. I recommend taking the quiz within a day or so of watching
the movie, so the movie is still fresh in your mind.
4) I’ve tried to indicate the parental guidance ratings for the movie below. Please pay attention to
these. Some of the movies have extremely vulgar language that may be offensive to some.
None of the movies are exactly pornographic, but some have mild sex scenes and nudity. Some
are quite violent. However, some of the selections are more suitable for general audiences.
Please choose a movie appropriate to your comfort level.
Do the Right Thing (1989, Spike Lee)
Do the Right Thing put Spike Lee on the map as filmmaker – he produced, wrote, directed, and
stars in the film It is a comedy-drama that ends in tragedy. In sweltering summer heat on a
block in Brooklyn, NY, racial tensions rise, culminating in violence and death.
Rating: R (extremely harsh and offensive language, brief nudity, a mild sex scene, some
violence).
Blood Diamond (2006)
Blood Diamond tells part of the story of Sierra Leone’s tragic civil war and its “wealth curse,”
i.e., the coveted diamonds that people fought for, died for, and that exacerbated the country’s
political problems. It is a powerful movie, but the story it tells is a familiarly grim tale of
African exploitation at the hands of European and American whites. Leonardo DiCaprio stars as

a South African mercenary who undergoes a radical change of heart. Rating: R (strong violence
and language.
Harold and Maude (1971)
Harold and Maude is a “small,” quirky movie about a teenager obsessed with gaining his
mother’s attention and his rescue by a much-older woman. Funny, for those (such as myself)
who like slightly odd movies. Rating: G.
Hotel Rwanda (2004)
Hotel Rwanda tells the tragically true story of Paul Rusesabagina, a hotel manager who
courageously and generously put himself and his family in grave danger to help save the lives of
over a thousand innocents. Among the ravages of a brutal and hysterical genocide, there are
some who can be compassionate, even when failed on all sides by the United Nations and others
who could have done much more. The Rwandan genocide, while little thought about by most
Americans, brought out human cruelty and mass slaughter not seen since World War II.
Rusesbagina is compellingly portrayed by Don Cheadle. Rating: PG-13 (Violence and Strong
Language)
Just Mercy (2019)
Just Mercy tells the true and very moving story of Bryan Stevenson and of his first cases in
which he tried to free wrongly convicted death row inmates from execution. The centerpiece
case is that of Walter McMillan, sentenced to death on the flimsiest evidence for killing a young
white woman. Stevenson’s ultimate success catapulted him to later work with the Equal Justice
Initiative in Montgomery, AL, which recently opened the national anti-lynching museum and
monument. Stevenson is wonderfully played in the movie by Michael B. Jordan. Rating: PG
(mild language, minimal on-screen violence).

PHI 171 – Movie Assignment:
Analog film movie camera by Juhele

“Blood Diamond” (2006) Study Questions:
For over a decade beginning in the 1990s, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) fought an
insurgent rebel campaign against government forces of Sierra Leone, a small country in west
Africa. The conflict caused over 2 million people to become refugees and killed untold
thousands of innocents and combatants. Many who were captured were mutilated by having
limbs severed by machetes, and others were enslaved and forced to work in the diamond mines.
Diamonds were the chief source of financial support for the RUF, who ultimately traded them for
weapons. RUF diamonds were smuggled out of the country through Liberia and strongman
Charles Taylor, who later became a notoriously corrupt president of Liberia. These diamonds –
“Conflict Diamonds” or “Blood Diamonds” – eventually ended up in world diamond markets
where there were often bought and sold by prosperous Europeans and Americans.
This movie tells the story of a white, Rhodesian diamond smuggler named Archer, who becomes
caught up in this struggle, through a link to one of the unfortunate victims of the war, a man
named Solomon. Much of the movie focuses on how Archer and an American journalist try to
help Solomon find his kidnapped son. While Solomon ultimately succeeds, Archer’s does not
fare so well.
Rated R for violence, graphic scenes of murdered corpses and mutilations, and occasional foul
language.
Retool following paragraph:
Apparently, in October 2006, the Diamond Council tried to persuade Blood Diamond's director,
Edward Zwick, to add a disclaimer to the film citing the “Kimberley process” and noting that
Sierra Leone's civil war was long over. Zwick refused, explaining: "What I wanted to create in
their [movie-goers'] minds is consciousness," said Zwick. "A purchase of a diamond just has to
be an informed purchase. I think after seeing this movie, people will feel it incumbent upon
themselves to ask for a warranty, so as to guarantee the diamond they’re buying is not from a
conflict zone."
Questions:
Which affluent country is responsible for the diamond purchases?
When he’s caught trying to smuggle diamonds into Liberia, Archer is trying to smuggle them in
what?

The point of the RUF making blindfolded young kidnapped recruits kill someone standing at the
wall is what, would you say?
The journalist’s name is?
Solomon’s last name is ?
Where does Solomon reconnect with Jesse?
The name of the European diamond company mentioned in the film is Van de ____________?
(Kaap)
Is this company profiting from the war? If so, how?
Earlier in his life, Danny was a mercenary, meaning what, exactly?
What happened to Danny’s parents?
When asked, in a reflective moment, if he thinks people are basically good, Danny’s reply is
what?
What’s TIA?
Essay Question:
In ethical quagmires like the one depicted here, it can be difficult and controversial to say who is
responsible for the problem, and to what degree. Do western diamond companies who buy and
sell blood diamonds have an obligation to refrain from this practice, especially when they are
aware of the possibility certain diamond are blood diamonds sold by the RUF or a similar group?
Is it wrong for individual smugglers like Archer to attempt to profit from the conflict in the way
he was trying to, earlier on in the film?
Quoted from Langfitt, F. (2006) “Industry Braces for Blowback from ‘Blood Diamond,” (Oct.
20), Available at: https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=6353402 (last
accessessed May 6, 2020).

PHI 171 – Movie Assignment:
Analog film movie camera by Juhele

“Do the Right Thing” (1989) Study Questions:
Which character first says: “Do the Right Thing”?
What is the name of the owner of the pizza shop?
The stutterer’s name is?
The character who saves the child’s life by pushing him out of the path of the oncoming car.
The fledgling boycott against the pizza shop is directed at what?
Radio Rahim’s boombox is smashed up by who or what?
The trash can through the window was thrown by whom?
The message in the end, or at least the view of MLK, is what?
Who kills whom?
Essay question: In the end, there is a memorable post-riot conversation between Sal and Mookie.
While they have and show signs of some lingering hostility towards each other, there are also
hints of mutual understanding and respect. Interpret the meaning of this scene as you see it and
tie it to the larger message the film tries to convey.
Recent (April 2020) article on “Do the Right Thing” from the New York Times: Viewing Party -Do the Right Thing.
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“Harold and Maude” (1971) Study Questions:
Harold and Maude is a quirky, funny story about what happens when a rich, death-obsessed
young man has his life turned upside-down after meeting a lively septuagenarian named Maude
at a funeral. Stars Ruth Gordon, Bud Cort, and Vivian Pickles, directed by Hal Ashby.
(Available as of 4/2020 for free on Amazon Prime. No issues with dirty language, violence,
nudity or sexuality.)
Questions:
At one point in the movie, Harold estimates the number of feigned (pretended) suicides he’s
staged. How many?
Why do you think he does them (the feigned suicides)?
What ruins his Mom’s first attempt to set Harold up with a blind date she’s lined up?
At one point, Harold says he wants to be a daisy, because they are all the same. Maude’s
response is that “much of the world’s sorrow comes from people who are this (pointing at one
daisy in particular), yet allow themselves to be treated as a that (gesturing at the field broadly).”
What does she mean?
What happens to the highway motorcycle cop who tries to write Maude up for her bad driving?
Describe the first time Harold’s Mom thought he was dead. How does this incident help make
sense of his later feigned suicides?
What becomes of uncle Viktor’s attempts to turn Harold around?
What happens to Harold’s “last” blind date?
Essay: What perspective about life does Harold ultimately get from Maude? How did she
convey this perspective in her actions? In what ways does his “new, post-Maude perspective” –
what little we see of it – reflect Maude’s approach to life?
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“Hotel Rwanda” (2004) Study Questions:
Rwanda, and African country colonized by Belgium, gained its independence in 1962, following
which the country became mired in tensions and violence between the country’s Hutu majority
tribe and its Tutsi minority. Thousands of Tutsis fled into neighboring countries, and an
attempted invasion by a Tutsi rebel group out of exile resulted in civil that ended in 1993.
In 1994, the Hutu president of Rwanda was killed when his plane was shot down. Hutu
politicians blamed Tutsis for the attack. Within hours of the president’s death, loosely organized
Hutu militia groups mobilized and killed approximately 800.000 Tutsis over a span of just 100
days. Despite full awareness of what was going on, the international community, including the
United Nations (UN), did virtually nothing to stop or even slow the slaughter.
Hotel Rwanda tells the true story of one man’s courage. Paul Rusesabagina is the manager of a
Belgium-owned luxury hotel in Rwanda’s capital city of Kigali. He is good at pleasing the
hotel’s mostly white patrons and skillful at staying in the good graces of Rwandan army officers
and local businessman. Though himself a Hutu, Paul’s wife is Tutsi, making their children
mixed.
Paul’s Tutsi neighbors seek refuge in his house once the killing starts. Eventually, he bribes a
Rwanda army officer to allow him put them up at his hotel. Soon enough, over a 1,000 Tutsis
and moderate Hutus were being sheltered in the Hotel Rwanda. The UN withdrew most of its
peacekeeping force, and troops sent by foreign governments arrive only evacuate citizens from
their home countries. Through shrewd determination and courage. Paul is ultimately able to save
both his family and over 1,200 others.
For more on the genocide: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13431486
An interview with the real Paul Rusesabagina can be heard here:
https://www.npr.org/2006/04/06/5324187/paul-rusesabagina-no-ordinary-man. He also wrote a
book describing his life and his experiences during the genocide, An Ordinary Man: An
Autobiography (2006). A book written by the UN Commander (Romeo Dallaire) portrayed in the
movie, co–written with Samantha Power, is Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of
Humanity in Rwanda (2004).
The Oscar-nominated film, Hotel Rwanda, features Don Cheadle playing the role of
Rusesabagina.
Questions:

Right at the outset, the basis of Hutu resentment towards Tutsis is explained briefly. What
explanation of the resentment is given?
Who created the distinction between Hutus and Tutsis?
What’s the significance and meaning of the phrase: “cut the tall trees”?
What color hats and vests do the UN peacekeepers wear?
When the UN commander (Dallaire) tells Paul: “we think you’re dirt,” what is his point? Is that
Dallaire’s own view, do you think?
Paul saw something so revolting he made his driver promise not to tell anyone he’d seen. What
was it?
Where do Paul and Tatiana live now?
While at the beginning of the film, Paul’s allegiance lies primarily to his family. As the story
goes on, his sense of obligation to the innocents being sheltered at his Hotel seems to grow, to
the point of leaving his family to stay to help those in the Hotel. In leaving his family in this
way, did Paul do the right thing, or should his primary allegiance have remained with his family?
In 2005, largely in reaction to the Rwanda disaster, world leaders adopted a resolution called
“Responsibility to Protect” )(R2P). This resolution obligates nations to come to the assistance of
innocents in civil conflicts such as the Rwandan genocide. In 2006, the UN Security Council
passed a similar measure, Resolution 1674. What is your view on this? Do countries with the
capacity to help have an obligation to intercede in such conflicts to protect innocents? Or is this
“none of their business,” i.e., an unjustified trampling of others countries’ sovereignty?
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“Just Mercy” (2019) Study Questions:
Just Mercy tells the true story of Bryan Stevenson, an African American lawyer who’d recently
graduated from Harvard Law School, and his heroic and ultimately successful struggle to free
unjustly convicted death row prisoners in Alabama. The narrative focuses on the plight of
Walter McMillan, who was sentenced to death for the killing of a young, pretty white woman.
The main evidence against McMillan at trial was the bogus testimony of a criminal with a strong
incentive to lie. The film exposes the almost unbelievable racism and indifference to justice by
prominent whites, such as the local sheriff and D.A. Through guile and perseverance Stevenson
prevails in the end. The end of the film shows Stevenson and McMillan testifying at a U.S.
Senate hearing on the death penalty and injustices that are so often related it in our criminal
justice system.
Bryan Stevenson founded and runs the Equal Justice Initiative in Montgomery, AL.
https://eji.org/about/. One of the signature accomplishments of EJI is a national lynching
monument and nearby museum. The monument honors over 4,000 documented victims of
lynching by whites in the US. The Washington Post, NYTimes, and other prominent media
outlets have praised it for its emotional power and the elegant grace and dignity with which it
treats the legacy of lynching’s victims. (Wash Post, 4-24-18)

Bryan Stevenson speaking at the LBJ Library, photo by Laura Skelding, Public Domain.
https://www.flickr.com/photos/100836534@N04/33699094428

Questions:
What was the name of Walter McMillan’s alleged victim?
Who was strip searched and why?

When Stevenson goes to visit McMillan’s wife, who else comes out to meet him?
Why were the whites out to get McMillan?
When visiting him in prison, what does Stevenson bring McMillan from his wife?
What was Herb convicted of doing?
What caused Herb’s mental problems?
What did Darnell get arrested for?
What does Ralph Myers say about his knowledge of the killing of McMillan’s alleged victim
when he is interviewed a first time, as Stevenson discovers on tape?
What did Herb request as his last song?
How did Ralph Myers become so afraid of fire?
After Ralph Myers recounts his testimony on the witness stand, how does the judge then rule?
What show did Stevenson appear on that led to McMillan’s conviction being overturned?
One of the last lines of the movie is “we all need some measure of unmerited ________”.
What happened to Ray Hinton, McMillan’s cell mate friend? (Stevenson got him exonerated in
2015).

